Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Former Louisiana congressman, William J. Jefferson (defendant), was convicted of eleven offenses - including conspiracy, wire fraud, bribery, money laundering, and racketeering - arising from his involvement in multiple bribery and fraud schemes. Defendant appealed his convictions on several grounds: (1) that an erroneous instruction was given to the jury with respect to the bribery statute's definition of an "official act"; (2) that another erroneous instruction was given with respect to the "quid pro quo" element of the bribery-related offenses; (3) that defendant's schemes to deprive citizens of honest services did not constitute federal crimes; and (4) that venue was improper on one of his wire fraud offenses. The court affirmed each of defendant's conviction except his Count 10 wire fraud conviction and sentence, which the court vacated and remanded for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.

Oceanpro, a seafood wholesaler, and two Oceanpro employees, Timothy Lydon and Benjamin Clough, III, were convicted for purchasing untagged and oversized striped bass. Oceanpro and Clough were also convicted for giving a false statement to federal law enforcement officers during the course of the investigation of the crimes. On appeal, Oceanpro and Clough challenged the District of Maryland's venue for the false statement offense because the false statement was made at the offices of Oceanpro in the District of Columbia, not in Maryland. In addition, all defendants contended that the order of restitution to the States was improper because the States did not have a sufficient interest in the illegally caught fish so as to make them "victims" as was required for receiving the benefit of a restitution order. The court rejected both arguments, concluding that venue for the false statement charge was proper in the District of Maryland and that Maryland and Virginia's interest in striped bass was sufficient to make the States "victims" and therefore to justify an award to them of restitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of falsely representing himself to be a U.S. citizen in violation of 18 U.S.C. 911 and of committing identity theft in relation to a false claim of U.S. citizenship in violation of 19 U.S.C. 1028A. At issue was what could constitute a claim of citizenship under section 911. The court held that the "cumulative context" provided a substantial foundation for the jury's conclusion of willful misrepresentation and the jury's verdict was consistent with decisions in other circuits that required a direct claim of U.S. citizenship to sustain a conviction under section 911. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff, a minor, sustained serious injuries at birth due to the negligence of medical professionals who attended her delivery. As a result of plaintiff's injuries, DHHS, through the state Medicaid program, paid more than $1.9 million in medical and health care expenses on her behalf. Plaintiff instituted a medical malpractice action in state court and eventually settled the action for a lump some of approximately $2.8 million. The settlement agreement did not allocate separate amounts for past medical expenses and other damages. DHHS subsequently asserted a statutory lien on the settlement proceedings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat 108A-57 and 59 (third-party liability statues), which asserted that North Carolina had a subrogation right and could assert a lien upon the lesser of its actual medical expenditures or one-third of the medicaid recipient's total recovery. Plaintiff brought the instant action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking to forestall payment under federal Medicaid law known as the "anti-lien provision," 42 U.S.C. 1396p. The court was persuaded that the unrebuttable presumption inherent in the one-third cap on the state's recovery imposed by the North Carolina third-party liability statutes was in fatal conflict with federal law. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in favor of the Secretary and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed the sentence imposed following remand for sentencing where defendant's convictions arose from his participation in a telemarketing sweepstakes scheme in Costa Rica. The court held that it need not resolve whether the district court erred in concluding that it was barred from reconsidering the Sentencing Guidelines calculation, because even if the court assumed that the district court erred in this respect, that error was harmless under the facts of the case. The court also held that, given the totality of the district court's statements, defendant's sentence was not improperly based on his decision to go to trial or as a result of his successful appeal of his original sentence. Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff, an inmate, filed a complaint in state court against defendants, contending that defendants engaged in a campaign of harassment against him and asserted several claims against them, including violations of his federal constitutional rights. Following defendants' removal to federal district court, the district court remanded the case to state court, in part based on plaintiff's status as a "three-strikes" prisoner due to his frequent legal filings. Because the court found that the district court lacked a statutory or legal basis to remand plaintiff's action to state court, the court reversed the order and reinstated plaintiff's complaint for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought this action, alleging that her former employer, the County, unlawfully discriminated against her by offering her a less favorable severance package than that offered to male employees holding similar positions. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the theory that the discriminatory denial of a non-contractual employment benefit could not constitute an adverse employment action; the district court's alternative rationale for dismissing the complaint, that she suffered no adverse employment action because the County fired her before it made its allegedly discriminatory offer, also failed because it ignored the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and because Title VII protects both current and former employees from discriminatory adverse employment actions. The court granted leave to the district court to consider, in the first instance, two additional arguments raised by the County. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

A Pentagon police officer allegedly assaulted plaintiff, a contract security officer assigned to the Pentagon, while they were stationed at a security checkpoint for Pentagon employees. Plaintiff sued the United States for assault under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(h), and the district court granted summary judgment to the United States. The court held that section 2680(h) waived the United States' sovereign immunity regardless of whether an officer was engaged in an investigative or law enforcement activity when he committed an assault. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from convictions arising from his attempt to leave the United States carrying approximately $40,000 in United States currency, without reporting the currency to customs authorities. In denying his motion for a new trial, the district court acknowledged that it had erred in excluding certain testimony at defendant's trial, but concluded that the error was harmless. Because the court could not say, with fair assurance, that the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury verdict, the court must vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

In this case, a subcontractor to a subcontractor to a prime contractor with a federal agency brought a procedural due process claim against that agency and tort actions against a separate contractor for allegedly causing the termination of his at-will consulting agreement. The court concluded that plaintiff's case involved both the wrong defendants and the wrong claims. Because permitting these claims to go forward would reward artful pleading and impermissibly constitutionalize state tort law, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants.