Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued defendant, a bail bondsman, and others, alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as various state law tort claims. The claims stemmed from defendant's efforts to apprehend a fugitive in and around plaintiff's home. A jury found in plaintiff's favor on her section 1983, trespass, and assault claims. Defendant appealed, challenging the jury's verdict and damages award. The court held that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity where neither history nor policy supported extending the defense to bail bondsmen. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that plaintiff's consent was involuntary and the court affirmed the verdict on the 1983 claim. The court further held that there was a sufficient basis to support the jury's conclusion that plaintiff was in reasonable fear of bodily harm. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion regarding the actual damages award and found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to leave the punitive damages award undisturbed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Officer Robert M. Bauer and several other defendants, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deprivation of her Fourth Amendment right to freedom from seizure without probable cause, and also asserting her state law claim for malicious prosecution. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that no prudent person would have believed that plaintiff violated the impersonation statute at issue and therefore, plaintiff's arrest lacked probable cause and was unreasonable. Thus, plaintiff's constitutional right not to be unreasonably seized was violated. The court also held that the district court did not err in ruling that Officer Bauer was not, at this stage of the litigation, entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's section 1983 claim.

Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and knowingly using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The court held that the detention of defendant's vehicle was valid, but that the district court improperly admitted certain prior "bad act" evidence of his statements showing his knowledge of crack cocaine and his willingness to manufacture and distribute it. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court.

Defendants were convicted by a jury of violating and conspiring to violate the animal fighting prohibition of the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. 2156(a) (the animal fighting statute), resulting from their participation in "gamefowl derbies," otherwise known as "cockfighting." Defendants raised several challenges on appeal. Upon review of the parties' arguments, the court held that the animal fighting statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause; that the provision of different elements of the crime in jurisdictions permitting animal fighting did not violate defendants' equal protection rights; and that the district court did not err in conducting Scott Lawson's trial jointly with the trials of his co-defendants. The court held, however, that the juror's misconduct violated Lawson's right to a fair trial, and therefore vacated the convictions for violating the animal fighting statute. The court also vacated the conspiracy convictions with respect to those defendants for which the conspiracy related solely to the animal fighting activities. Further, the court rejected the challenges made by several defendants to the illegal gambling convictions, and affirmed the convictions relating to those offenses as well as the conspiracy convictions for which illegal gambling was one of the objects of the conspiracy alleged.

Defendants were indicted for their roles in organizing, operating, and participating in "gamefowl derbies," otherwise known as "cockfighting." Defendants entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of conspiring to violate the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. 2156 (the animal fighting statute). At issue was whether Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in enacting a criminal prohibition against animal fighting. The court held that the animal fighting statute prohibits activities that substantially affected interstate commerce and thus, was a legitimate exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. The court also held that the statute did not require the government to prove defendants' knowledge regarding the particular venture's nexus to interstate commerce. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions.

Defendant plead guilty for fraudulently obtaining benefits under the Federal Employment Compensation Act (FECA), 18 U.S.C. 1920. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that the district court failed to follow the mandates of Rule 11 by not advising him that his FECA benefits could be terminated as a result of his guilty plea. The court held that the loss of government benefits was a collateral consequence of defendant's plea and therefore, the district court was not required to advise him of it pursuant to Rule 11. The court also held that the district court conducted a sufficient inquiry into defendant's competence and that the district court, after carefully considering the judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion, appropriately denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit goods, trafficking in counterfeit goods, and smuggling goods into the United States. The counterfeiting convictions were based on the jury's determination that a mark displayed on goods defendants imported into the United States was a counterfeit of a trademark registered to fashion designer Burberry Ltd, depicting its signature plaid pattern. On appeal, defendants advanced various challenges to their convictions for trafficking in counterfeit goods under 18 U.S.C. 2320(a). Defendants also asserted that certain comments made by prosecutors at trial necessitated a retrial. Because the court found that defendants' arguments lacked merit, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of providing, and conspiring to provide, material support to terrorists and a foreign terrorist organization. For the third time, defendant challenged the district court's application of the sentencing enhancement for a "federal crime of terrorism" under U.S.S.G. 3A1.4 (terrorism enhancement) and his resultant sentence of 180 months imprisonment. Having carefully reviewed and assessed the sentencing proceedings prompting this third appeal, the court was satisfied that the district court complied with its mandate that the district court make specific findings of facts that supported its application of the enhancement. Therefore, the court rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred in applying the terrorism enhancement, plus his other assertions of procedural error, and affirmed the sentence.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of stalking through the use of a facility of interstate commerce and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant raised several issues on appeal, including the vagueness of the stalking statute and the length of his sentence. Accepting defendant's contentions, however, would undermine Congress' efforts to protect people like D.S. and R.S., the people defendant was stalking, from precisely the sort of terrifying conduct that took place in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

This appeal arose from the district court's order granting final judgment to the United States upon equitable claims of payment by mistake of fact and unjust enrichment against Tuomey arising out of alleged violations of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395nn, (the Stark Law), and awarding damages plus pre- and post-judgment interest. Because the court concluded that the district court's judgment violated Tuomey's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Because the court was remanding the case, the court also addressed other issues raised on appeal that were likely to recur upon retrial.