Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose out of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PCA on plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. Because the court found that there were genuine issues of fact as to whether PCA took "tangible employment action" against plaintiff, the court reached neither the question of whether the district court erred by not determining whether Bobby Mills was a supervisor nor the question of whether the district court correctly applied the Faragher-Ellerth defense test. The court also held that there was uncertainty about whether there was a nexus between the harassment and plaintiff's alleged termination. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded.

Plaintiff, who is deaf, appealed the district court's ruling of summary judgment for defendants, arguing that he was entitled to have the jury hear his argument that he was not reasonably accommodated by defendants during their investigation, in violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Plaintiff claimed he suffered "emotional issues" and "persistent anger" because the county "violated [his] right to communicate" by handcuffing him behind his back and failing to explain their presence. Having concluded that the ADA applied to the investigation of criminal conduct, the court next determined whether the deputies' conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. The court found that due to the exigencies inherent in responding to a domestic violence situation, no further accommodations were required than the ones made by the deputies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendants, husband and wife, were convicted in a jury trial of two offenses related to their conduct of growing marijuana at their home in a rural area of West Virginia. Defendants raised three issues on appeal. The court concluded that the affidavit provided a sufficient basis to establish probable cause for issuance of the thermal-imaging search warrant. Therefore, the court held that the district court did not err in denying defendants' motion to suppress. The court could not say that the district court acted on an erroneous legal principle in determining that defendants' reason for personally using marijuana should be excluded from evidence. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting the government's motion in limine. Finally, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in determining that defendants failed to carry their burden of proving that they satisfied the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(5). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision denying application of the safety-valve provision.

Defendant was convicted after pleading guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court committed three errors in sentencing. Because the court concluded that pointing and presenting a firearm in violation of South Carolina Code 16-23-410 qualified as a crime of violence under the first clause of the Guidelines definition of that term, the court need not address defendant's argument that this offense did not qualify as a crime of violence under the second clause of the Guidelines definition. The court agreed with the Third Circuit that a sentence imposing an Alford plea qualified as a "prior sentence" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 4A1.2. Because the court already concluded that the reasons given at the hearing adequately explained defendant's sentence, the court rejected defendant's argument that the district court's issuance of a written sentencing order failed to afford defendant an opportunity to respond to the basis for the variance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence.

Defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At issue was whether defendant's sentence was properly enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), on the basis of three previous felony convictions when two of the convictions were for violation of Florida's "fleeing-or-eluding" statute, Fla. Stat. 3106.1935(2). Applying Sykes v. United States, the court held that the two convictions at issue qualified as predicate offenses under the residual clause in the ACCA and affirmed the judgment. The court also rejected defendant's contention that the ACCA's "residual clause" was unconstitutionally vague.

Plaintiffs brought an action under 18 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants after defendants asked plaintiffs to remove large, graphic signs depicting aborted fetuses that plaintiffs were using as part of a roadside demonstration. Plaintiffs and defendants subsequently cross-appealed different portions of the district court's opinion and order. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity to defendants in their individual capacities where, at the time of the anti-abortion demonstration at issue, it was not clearly established that law enforcement officers could not proscribe the display of large, graphic photographs in a traditional public forum. The court held that plaintiff was indeed awarded summary judgment on its request for a declaratory judgment that defendants' actions were an unconstitutional infringement on its First Amendment rights. There was no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of attorney's fees to plaintiffs. Finally, the court held that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to order defendants to safeguard plaintiff's First Amendment rights and refrain from impermissible content-based restrictions in the future. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on grounds of qualified immunity, the denial of an award of attorney's fees to plaintiff, and the grant of injunctive relief to plaintiff against defendants.

In July 1994, defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to 210 months of incarceration, followed by a three year term of supervised release. In August 2010, defendant's probation officer filed a Notice of Violation, alleging six violations of the conditions of defendant's supervised release. Defendant subsequently appealed the judgment of the district court revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to 24 months of incarceration. Because the court failed to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) when it admitted and relied on hearsay evidence at defendant's revocation hearing, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition. As part of a plea agreement, defendant waived his right to appeal "any sentence." During defendant's subsequent incarceration, the government filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), seeking to reduce his sentence in light of his assistance to the government in prosecuting an unrelated case. The district court denied the motion and defendant appealed. Because the court concluded that it was within the scope of defendant's appellate waiver, the court dismissed the appeal.

A jury convicted defendant, the "Commander" of the American National Socialist Workers' Party, on four counts (Counts 1, 3, 5, and 6). Counts 1, 5, and 6 were for transmitting interstate commerce - by email, U.S. Mail, and telephone - threats to injure or intimidate individuals in violation of 18 U.S.C. 875(c). Count 3 was for violating 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(1) for intimidation of individuals to "influence, delay, or prevent the[ir] testimony." The government subsequently appealed the district court's judgment of acquittal on Count 6 and its refusal to apply the sentencing enhancement for vulnerable victims on Count 3, and defendant appealed the district court's refusal to grant his Rule 29 motion as to Counts 1, 3, and 5 and to sustain his objection to Count 3 based on constructive amendment of the indictment. The court affirmed the district court's rulings on the Rule 29 motions as well as to all four counts, and affirmed defendant's convictions on Counts 1, 3, and 5, but vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing because the district court applied an incorrect standard in deciding whether to consider an enhancement for victims' vulnerability.

Defendant appealed his conviction in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The court held that, in light of its review of defendants' specific arguments and based on the totality of the surrounding circumstances, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress his statements; the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the third indictment because defendant was first arrested for the two counts of aggravated sexual abuse in the Eastern District of Virginia and that arrest was for the same charges for the same conduct listed in the operative third indictment; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Government's motion in limine to exclude defendant's expert witness. Therefore, finding no error, the court affirmed the judgment.