Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, seeking to offer services as a psychic and spiritual counsel in the County of Chesterfield, challenged the application of regulations enacted by the County affecting fortune tellers. The County regulated fortune tellers in four ways, one of which was applicable to all those operating a business in the County, with the others more specific to fortune tellers. The district court considered and rejected plaintiff's claims and plaintiff subsequently appealed. The court held that the First Amendment Free Speech Clause afforded some degree of protection to plaintiff's activities where the County could not establish either premise of its argument that fortune telling was inherently deceptive speech outside the scope of the First Amendment. However, the County's regulations did not abridge plaintiff's First Amendment freedom of speech where the County's regulation of plaintiff's activities fell squarely within the scope of the professional speech doctrine. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that granting summary judgment to the County on plaintiff's constitutional and statutory religion claims was proper where plaintiff's beliefs comprised a way of life, and not a religious exercise. Finally, plaintiff's Equal Protection argument failed where the court, applying rational basis review, held that the County's regulatory scheme was rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, VA" on Justia Law

This case involved the City's adoption of an ordinance that proscribed "soliciting" in certain areas of the City. At issue was whether the ordinance restricted the free speech of individuals who regularly beg in the areas at issue. The court held that plaintiffs had standing to bring this First Amendment suit and that the complaint was improperly dismissed at the pleadings stage. The court found that plaintiffs have asserted a claim that the City enacted a content-based regulation, which was not the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the conduct of police officers lead to their son's death, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that all three officers involved in the incident were entitled to qualified immunity and awarded summary judgment in their favor. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that two of the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, but that the district court erred in awarding summary judgment in favor of the officer who repeatedly activated his taser at plaintiffs' son. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Meyers, Sr. v. Baltimore County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Bethel brought this action asserting that the County's zoning regulations, which prevented Bethel from constructing a church, violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., the United States Constitution, and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on all claims. The court concluded that the County had presented no evidence that its interest in preserving the integrity of the rural density transfer zone could not be served by less restrictive means, like a minimum lot-size requirement or an individualized review process. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on Bethel's substantial burden claim. The court affirmed in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery County Council" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Virginia inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants. Plaintiff is a pre-operative transsexual suffering from a diagnosed and severe form of a rare, medically recognized illness known as gender identity disorder (GID). She alleged that, in light of defendants' knowledge of her ongoing risk of self-mutilation, defendants' continued denial of consideration for sex reassignment surgery constituted deliberate indifference to her serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court concluded, however, that plaintiff's complaint stated a claim for relief that was plausible on its face and therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "De'Lonta v. Johnson" on Justia Law

This case involved the 18 U.S.C. 2703(d) orders pertaining to the Government's request for records of electronic communications relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. The underlying facts of the investigation related to the unauthorized release of classified documents to WikiLeaks.org, and the alleged involvement of a U.S. Army Private First Class. At issue was the public's right to access orders issued under section 2703(d) and related documents at the pre-grand jury phase of an ongoing criminal investigation. Because the court found that there was no First Amendment right to access such documents, and the common law right to access such documents was presently outweighed by countervailing interests, the court denied the request for relief. View "In re: 2703(d) Application" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Richmond International Airport and TSA agents, alleging violations of his constitutional rights when he was seized and arrested for displaying the text of the Fourth Amendment on his chest. The district court denied the TSA agents' motion to dismiss the First Amendment claim and the TSA agents appealed. Because the court found that the facts as alleged by plaintiff plausibly set forth a claim that the TSA agents violated his clearly established First Amendment rights, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Tobey v. Jones" on Justia Law

This case involved the constitutionality of the North Carolina "Woman's Right to Know Act," N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-21.80 to -21.92, a statute that required certain informed consent procedures prior to the performance of an abortion. Appellants - a group of pro-life medical professionals, women who have previously undergone abortions, and pregnancy counseling centers - filed a motion to intervene as defendants in the suit. The court affirmed the district court's denial of appellants' motion to intervene as of right based on its finding that the Attorney General was adequately representing their interests. The court held that the putative intervenor must mount a strong showing of inadequacy. In this instance, both the government agency and the would-be intervenors wanted the statute to be constitutionally sustained. The court also held that the district court did not err in concluding that appellants failed to establish adversity of interest with the Attorney General and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting appellants' claim of nonfeasance by the Attorney General. View "Stuart v. Huff" on Justia Law

The Town appealed the district court's invalidation of its municipal sign ordinance as it applied to a resident. Dissatisfied with the Town's efforts to resolve a dispute with the resident, the resident painted the words, "Screwed by the Town of Cary" across a fifteen foot swath of the facade of his home. The court acknowledged that the Town's Sign Ordinance, and in particular its application to the resident, has aggravated some town residents who believed that it was excessively restrictive. But their recourse lies with the ballot, not the Constitution. Because the Sign Ordinance had distinguished content for a constitutionally permissible purpose, the court held that it did not violate the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Bowden v. Town of Cary" on Justia Law

CFIF and WVFL are 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(4) organizations that engage in election-related speech. These organizations and an individual brought suit alleging that West Virginia's campaign finance statutes were constitutionally impermissible. At issue was whether West Virginia's campaign-finance reporting and disclaimer requirements could survive constitutional scrutiny, West Virginia Code section 3-8-1 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's decisions to (1) strike "newspaper, magazine or other periodical" from West Virginia's "electioneering communication" definition; (2) upheld the "electioneering communication" definition's exemption for grassroots lobbying; (3) declined to consider the merits of the CFIF's challenge to the bona fide news account exemption because the organization lacked standing; and (4) prohibited prosecutions for violations that occurred while the earlier injunctions were in effect. However, the court reversed the district court's decision with respect to (1) its conclusion that subsection (C) of the "expressly advocating" definition was unconstitutional; (2) its choice to uphold the "electioneering communication" definition's section 501(c)(3) exemption; and (3) its application of an "earmarked funds" limiting construction to the reporting requirement for electioneering communications. Because WVFL did not file a notice of appeal in this case, the court could not consider its challenge to the district court's finding that the statutory scheme's twenty-four- and forty-eight-hour reporting requirements were constitutional. Consequently, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Center for Individual Freedom v. Tennant, et al." on Justia Law