Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A group of local volunteer fire and rescue departments ("LFRDs") and several of their former administrative employees brought suit against Defendants Montgomery County, Maryland, the County Council, and certain county officials contending that Defendants eliminated part of their funding in retaliation for opposing to legislation supported by Defendants. The district court dismissed the LFRDs' complaint, declining to inquire into Defendants’ alleged illicit motive behind an otherwise facially valid budgetary enactment, finding that certain individual defendants were protected by legislative immunity, and concluding that because the individual Plaintiffs were not County employees, they could not bring an abusive discharge claim under state law. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found no error nor abuse of discretion in the district court's judgment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Plaintiff Jane Huggins, trading as SADISCO of Maryland (SADISCO) sued Prince George’s County, Maryland and five County officials after the County shut down the salvage automobile wholesaling business operated by SADISCO on a parcel of land that SADISCO owned within the County. SADISCO’s complaint alleged one count under federal law and four counts under Maryland’s common law. The district court dismissed certain counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment in favor of the County and officials with respect to the remaining counts. Plaintiff appealed, and after review, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court correctly rejected Plaintiff's arguments.

Centro Tepeyac a filed suit against Montgomery County, Maryland, the Montgomery County Council, the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services, and Marc Hansen, the acting County Counsel, challenging the constitutionality of Montgomery County Resolution No. 16-1252. In its complaint, it contended that in compelling speech, the resolution violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The resolution required "limited service pregnancy resource centers," such as Centro Tepeyac, to display a sign on their premises stating (1) "the Center does not have a licensed medical professional on staff"; and (2) "the Montgomery County Health Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed health care provider." Violation of the resolution was punishable as a "Class A civil violation." For relief, Centro Tepeyac sought a declaratory judgment that Resolution 16-1252 was unconstitutional and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against its enforcement. Applying strict scrutiny, the district court entered an order denying Centro Tepeyac’s motion for a preliminary injunction as to the first statement required by Resolution 16-1252 (regarding the medical professional on staff) and granting its motion as to the second mandated statement("the Montgomery County Health Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed health care provider.") Montgomery County appealed the district court’s preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the second mandated statement, and Centro Tepeyac cross-appealed the district court’s denial of its motion for an injunction with respect to the first. For the reasons given in "Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore," (___ F.3d ___, No. 11-1111 (4th Cir. June 27, 2012)) the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction and reversed its denial of the preliminary injunction requested by Centro Tepeyac with respect to the first mandated statement. The Court concluded that the goals of the "no licensed medical professional" disclosure could readily be achieved through less speech-restrictive methods. "Such methods might include a more vigorous enforcement of laws against practicing medicine without a license."

Archbishop Edward F. O'Brien, St. Brigid's Roman Catholic Congregation, Inc., and the Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. ("the Pregnancy Center") filed suit against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, challenging the constitutionality of the City’s Ordinance 09-252, which required that "limited-service pregnancy centers," such as the Pregnancy Center, post signs disclaiming that they "do[ ] not provide or make referral for abortion or birth control services." The complaint alleged that the ordinance, both facially and as applied to the plaintiffs, violated the plaintiffs' free speech, free exercise, and equal protection rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the plaintiffs' rights under the Conscience Clause of Maryland's health law. The district court granted summary judgment to the Pregnancy Center on its freedom of speech count, dismissed the Archbishop and St. Brigid's as plaintiffs for lack of standing, and dismissed the remaining counts without prejudice, in view of its free speech ruling. The court held that the disclaimer required by Ordinance 09-252 is "a form of compelled speech" that "alters the course of a [pregnancy] center’s communication with a client or prospective client about abortion and birth-control" and "is based, at least in part, on disagreement with the viewpoint of the speaker." The court entered a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the ordinance. Upon review of the briefs submitted by both the parties and numerous amici briefs in this case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the ordinance in question was not narrowly tailored to promote the City's interest so as to justify its intrusion on the Pregnancy Center's speech.

Having pled guilty in the District of South Carolina to eight counts of a superseding indictment, Defendant Chadrick Evan Fulks was sentenced to death. The capital sentence was imposed on his convictions of carjacking resulting in death, and kidnapping resulting in death. The federal charges in South Carolina related to the abduction and murder of Alice Donovan on November 14, 2002, in the course of a multistate crime spree engineered by Defendant and his cohort Brandon Basham, following their escape from a Kentucky jail. Three days prior to Donovan being carjacked, kidnapped, and killed, Samantha Burns suffered the same fate in West Virginia at the hands of Defendant and Basham. The district court sentenced Defendant in 2004, and on appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence. The United States Supreme Court denied Defendant's petition for certiorari. Subsequently, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence, and requested a new trial. The motion listed thirty-three claims for relief; the district court issued an "exhaustive" memorandum opinion and rejected each claim. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's allegations of error by the district court and affirmed the denial of his motion.

Deputy James Elliott stopped Defendant Sean Sowards for speeding along North Carolina’s Interstate 77 after visually estimating that Defendant's vehicle was traveling 75 mph in a 70-mph zone. Although the deputy's patrol car was equipped with radar, he had intentionally positioned his patrol car at an angle that rendered an accurate radar reading impossible. During the traffic stop, Deputy Elliott had a canine trained in drug detection, Ringo, sniff the outside of Defendant's vehicle. When the dog signaled the possible presence of a controlled substance, Deputy Elliott, along with other officers, searched Defendant's vehicle and discovered approximately 10 kilograms of cocaine. Subsequently, a grand jury charged Defendant with possession of at least 5 kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police lacked probable cause to initiate a traffic stop based exclusively on the deupty's visual estimate --uncorroborated by radar or pacing and unsupported by any other indicia of reliability-- that Defendant's vehicle was traveling 75 miles per hour in a 70-mph zone. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit agreed and reversed the district court.

A Virginia jury convicted Petitioner-Appellee Leon Winston of capital murder. The court, following the jury’s recommendation, sentenced him to death. Petitioner's direct appeals failed and his conviction became final, at which point he sought habeas relief in state court. The Supreme Court of Virginia denied relief, rejecting Petitioner's requests for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner then filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court granted him an evidentiary hearing to explore whether his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to raise the claim under "Atkins v. Virginia" (536 U.S. 304 (2002)) that his mental retardation categorically barred imposition of a death sentence. But the court reversed course and held that it was precluded from considering any evidence adduced during the federal proceeding. Looking only to facts presented in the state habeas proceeding and conducting a deferential review of the state-court decision, the court denied Petitioner's petition for habeas relief. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit vacated in part the district court’s decision on appeal, ordering it to conduct a de novo review of Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim while entertaining the evidence offered during the federal hearing. On remand, the district court granted Winston’s petition for habeas relief and vacated his death sentence. Virginia appealed, contending that intervening Supreme Court precedent eroded the foundation of the Fourth Circuit's prior opinion in the earlier case compelling the Court to forgo de novo review and instead accord substantial deference to the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision denying habeas relief. The Fourth Circuit disagreed and found nothing in recent Supreme Court decisions that called into question its reasoning in "Winston I," which, as law of the case. Reviewing Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim de novo, the Court agreed with the district court that Petitioner established that his trial attorneys rendered deficient performance that prejudiced him. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's grant of habeas relief.

Defendant-Appellant Ronald Colson pled guilty to six counts of receiving movies depicting actual female minors engaged in actual and simulated genital and oral sex with adult males, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2). Because Defendant had a prior state conviction which the district court concluded "related to either sexual abuse or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor," the court imposed, over Defendant's objection, a 15-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the earlier conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense under section 2252A(b)(1). He contended that the district court erred as a matter of law because his 1984 conviction did not, when considered under the categorical approach, relate to sexual abuse involving a minor. He noted that under this approach, the sentencing court must, in evaluating whether the conviction qualifies as a predicate offense, focus on the elements of the offense and the fact of conviction, taking the most benign conduct that could support a conviction. According to Defendant, because the Virginia statute under which he was convicted in 1984 arguably covered innocuous depictions of nudity, he could not be subject to a sentencing enhancement requiring a conviction that categorically relates to sexual abuse of a minor, as required by the federal enhancement statute. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Defendant misread the requirements for a conviction under the Virginia Code and read too narrowly the scope of convictions that can serve as predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence.

Plaintiff brought a discrimination claim against her former employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., for denying her a reasonable accommodation following her foot surgery. The district court dismissed her case after concluding she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by not filing her proposed accommodation with the EEOC. The court held that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies under the circumstances and reversed the district court's judgment.

This suit arose after Project Vote learned that students at Norfolk State University, a historically African-American college, experienced problems in registering to vote in the November 2008 primary and general elections in Virginia. At issue was whether Section 8(i)(l) of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), which required public disclosure of "all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters," 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(i)(l), applied to completed voter registration applications. The court held that the district court correctly interpreted Section 8(i)(l), concluding that it did not apply to such applications and holding that defendants had violated the NVRA by refusing to disclose the completed applications with voters' Social Security numbers redacted.