Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of simple possession of crack cocaine and sentenced to a 63-month term of imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained by police after a patdown where defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was subject to a routine traffic stop. The court held that the government failed to meet its burden of establishing that officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous when the patdown began. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine and heroine. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions and sentence on multiple grounds. The court held that the for-cause striking of prospective jurors based on their perceived inability to accept an interpreter as the final arbiter of what was said or written did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the district court's decision to strike the prospective jurors was not a manifest abuse of discretion and did not contravene the Sixth Amendment; Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) records were admissible under the public records exception to hearsay; defendant's challenge to his conviction under an indictment that charged him with conspiracy to import and distribute "1 kilogram or more" of heroin and "5 kilograms or more" of cocaine failed because the lesser included offense was included in the charged offense and there was no variance; because defendant failed to provide a showing of good cause, his claim that the indictment was defective was waived; the court could not conclude that the district court judge committed plain error in giving the modified Allen charge after receiving two jury notes expressing an inability to reach a verdict; nor could the court conclude that the district court plainly erred by not, sua sponte, ordering a mistrial after approximately two days of jury deliberations; substantial evidence supported the verdict and the district court did not err in denying the motion for acquittal; the district court acted within its discretion in admitting testimony of a certain witness; and the district court did not commit clear error in finding, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant was a manager or supervisor in the conspiracy; and the district court did not err in finding that five participants were involved pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B.1(b). Accordingly, the convictions and sentence were affirmed.

Plaintiff, a North Carolina registered lobbyist, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the North Carolina State Board of elections to challenge the constitutionality of North Carolina's "Campaign Contributions Prohibition," N.C. Gen. Stat. 163-278.13C, which prohibited any registered lobbyist from contributing to the campaign of any candidate for the North Carolina General Assembly or the Council of State. Applying the "closely drawn" standard of scrutiny that the court concluded was applicable to such contribution restrictions, the court held that the statute was constitutional, both facially and as applied to plaintiff, as a valid exercise of North Carolina's legislative prerogative to address potential corruption and the appearance of corruption in the State.

Defendant, a former Sheriff of Buncombe County, was convicted by a jury of numerous conspiracies and other charges relating to his receipt of bribes in connection with the unlawful operation of video poker machines in Buncombe and other North Carolina counties. Defendant appealed his convictions. The court held that even if the district court erred in admitting into evidence the recording of the December 19 meeting at issue, such error was harmless. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to sever. The court further held, under the plain error standard of review, that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conspiracy conviction for "the obtaining of property of another" by conduct and under circumstances proscribed in the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. The court finally held that the district court did not exhibit unfair treatment or bias toward defendant. The court rejected defendant's argument that the Honest Services Fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1346, was unconstitutionally vague and affirmed his convictions for violating the statute.

Defendant pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924. On appeal, defendant objected to the district court's application of the section 924(e)(1) sentencing enhancement, asserting that recent Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit decisions undermined the PSR's contention that his previous convictions were for Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) violent felonies. A divided panel of the court affirmed defendant's sentence, employing the "modified categorical approach" first announced in Taylor v. United States, for the purpose of analyzing prior offenses to determine whether they constituted ACCA violent felonies. Upon granting defendant's petition for rehearing en banc, the court vacated the panel opinion. When the court considered defendant's charging documents in their proper legal context, the court could not determine that he was convicted of violating N.C. Gen. State 14-202(a)(2). Consequently, defendant's indecent liberties offenses were not ACCA violent felonies.

Plaintiffs, 72 Iraqis who were seized in Iraq by the U.S. military and detained at various locations throughout Iraq, commenced this action against L-3 Services, a military contractor, alleging that L-3 Services' employees and military personnel conspired among themselves and with others to torture and abuse them while they were detained and to cover up that conduct. L-3 Services filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on numerous grounds and the district court denied the motion. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss this case for the reasons given in Al-Shimari v. CACI International. The court held that plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by federal law and displaced by it, as articulated in Saleh v. Titan Corp.

Plaintiffs, four Iraqi citizens, who were seized by the U.S. military in the Iraq war zone and detained by the military in Abu Ghraib prison, near Baghdad, commenced this tort action against a civilian contractor retained by the military to assist it at the prison in conducting interrogations for the purpose of obtaining intelligence. Plaintiffs alleged that while they were detained, the contractor's employees and military personnel conspired among themselves and with others to torture and abuse them and to cover up that conduct. The contractor filed a motion to dismiss on numerous grounds and the district court denied the motion. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case. The court held that the plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by federal law and displaced by it, as articulated in Saleh v. Titan Corp.

Defendant, a Maryland attorney, was convicted of offenses related to a scheme to launder proceeds that he obtained from a client. On appeal, defendant challenged several counts of conviction for money laundering, as well as his obstruction of justice conviction, and the denial of his motion to sever the failure-to-file counts. The court affirmed the convictions for money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957, and affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to sever. The court reversed, however, defendant's conviction on the obstruction-of-justice charge for insufficient evidence. Therefore, the court remanded for resentencing.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his negligence action against defendant where plaintiff alleged that his injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of defendant, a private contractor of the Army. The district court dismissed plaintiff's negligence claim because it was barred by the political question doctrine, or in the alternative, preempted by the combat activities exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq. The court affirmed the judgment on the basis that an adjudication of plaintiff's claim against defendant would necessarily implicate a political question, where the court would be obliged to evaluate military decisions in a combat theatre, which the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to decide. Accordingly, the court did not reach the FTCA preemption issue and vacated that aspect of the district court's opinion.

Plaintiff filed a complaint under Title VII against her former employer, alleging that it engaged in religious discrimination and retaliation against her. After the district court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment, the employer filed an interlocutory appeal, contending that the plain language of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1(a), the religious organization exemption, barred plaintiff's claims. The court held that because the plain language of section 2000e-1(a) exempted religious organizations like the employer from plaintiff's claims of religious discrimination, the district court erred in denying the employer's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the employer.