Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as state law claims, after plaintiff was shot by the officers. Plaintiff, after hearing sounds of unknown persons outside his home, opened the front door carrying a shotgun and was shot by the officers. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. The district court did not err in denying the officers qualified immunity from plaintiff's excessive force claims under section 1983 where a reasonable officer would not have had probable cause to feel threatened by plaintiff's actions and the constitutional right at issue - the right to be free from deadly force when posing no threat - was clearly established at the time the officers shot plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment as to the section 1983 claims. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of public officers' immunity with respect to plaintiff's state law tort claims. View "Cooper, Sr. v. Sheehan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(2), a part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), as violating his right to equal protection of the laws under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Plaintiff challenged a provision that caps the attorneys' fee award that a successful prisoner litigant could recover from the government in a civil rights action at 150 percent of the value of the prisoner's monetary judgment. The court declined to apply heightened equal protection scrutiny in this case and joined its sister circuits in concluding that section 1997e(d)(2) was constitutional. Congress's goals in enacting section 1997e(d)(2) included reducing marginal or frivolous prisoner civil rights lawsuits and protecting the public fisc. Such goals were legitimate and Congress acted rationally in adopting the provision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Wilkins v. Gaddy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, out-of-state medical providers seeking to open facilities in Virginia, filed suit challenging Virginia's certificate-of-need requirement. In order to launch a medical enterprise in the state of Virginia, a firm was required to obtain a certificate of public need. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that Virginia's requirement violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating in both purpose and effect. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court concluded that plaintiffs' Commerce Clause challenges required closer scrutiny and further proceedings before the district court. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims were properly dismissed. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colon Health Centers v. Hazel" on Justia Law

College Newspapers challenged the ABC's ban on alcohol advertisements as violative of the First Amendment. The court concluded that the challenged regulation violated the First Amendment as applied to the College Newspapers where a regulation of commercial speech must satisfy all four Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. prongs in order to survive an as-applied challenge, and the regulation at issue here did not satisfy the fourth prong. The district court erred in concluding that the challenged regulation was appropriately tailored to achieve its objective of reducing abusive college drinking. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the ABC. View "Educational Media Co. v. Insley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Sheriff of the City of Hampton, Virginia, in his individual capacity and in his official capacity, alleging that the Sheriff retaliated against plaintiffs in violation of their First Amendment rights by choosing not to reappoint them because of their support of his electoral opponent. The court concluded that, as to the claims of Plaintiffs Sandhofer, Woodward, and Bland, the district court properly analyzed the merits of the claims; as to the claims of Plaintiffs Carter, McCoy, and Dixon, the district court erred by concluding that plaintiffs failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the Sheriff violated their First Amendment rights; nevertheless, the district court properly ruled that the Sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity on Carter's McCoy's, and Dixon's claims seeking money damages against the Sheriff in his individual capacity, and that the Sheriff was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity against those claims to the extent they sought monetary relief against him in his official capacity; and the Sheriff was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on Carter's, McCoy's and Dixon's claims to the extent the remedy sought was reinstatement. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bland v. Roberts" on Justia Law

This case concerned efforts by the Town of Nags Head, North Carolina, to declare beachfront properties that encroach onto "public trust lands" a nuisance, and regulate them accordingly. In the related appeal of Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, the district court adjudicated the claims but concluded that it was inappropriate for a "federal court to intervene in such delicate state-law matters," and abstained from decision under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. The court reversed the district court's decision to abstain in this case where resolving the claims in this case was not sufficiently difficult or disruptive of that policy to free the district court from its "unflagging obligation to exercise its jurisdiction." Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a correctional officer alleging that he used excessive force against plaintiff. Without provocation, the officer assaulted plaintiff for about two minutes before the officer moved plaintiff to a holding cell, knocking his head against a gate on the way out. The prison staff then kept plaintiff in ambulatory restraints for seventeen hours following the assault. On appeal, the officer appealed the district court's denial of his Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law. Because no extraordinary circumstances were applicable to plaintiff's injuries and he suffered no more than de minimis injury, he could not, at the time the assault took place, state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the right he sought to avail himself of was not clearly established in the Fourth Circuit at the time of the alleged suit and the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Hill v. Crum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Board, the County Sheriff, and two deputy sheriffs, alleging that the deputies violated her Fourth Amendment rights when, after questioning her at her workplace, they arrested her on an outstanding civil warrant for removal issued by ICE. The court concluded that the deputies did not seize plaintiff until one of the two deputies gestured for her to remain seated while they verified that the immigration warrant was active; the civil immigration warrant did not provide the deputies with a basis to arrest or even briefly detain plaintiff; the individual defendants were immune from suit because at the time of the encounter neither the Supreme Court nor the court had clearly established that local and state law enforcement officers could not detain or arrest an individual based on a civil immigration warrant; and qualified immunity did not extend to municipal defendants. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Santos v. Frederick County Board" on Justia Law

This case concerned a class action filed against defendants for contamination of plaintiffs' properties by gasoline and a gasoline additive (the Koch action). Former Koch class members subsequently filed a new class action (the Ackerman action). On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's order abstaining from exercising jurisdiction under the Colorado River doctrine. The court held that 28 U.S.C. 1446(d) affected only the jurisdiction of the state court only with regard to the case actually removed to federal court; because Koch was not removed, the state court maintained jurisdiction over it, and the amendment to the complaint in that case was not void ab initio; and the district court was correct to consider the amended Koch complaint in determining whether the Koch and Ackerman actions were parallel, and the district court did not abuse its discretion when concluding that exceptional circumstances warranted abstention in favor of the pending Koch action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Ackerman v. ExxonMobil Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Town after the Town declared plaintiffs' cottages to be in violation of its nuisance ordinance. The cottages were considered nuisances as a result of storm or erosion damage. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' procedural due process claims because plaintiffs' procedural due process rights were not violated where the Town never deprived plaintiffs of any property interest; affirmed the grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' equal protection claims because plaintiffs' equal protection rights were not violated where the Town had a rational basis for its decision to declare plaintiffs' cottages nuisances under the Town's ordinance; and remanded the takings claims based on the court's conclusion that a state and its political subdivisions waived the state-litigation requirement by removing a case to federal court. View "Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head" on Justia Law