Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1993, Dixon and Hoffner beat their friend Hammer, tied him to a bed, stole his wallet and his automobile, drove him to a remote area, and buried him alive. One month into the investigation, Hoffner led police to Hammer’s body and Dixon provided a tape-recorded account of the events. Dixon was indicted for aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. At trial, the defense presented no evidence and cross-examined only three of 15 prosecution witnesses. The jury convicted Dixon on all charges and recommended the death penalty, which the court imposed. The Ohio Court of Appeals consolidated Dixon’s direct appeal and post-conviction appeal, arguing ineffective assistance, and affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court also affirmed. Dixon then filed a federal habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instructions, improper exclusion of mitigating evidence at sentencing, and violation of his Miranda rights. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit ruled that his confession was coerced, deeming his remaining claims pretermitted. In 2011 the Supreme Court reversed. After review of the remaining claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instruction, and exclusion of mitigating evidence at the penalty hearing, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of habeas corpus. View "Dixon v. Houk" on Justia Law

In 2007, Gillis was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 4.12 grams of crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, 21 U.S.C.841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 860(a) and sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment. On remand for reconsideration of the career-offender sentencing guidelines, in 2009, the district court resentenced Gillis to 191 months. Six months after the deadline to appeal his resentencing, Gillis wrote to the judge, acknowledging that his appeal was not timely and requesting that the court permit late appeal. His attorney subsequently filed a belated notice of appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed that appeal as untimely filed. Gillis filed a pro se motion to set aside his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not timely appeal. Gillis did not respond to a motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed because Gillis had not filed his 2255 motion within the one-year limitation period. The Sixth Circuit held that, although Gillis did not file his appeal for 201 days, there was appellate jurisdiction; when a district court fails to issue a separate judgment in denying a 2255 motion, a petitioner effectively has 210 days to submit an appeal. However, the district court properly dismissed Gillis’s 2255 motion as time-barred under 2255(f). View "Gillis v. United States" on Justia Law

A “millionaire party” involves betting on games of chance customarily associated with a gambling casino, using imitation money or chips that have a nominal value equal to or greater than the value of the currency for which they can be exchanged, Mich. Comp. Laws 432.103a(8). Millionaire-party licenses may be issued to a “qualified organization” for up to four consecutive days at a single location. Proceeds from a millionaire party, less “reasonable” expenses incurred to operate the event, must be “devoted exclusively” to the charitable purposes of the licensee. Following denial of licenses for millionaire parties to be held at adult businesses, plaintiffs sued, alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and that they were deprived of their constitutionally protected status as an “approved lessor” for millionaire parties without due process of law. They claim that the state adopted a blanket policy of denying all such applications in retaliation for Plaintiffs’ exercising their First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that plaintiffs’ allegations concerning retaliation must be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, but that being an “approved lessor” is not a protected entitlement. View "Top Flight Entm't, Ltd. v. Schuette" on Justia Law

Good, a Michigan inmate, claims he was convicted based on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The state trial court denied his motion to suppress without holding an evidentiary hearing, and a state appellate court denied his appeal. Good sought, and was denied, a federal writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the prohibition on federal habeas review of exclusionary rule claims that applies to prisoners who received “the opportunity for full and fair consideration” of their claims in state court. Because the Michigan Court of Appeals has rejected Good’s due process argument on the merits, Good may prevail only by showing that the decision was contrary to or unreasonably applied U.S> Supreme Court precedents, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). Good identified no Supreme Court holding establishing that the Due Process Clause ever requires an evidentiary hearing on a Fourth Amendment suppression motion. View "Good v. Berghuis" on Justia Law

Masked law enforcement agents, dressed in black, with guns drawn, broke into a Detroit home and allegedly assaulted and terrorized the plaintiffs. The agents were part of a multi-agency effort targeting drug trafficking and other crimes in the “8 Mile Corridor.” When the plaintiffs asked the intruders to identify themselves, the agents refused, responding instead that they were “Team 11.” In an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of state and local officials and, after the close of plaintiffs’ evidence, granted the federal agents judgment as a matter of law. Undisputed testimony indicated that the state and local defendants were not part of the entry team but provided only perimeter security. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to state and local defendants, but reversed with respect to the federal agents. Genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to the personal involvement of the federal officers in the raid and their alleged conduct in violating plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The circumstances of this case, which include an intentional concealment of identity, coupled with an “I wasn’t there” defense, warrants shifting the burden of production onto the federal agents to establish their lack of involvement. View "Burley v. Gagacki" on Justia Law

In 1994 an Ohio jury convicted Mason of aggravated murder, rape, and having a weapon while under disability; the court adopted a recommendation that Mason be sentenced to death. Mason’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal; state court collateral attack was unsuccessful. In 1999, Mason sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit granted a conditional writ to “result in the vacation of his death sentence unless the state of Ohio commences a new penalty-phase trial against him within 180 days from the date that the judgment in this matter becomes final.” On remand, the district court entered its own conditional writ recalculating the date on which the 180-day period began. The period set by the Sixth Circuit expired, and no retrial had commenced. Mason was subsequently removed from death row, and a new sentencing proceeding was scheduled. The district court rejected an argument that the state should be prevented from seeking the death penalty for failure to comply with the deadline. The Sixth Circuit modified, holding that the district court erred by recalculating the beginning of the 180-day period without authority, but that the state may, nonetheless, seek the death penalty at the penalty-phase retrial. View "Mason v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

After her child was murdered by his father, the mother sued employees of county and state Child Protective Services (CPS) and others,, alleging negligence; violations of constitutional rights (42 U.S.C. 1983); and violation of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act--Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. 670, and of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. 5106. The complaint alleged that from 1998-2007, CPS received numerous complaints about the father’s abuse and neglect of the child and his siblings. The district court rejected a defense of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The contours of the substantive due process right to be free from government action increasing the risk of harm was not sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that pursuing the father for use of a cattle prod, while failing to immediately remove the child, would violate the child’s substantive due process rights. Given previous cases, it is not clear that a reasonable CPS official would understand that failure to seek termination of parental rights would constitute denial of procedural due process. Without ignoring the father’s role in causing the child’s death, CPS employees’ conduct cannot be said to be the “most immediate, efficient, and direct cause” of the injury. View "Jasinski v. Tyler" on Justia Law

On May 12, 2009, Stewart arrived from Japan with two laptop computers. A Customs Officer randomly approached him and found Stewart’s responses “confrontational.” Searching one computer, the officer found thumbnail images that he believed to be child pornography; he called ICE Agent Young, who told Stewart that they were detaining his laptops for further examination, but he was free to leave. Young secured a warrant. Forensic examination led to an indictment on September 8, 2009. On February 5, 2010, Stewart moved to suppress, arguing that the “extended border search” was without reasonable suspicion. On May 24, 2010, the district court denied the motion. Stewart moved to dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, arguing that his June 15, 2010, trial date meant that he would not be brought to trial within 70 nonexcludable days of indictment. The district court dismissed without prejudide, stating that its calendaring program mistakenly kept Stewart’s motion to suppress under advisement for 67 days, when it should have excluded only 30 days. One month later, a grand jury returned a new indictment, charging two counts of transportation of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed his convictions, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in dismissing the earlier indictment without prejudice, rather than with prejudice; in denying his motion to suppress; in admitting two prosecution exhibits; and by not, sua sponte, instructing the jury on the statutory definition of “identifiable minor.” View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Grand Resort, which has operated in the Great Smoky Mountains since 1982, claims that TripAdvisor’s publication of a survey that concluded that Grand Resort was the dirtiest hotel in America caused irreparable damage to its business and that TripAdvisor used a flawed rating system that distorted actual performance and perspective. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the “dirtiest hotels” list is protected opinion; it reflects TripAdvisor’s users’ subjective opinions and is not capable of being defamatory. The court rejected a motion to amend to add claims of trade libel-injurious falsehood and tortious interference with prospective business relationships to the claims of false light-invasion of privacy and of defamation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that amendment of the complaint would be futile. View "Seaton v. TripAdvisor, LLC" on Justia Law

Droganes is a Kentucky fireworks dealer. In 2007, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) agents raided his business on suspicions that he was illegally selling “display” fireworks and seized more than 800,000 pounds of merchandise, only part of which proved to be contraband. Display fireworks are more powerful than consumer fireworks and are subject to greater regulation. Droganes pleaded guilty to distributing explosives without a license (18 U.S.C. 842(a)(1)) and agreed to forfeit the seized items determined by ATF to be display fireworks.” The government tendered a proposed forfeiture order encompassing all such fireworks, which the district court accepted. Droganes objected to the breadth of the order and the classification standard the government used to classify the fireworks and sought monetary sanctions for alleged failure to return the legal fireworks in a timely manner or to reimburse him. The district court rejected all of his claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court’s determination of forfeiture was consistent with Droganes’s plea agreement. The court acknowledged the “seemingly interminable delays in testing the seized fireworks, many of which the government knew not to be display fireworks.” View "United States v. Droganes" on Justia Law