Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Commonwealth of Virginia brought suit against the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, challenging one provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power. Virginia maintained that the conflict between this provision and a newly-enacted Virginia statute provided it with standing to pursue this action. The court held that Virginia, as the sole plaintiff here, lacked standing to bring this action because the challenged provision, the individual mandate, imposed no obligation on Virginia and the Virginia statute did not confer on Virginia a sovereign interest in challenging the individual mandate. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs brought this suit to enjoin, as unconstitutional, enforcement of two provisions of the recently-enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119. The challenged provisions amended the Internal Revenue Code by adding: (1) a "penalty" payable to the Secretary of the Treasury by an individual taxpayer who failed to maintain adequate health insurance coverage and (2) an "assessable payment" payable to the Secretary of the Treasury by a "large employer" if at least on of its employees received a tax credit or government subsidy to offset payments for certain health-related expenses. The court held that because this suit constituted a pre-enforcement action seeking to restrain the assessment of a tax, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, stripped the court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff, an unincorporated association made up of homeless and formerly homeless people that advocated for their rights, sued defendants, alleging that defendants had conspired to establish the Conrad Center on Oliver Hill Way, a site removed from Richmond's downtown community, for the purpose of reducing the presence of the homeless population in the downtown area by providing services for them in a remote location. Plaintiff claimed that the relocation of homeless services to the Conrad Center violated 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985(3); the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. The court held that plaintiff did not state a valid section 1985(3) conspiracy claim; plaintiff's 1983 and equal protection claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations; plaintiff's FHA claims were barred by the two-year statue of limitations and, more fundamentally, they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; and plaintiff's ADA retaliation claim was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant was charged in a superseding indictment with one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and one count of possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to the first count while retaining his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced defendant to 120 months of incarceration. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's determination that the police acted legally when they entered his home. The court held that the district court erred in finding that the police's initial entry into the house was valid, but that it properly found defendant's girlfriend's consent for the second search was valid. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court for a determination as to whether the taint from the initial illegal entry into the house was dissipated by the girlfriend's consent.

After defendant pled guilty to federal drug trafficking, the district court held that his prior state convictions for marijuana possession, for which he faced no possibility of imprisonment, was for an offense "punishable by imprisonment for more than one year," triggering a sentencing enhancement under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 841. This enhancement doubled defendant's minimum sentence. The court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case to the court for "further consideration in light of Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder." A panel of the court then held that Carachuri did not require any change in the court's prior holding. The court voted to rehear the case en banc and subsequently vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant conditionally plead guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a drug user and one count of possession of marijuana where he had moved to suppress the gun and drugs on the ground that the officer's frisk was unlawful. At issue was whether evidence seized during a street encounter between law enforcement and citizens was properly admitted into evidence during a subsequent criminal prosecution. The court held that the seizure of the evidence did not comport with settled Fourth Amendment principles, and therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and remanded for further proceedings.

This appeal stemmed from the district court's grant of a motion for reduction of sentence for substantial assistance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). In granting the motion, the district court reduced defendant's sentence for distribution of child pornography from 96 months imprisonment to one day. At issue was whether the district court exceeded its authority under Rule 35(b) because it did not base its grant of the motion on defendant's assistance to the government, but instead grounded the reduction solely on the court's concern that defendant would not receive his preferred medication while in prison. The court held that the district court exceeded its authority under Rule 35(b) by granting the motion based on factors other than the defendant's cooperation with the government. The court also held that the mere possibility that a change in treatment of the defendant's ADHD, based on the professional judgment of a prison's medical team, simply did not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. The court further held that, because reconsideration of the motion by the original sentencing judge would inevitably invite speculation as to whether the medical issue continued to play a role in the ultimate ruling, the court ordered the case reassigned to a new judge on remand.

Plaintiff, operator of an electricity plant, sued defendant ("the county"), seeking to enjoin Expedited Bill 29-10, which imposed a levy on large stationary emitters of carbon dioxide within the county, on the ground that it violated the United States and Maryland Constitutions. At issue was whether a Montgomery County exaction on carbon dioxide emissions, levied only upon plaintiff's electricity-generating facility, was a tax or a fee. The court held that the carbon charge, which targeted a single emitter and was located squarely within the county's own "programmatic efforts to reduce" greenhouse gas emissions, was a punitive and regulatory fee over which the federal courts retained jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner sought habeas relief from his capital sentence for convictions of murdering a husband and wife, as well as robbing the husband. At issue was whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel and whether the State of North Carolina violated his Eighth Amendment and due process rights by presenting to the jury evidence and argument that contradicted those presented in the trials of his co-defendants. The court affirmed the denial of the petition for habeas relief and held that, in light of the circumstances and the evidence presented at trial, the federal district court correctly determined that the state court's decision did not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established law or an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Appellant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and aiding and abetting; possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of firearms. At issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's convictions; whether the district court erred in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence; and whether the court erred in continuing to poll the jury after one juror indicated that the verdict was not unanimous. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the government presented substantial evidence to support appellant's convictions on all three counts; that appellant's Rule 404(b) argument was without merit where there was no error in admitting the evidence of a prior arrest when the evidence was relevant to prove his knowledge and lack of mistake, as well as necessary to prove the element of intention; and that the district court's continued polling of the jury in this case was not reversible error where there was no objection to the continued polling, the district took great pains to avoid doing anything that the jury would perceive as coercive, and the district court gave a fair and balanced Allen charge when it instructed the jury to deliberate further.