Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm while being an unlawful user of marijuana, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3). At issue was whether defendant's section 922(g)(3) conviction violated his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Although the court concluded, by applying the intermediate scrutiny standard, that Congress had an important objective for enacting section 922(g)(3) to reduce gun violence and might have reasonably served that objective by disarming drug users and addicts, the court nonetheless found that the government failed to make the record to substantiate the fit between its objectives and the means of serving that objective. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff filed a racial discrimination action under Title VII in a North Carolina state court, naming the Secretary as a defendant. The Secretary removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1442(a) and then filed a motion to dismiss. The court concluded that because the United States and the Secretary did not consent to be sued in a North Carolina state court under Title VII, the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Inasmuch as removal to the federal court, under the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction, did not cure that jurisdictional defect, the court affirmed the district court's order.

Defendant was indicted on the charge of possessing a firearm while being a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Defendant, an African American, moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the U.S. Attorney's Office selected him for prosecution under a federal-state law enforcement initiative known as Project Exile because of his race, in violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. On appeal, defendant requested that the court reverse the district court's order denying his motion for discovery and remand the case for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. The court held that defendant failed to make a credible showing that a similarly situated defendant of another race had evaded prosecution under Project Exile in order to obtain discovery on his selective prosecution claim and that defendant had failed to carry his burden of producing some evidence to make a credible showing of both discriminatory effect and intent. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of nine criminal counts related to his membership in the gang Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). Defendant appealed, among other things, his convictions under 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(1)(C) for aiding and abetting witness-tampering murder. The court held that, although the district court based its section 1512(a)(1)(C) jury instructions on the court's decision in United States v. Harris which - while this appeal was pending - was abrogated by the Supreme Court's decision in Fowler v. United States, the court concluded that the error in instructing the jury was harmless. Finding no error in regards to defendant's remaining claims, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Defendant subsequently challenged the district court's jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e) to impose a second prison sentence for violations of his supervised release after the district court effectively revoked his supervised release and imposed a prison sentence in a prior hearing. The court affirmed and held that the district court had jurisdiction to hold the September 17 violation hearing and to impose the 12 month sentence for supervised-release violations arising from defendant's state convictions.

Petitioner appealed the district court's decision to abstain, on the basis of Schlesinger v. Councilman, and dismiss without prejudice his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the U.S. Army's exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over him. The court held that the district court was well within its discretion in applying Councilman abstention and dismissing without prejudice petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court remanded, however, for correction of an error in the judgment because, although the district court applied Councilman abstention and dismissed the petition without prejudice, the judgment erroneously indicated that the district court granted the Army's summary judgment motion on the merits.

Defendant appealed his drug trafficking and firearm convictions. Defendant contended that the district court erroneously admitted into evidence a jacket recovered from the vicinity of the arrest. Defendant also contended the district court compounded its error by declining to exclude expert evidence concerning DNA testing performed on the jacket, together with evidence documenting the jacket's handling and custody during the testing process. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that admission of the jacket into evidence satisfied the Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) threshold. The court also held that if the district court's admission of an expert's report constituted error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant pled guilty under a conditional plea agreement to knowing possession of a firearm not registered to him. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his home; in denying defendant's request for a hearing challenging the veracity of the search warrant; and in sentencing defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a stop-and-frisk in a deserted gas station parking lot in the wee hours of the morning. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion and held that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop-and-frisk.

Defendant was convicted in a jury trial of three offenses related to his possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant argued that the search warrant that led to his arrest was invalid; that a jury instruction involving the term "obscene" was erroneous because it lacked a knowledge requirement; and that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court held, pursuant to United States v. Leon, that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress. The court also held that the district court did not give the jury an erroneous instruction because the jury was not required to find that defendant knew that the images at issue were obscene. The court further held that defendant's sentence was not unconstitutional where the harshness of defendant's penalty reflected the gravity of his crimes and, as the district court correctly noted, the severity of defendant's sentence was based on his recidivism. The ten-year sentence for Count Two was also proportional to other sentences because this sentence was mandated by statute. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.