Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The issue presented in this appeal was whether the right recognized in "Padilla v. Kentucky," (130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010)) is a new right that has been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review so as to enable Defendant-Appellant Shahzad Mathur to file a timely motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his guilty plea for drug trafficking. When Defendant, an alien residing in the United States, pled guilty in 2007 to conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine in 2008 and received a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment, his lawyer failed to advise him of the immigration-related consequences of his plea, such as possible deportation, telling him "not to worry" about such consequences. After pleading guilty, however, the Department of Homeland Security initiated deportation proceedings against Defendant based on his plea. Almost three years after his conviction, the Supreme Court handed down Padilla, and relying on that decision, Defendant filed a section 2255 motion seeking to vacate his plea. The district court denied Defendant's motion, finding it untimely. It concluded that Padilla was not to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that Defendant's 2255 motion was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 2255(f).

A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Albert Burgess, Jr. of two felonies involving the receipt and possession of materials depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The district court sentenced Burgess to a term of 292 months' imprisonment, and to supervised release for life. The district court also ordered that Burgess pay, among other things, restitution of $305,219.86 under the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Act for losses suffered by "Vicky," a child victim portrayed in pornographic material in Burgess' possession. Burgess challenged both his convictions and sentences on appeal. The Fourth Circuit affirmed his convictions and all aspects of his sentences, except the district court's award of restitution to the victim. Because the district court did not make specific findings regarding the elements of restitution, the Court vacated the restitution award and remanded the case to the district court for a calculation of the loss Burgess proximately caused the victim.

In this direct appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, the Fourth Circuit addressed a question of first impression in the circuit courts of appeal: in light of the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, codified in Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA"), how is the "household" size of a debtor seeking bankruptcy relief to be calculated under Chapter 13. Petitioner Tanya Johnson filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 13; upon receiving notice of Petitioners motion for confirmation of the plan, Petitioner's ex-husband objected because he felt the plan overstated Petitioner's household size and monthly expenses. As a result, the ex-husband maintained that Petitioner's disposable monthly income was insufficient to make payments to two unsecured loans for which he and Petitioner were jointly liable. In examining the parties' dispute, the bankruptcy court observed that the Code does not define "household," there was no binding precedent on point, and that other bankruptcy courts followed three different approaches to define that term. Finding no error in the bankruptcy court's method of calculating the Petitioner's household size based on how many individuals operate as an "economic unit" with the Petitioner, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying the Petitioner's motion for confirmation with leave to amend the Debtor's "disposable income calculation and plan to reflect the household size [of five]."

Appellants, eleven inmates in the custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections (DOC), brought this action against members of the Virginia Parole Board in their official capacities. The Inmates contended the Board adopted policies and procedures with respect to parole-eligible inmates imprisoned for violent offenses that violated the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution. Most notably, they asserted that the Board implemented an unwritten policy of denying parole to persons incarcerated for violent offenses. The district court granted Appellees' motion to dismiss the complaint, and the Inmates appealed. Because the Fourth Circuit agreed that the complaint failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish a plausible entitlement to relief under either a due process or ex post facto theory, the Court affirmed.

Plaintiffs James Brooks and Donald Hamlette, corrections officers at the Correctional Unit in Rustburg, Virginia, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants unlawfully fired them for exercising their First Amendment rights to free speech. "The Supreme Court has been quite clear, . . .that 'complaints about . . . the employee's own duties' that are filed with an employer using an internal grievance procedure . . . do[ ] not relate to a matter of public concern and accordingly 'may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of justification on the government employer.'" The Fourth circuit therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants.

The issue before the Fourth Circuit concerned commercial arbitration of insurance disputes in foreign tribunals. Appellant-Cross-Appellee ESAB Group, Inc. contended that South Carolina law "reverse preempts" federal law (namely, a treaty and its implementing legislation) pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act. ESAB Group faced numerous products liability suits arising from alleged personal injuries caused by exposure to welding consumables manufactured by ESAB Group or its predecessors. These suits presently were proceeding in numerous state and federal courts in the United States. ESAB Group requested that its insurers defend and indemnify it in these suits. Several, including Zurich Insurance, PLC (ZIP), refused coverage. As a result, ESAB Group brought suit against its insurers in South Carolina state court. The district court then found that ZIP had the requisite minimum contacts with the forum to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction and that the exercise of jurisdiction over ZIP was otherwise reasonable. Because it had referred to arbitration all claims providing a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. ESAB Group timely appealed the district court's exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction. ZIP filed a cross-appeal, challenging the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction and its authority to remand the nonarbitrable claims to state court. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed as to the district court’s exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction, and found no error in the district court's order compelling arbitration. Likewise, the Court rejected ZIP's arguments that the district court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over it and in remanding nonarbitrable claims to state court.

In this case, a group of hourly-wage employees of Perdue Farms, Inc. (Perdue) filed a civil conspiracy action under 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The plaintiffs alleged that certain corporate managers of Perdue, human resources staff, and plant managers conspired to hire aliens not authorized to work in the United States in an effort to reduce labor costs. They asserted that this illegal hiring practice has caused the depression of wages paid to all hourly-wage employees at certain Perdue facilities. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs failed to allege a civil conspiracy claim upon which relief could be granted. After review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for civil conspiracy because they did not sufficiently allege a violation of two predicate RICO acts.

Defendant-Appellant G. Martin Wynn, a professional engineer with the engineering firm of Talbert & Bright, Inc., was convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud, in violation based on his performance of services to Oconee County, South Carolina, in connection with its project to extend the runway at the Oconee County Regional Airport. Instead of procuring a required permit for the runway extension project from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC"), Defendant cut a valid permit off of an older set of plans prepared for a previous airport project and fraudulently attached that permit to the plans for the runway extension. He then mailed the fraudulently permitted plans to Oconee County and later emailed them to the DHEC. Following his conviction, the district court sentenced Defendant to 12 months and 1 day in prison and ordered him to pay Oconee County $118,000 in restitution. On appeal, Defendant contended that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on the offenses had they been properly presented to the jury. He also challenged the district court’s calculation of the amount of loss found for purposes of sentencing and ordering restitution. Finding no abuse of discretion and that the evidence presented against him was sufficient to support his conviction, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

South Carolina’s Spartanburg County School District Seven adopted a policy allowing public school students to receive two academic credits for off-campus religious instruction offered by private educators. The parents of two students at Spartanburg High School filed suit against the School District, alleging that the policy impermissibly endorses religion and entangles church and State in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The School District filed a motion for summary judgment, contending (1) that plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not injured by the policy, and (2) that the policy was constitutional in that it was neutrally stated and administered and that it had the secular purpose of accommodating students’ desire to receive religious instruction. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that that the purpose and primary effect of the School District’s policy was to promote Christianity. The district court rejected the school district’s standing argument but agreed with it on the merits and, accordingly, granted summary judgment to the School District. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed: "[the Court saw] no evidence that the program has had the effect of establishing religion or that it has entangled the School District in religion. As was the General Assembly and School District’s purpose, the program properly accommodates religion without establishing it, in accordance with the First Amendment."

The Government appealed the district court's grant of Defendants-Appellees WIlliam Danielczyk and Eugene Biagi's motion to dismiss count four, paragraph 10(b) of their indictment, which alleged that they conspired and facilitated direct contributions to Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential campaign in violation of federal election laws. The district court reasoned that in light of "Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission" (130 S.Ct. 876 (2010)), section 441b(a) of the Election Campaign Act of 1971 was unconstitutional as applied to Appellees. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court and reversed, finding that the lower court misapplied "Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont," (539 U.S. 146 (2003)) as the basis for its dismissal of count four.