Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written agreement, to possession of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. At issue was whether the denial of defendant's motion under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2) to modify the terms of supervised release imposed as part of the original sentence fell within the scope of defendant's waiver, as part of his plea agreement, of his right to appeal his conviction and sentence and to contest his sentence in any post-conviction proceeding. The court held that it did where defendant's appeal from the denial of his motion fell within the scope of a broadly-worded appeal and therefore, dismissed the appeal.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death in Texas for the murders of four victims. Petitioner applied for a certificate of appealability (COA) so that he could appeal the district court's denial of his federal habeas relief on his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence at the punishment phase of his trial. The court concluded that reasonable jurists would not find debatable the district court's conclusion that the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law on the record before it, and that petitioner's claims were not adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Accordingly, the court denied petitioner's request for a COA.

Appellant, a journalist, appealed from the district court's entry of an order barring communication with the media and its denial of his motion to intervene in a case involving charges of terrorism. The government indicted defendant for attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and the day that the indictment was filed, the district court entered an order barring the parties, their representatives, and their attorneys of record from communicating with the news media about the case. On appeal, appellant argued that the district court wrongly found that he had no right to intervene and that the district court's gag order violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights. The court concluded that FRCP 4(a) controlled this appeal and that notice was timely; that the gag order affected appellant's right to gather news and therefore, he had standing to challenge it; but, on the merits, appellant had not shown that the gag order violated the First Amendment where the gag order was not overly broad on its face and the gag order did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the denial of his motion to intervene did not limit his right to earn a living through news gathering in violation of his due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendants were committed of health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349. Defendant Grant also was convicted of two counts of aiding and abetting health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1347 and 2. Defendants each appealed their convictions. The court concluded that: (1) the district court did not plainly err by admitting a co-conspirator's statements; (2) the government's second cross-examination of Grant was not reversible prosecutorial misconduct; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to elaborate with a missing witness instruction; and (4) there was proof enough to support defendants' convictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted illegal reentry in the United States after having been deported and one count of false personation. Defendant subsequently appealed her sentence, contending that the district court erred in applying a sixteen-level enhancement based on its conclusion that her prior Oklahoma kidnapping conviction was a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The court concluded that the district court erred because the Oklahoma offense did not constitute any of the enumerated offenses that were crimes of violence; nor did it have an element of "physical force," as that term was defined in Johnson v. United States. Therefore, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.

PLN, a non-profit corporation, brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the TDCJ and three individual TDCJ officials (collectively, defendants) for alleged First Amendment and due process violations with TDCJ's censorship of five books PLN wished to distribute to inmates in the Texas prison system. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that PLN had not presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on its First Amendment claims where PLN had, at most, demonstrated that reasonable minds might differ on whether to permit certain books into a general prison population, which was very different from demonstrating that TDCJ's practices and exclusions had no reasonable relation to valid penological objectives. The court also rejected PLN's due process claim, concluding that TDCJ's procedures were reasonable. Because TDCJ had not violated PLN's due process rights, the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for claims arising out of their son's death. The district court granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity against their claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in restraining him. Plaintiffs appealed and argued that the use of a four-point restraint in this case was excessive force and defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that the treatment of plaintiffs' son did not violate a clearly established right and consequently, defendants were protected by qualified immunity even if their conduct constituted excessive force.

Defendants were convicted of bank robbery by force or violence and aiding and abetting the commission of bank robbery by force or violence. Both defendants appealed the denial of their motions to sever and argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict. Additionally, defendant Kirkwood appealed the denial of her motion for a mistrial. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Kirkwood's motion to sever, defendant Owen's motion to sever, and Kirkwood's motion for a mistrial. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's decision to convict both defendants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions.

Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of a fellow inmate and subsequently appealed his conviction and sentence. Defendant raised several issues on appeal, including errors surrounding another inmate's dismissal; evidentiary errors at the guilt/innocence phase; prosecutorial misconduct throughout the trial; sentencing errors; and post-trial error. The court addressed each category of issues separately, ultimately affirming defendant's convictions and death sentence. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial.

Months before his criminal trial, petitioner moved to dismiss his appointed counsel in exercise of his constitutional right to represent himself under Faretta v. California. The trial court denied the motion and petitioner was subsequently convicted. On direct appeal, a state appellate court reversed the conviction due to the denial of petitioner's right to self-representation, but the court then granted rehearing, and a five-judge panel affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence. Petitioner subsequently filed a habeas corpus application in federal district court under 18 U.S.C. 2254, and the court granted relief. The court concluded that petitioner made a clear and unequivocal invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself and that the state trial court erroneously denied his request in violation of Faretta. The state court's implicit finding of waiver was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of habeas relief.