Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, indicted for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and heroin, was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and deemed incompetent to stand trial. The district court, applying Sell v. United States, granted the government's motion to involuntarily medicate defendant for trial competency purposes. The district court did not mention or analyze any of the less intrusive alternatives suggested by the Supreme Court in Sell or by defendant himself. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings because careful findings concerning the availability of less intrusive means were necessary to vindicate the Supreme Court's admonition that forcible medication motions should be carefully scrutinized due to their impact on personal liberty. View "United States v. Chatmon" on Justia Law

This case involved two common methods employed to blend ethanol with conventional gasoline: inline blending and splash blending. Plaintiffs, API and AFPMA, brought federal preemption-based challenges in the district court seeking to enjoin enforcement of North Carolina's Ethanol Blending Statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-90. Although the court agreed with the district court insofar as it rejected plaintiffs' Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA), 15 U.S.C. 2801-2841, and federal renewable fuel program preemption challenges, the court held that genuine issues of material fact remained unresolved as to plaintiffs' Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051-1113, preemption challenge to the Blending Statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Petroleum Institute v. Cooper, III" on Justia Law

The Board petitioned for review of the FTC order finding that it violated the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45, by engaging in unfair competition in the market for teeth-whitening services in North Carolina. The court concluded that the Board was not exempt from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine; the Board engaged in a combination or conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; and substantial evidence supported the FTC's factual findings regarding the economic effects of the Board's actions and that those findings supported the conclusion that the Board's behavior violated section 1. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "The NC State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to her former employer, Mission, on her hostile work environment claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to establish that she had suffered a tangible employment action. The court also concluded that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Mission satisfied both elements of its affirmative defense. Mission could not be held vicariously liable for a supervisor's alleged harassment of plaintiff. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Mission. View "Crockett v. Mission Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed the underlying action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the witness residency requirement on nominating petitions impermissibly burdened their rights to free speech and free association under the First Amendment. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, with the Board's motion premised entirely on its assertion that plaintiffs have not suffered a legally cognizable injury and thus lacked standing. The district court denied the Board's motion as to standing and granted plaintiffs' motion on the merits. The district court declared the witness residency requirement unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. Although the Board's witness residency requirement served the Commonwealth's interest in policing fraud potentially permeating the electoral process and therefore meeting the first part of the strict scrutiny standard, the Board produced no concrete evidence of persuasive force explaining why plaintiffs' proposed solution, manifestly less restrictive of their First Amendment rights, would be unworkable or impractical. Accordingly, the court affirmed in all respects the judgment of the district court. View "Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd" on Justia Law

HomeAway filed suit in the District Court of Travis County, Texas, against Eye Street and others, asserting, inter alia, state law claims for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. Eye Street did not attempt to remove HomeAway's Texas suit to federal district court but, instead, filed its own action against HomeAway and others in federal district court. After HomeAway moved to dismiss Eye Street's action for improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer venue to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, the district court stayed the action pending the resolution of HomeAway's Texas lawsuit. On appeal, Eye Street challenged the propriety of the stay. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in staying Eye Street's action. Given the strong case for a stay under the United Capitol Insurance Co. v. Kapiloff factors and Eye Street's deliberate choice to forego removal, the district court's decision would be an appropriate exercise of discretion under either Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America/Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. or Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "VRCompliance LLC v. HomeAway, Inc." on Justia Law

Painter's Mill Grille, the owner and operator of a restaurant, and its principals filed a complaint against the restaurant's landlord and its agents. Plaintiff alleged that defendants, motivated by racial animus, interfered with plaintiff's business and its opportunity to sell the restaurant, including its leasehold interest, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, and 1985(3), as well as state tort principles. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiff's principals did not have standing to be plaintiffs and that Painter's Mill Grille did not set forth sufficient facts to state a claim to relief that was plausible on its face. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC against his employer, Dollar General, alleging that Dollar General failed to provide reasonable accommodation for his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213. While awaiting the EEOC's notice of his right to sue, plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Then plaintiff filed the present suit in district court. Dollar General moved for summary judgment, arguing that the filing of plaintiff's Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition deprived plaintiff of standing to maintain his ADA claim. The court agreed with its sister circuits and concluded that because of the powers vested in the Chapter 13 debtor and trustee, a Chapter 13 debtor could retain standing to bring his pre-bankruptcy petition claims. The court also concluded that because plaintiff was unable to show that he could perform the essential functions of his position with a reasonable accommodation, the district court properly granted summary judgment in Dollar General's favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View " Wilson v. Dollar General Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and their son appealed the district court's summary judgment holding that they were not entitled under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631, to an accommodation and a modification that they requested from the HOA. Plaintiffs had requested a modification to add a ramp leading to the front door of their home for use by their son, who required the use of a wheelchair. Plaintiffs also requested an accommodation to an HOA policy prohibiting the use of certain types of vehicles to allow the son to use an ATV within the community. The court vacated the district court's holding on the merits of the modification request for the wheelchair access ramp because that claim was not ripe; affirmed the district court's holding with respect to the accommodation request for permission to use an ATV because that request was not "reasonable" within the meaning of the Act; and affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' request for attorneys' fees and costs. View "Scoggins v. Lee's Crossing Homeowners Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate serving a life sentence, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging several constitutional violations relating to the conditions of his confinement. At issue on appeal was whether certain actions taken by prison officials after plaintiff's suspected receipt of contraband, including suspension of the inmate's visitation privileges for two years, violated his constitutional rights. The court concluded that the prison warden who imposed the challenged actions was shielded by qualified immunity from plaintiff's claim for monetary damages because, under the facts presented here, the inmate did not have a clearly established constitutional right to visitation. The court also held that because plaintiff's visitation privileges already have been restored, his request for injunctive relief must be dismissed as moot. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and affirmed in all other respects the judgment of the district court. View "Williams v. Ozmint" on Justia Law