Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals
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After a physical altercation in 1993, his wife (Carol) told O’Neal and his sons to leave the house. She filed a domestic complaint and planned to change the locks. O’Neal later returned to the house, broke through the front door and fired three shots Carol, one of which fatally wounded her. Carol’s son alleged that O’Neal also attempted to shoot him but that the gun jammed. A police canine unit later found him hiding in a nearby house where he surrendered. He confessed to the shooting. A forensic examination linked the bullet removed from Carol’s body to the pistol in O’Neal’s possession at the time of his surrender. Convicted of aggravated murder, O’Neal was sentenced to death. Ohio courts affirmed and denied post-conviction relief. A federal district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that three sub-70 IQ scores were insufficient on their own to prove O’Neal had significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. The court rejected claims, aimed at the aggravated burglary specification, that O’Neal received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to present the actual lease to support his assertion of contractual privilege to enter the house, and of spousal privilege. View "O'Neal v. Bagley" on Justia Law

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Three-month-old Jiyen was killed when 11 shots were fired into his home in a drive-by shooting. Prosecution witnesses testified to overhearing Drummond, discussing a retribution for the death of a fellow gang member, seeing Drummond with an assault rifle 15 minutes before the fatal shots were fired, and to hearing Drummond say that “he didn’t meant [sic] to kill the baby. A search of Drummond’s house yielded ammunition consistent with the shooting and a variety of items tying him to the gang. During the trial, the court twice closed the courtroom, once stating that witnesses felt threatened by some of the spectators. A jury found Drummond guilty on all counts; the trial court sentenced Drummond to death. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State courts denied post-conviction relief. A federal district court granted habeas corpus in part, holding that the state trial court violated Drummond’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Drummond’s family was removed from the courtroom after objection without any explanation regarding the scope of the closure and without considering any alternative options. View "Drummond v. Houk" on Justia Law

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An officer pulled over a car with expired tags. Booker was a passenger. The officer smelled marijuana. The driver told the officer that he could search the vehicle. The officer had previously arrested Booker and recovered 13 bags of marijuana concealed in his crotch. A drug-sniffing dog alerted near Booker. During a pat-down, the officer noticed that Booker clenched his buttocks, but found no drugs. Booker’s pockets contained large amounts of currency. A search of the front passenger seat revealed plastic bags: one contained .06 grams of marijuana, the others had residue. The officer arrested Booker for felony possession, despite not recovering enough marijuana to justify such an arrest under Tennessee law. At the police station, Booker fidgeted and tried to barricade himself in the room. During a strip search, officers observed a string protruding from Booker’s anus. Booker’s efforts to conceal the item led to an altercation. Booker was shackled and covered in a blanket for transport to the hospital. Although Booker denied having anything in his rectum, had normal vital signs, and refused to submit to a digital rectal examination, the doctor, who claimed to believe that Booker’s life was in danger, sedated him to perform an examination and removed a rock of crack cocaine, greater than five grams, from Booker’s rectum. The Sixth Circuit reversed Booker’s conviction. The unconsented procedure while Booker was under police control must be attributed to the state for Fourth Amendment purposes and “shocks the conscience.” View "United States v. Booker" on Justia Law

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Officers on patrol in a high-crime, high-drug area observed a vehicle, occupied by Hinojosa, parked next door to a house that had been the site of past drug activity. After Hinojosa walked up and down the driveway, went into the house, and left after less than one minute, officers followed him. There had been reports of drug manufacturing in an apartment in the building where he stopped. An officer exited the unmarked police car; the other parked the car so that it would not have blocked Hinojosa if he had tried to leave. The officer approached Hinojosa, indicating that he wanted to talk, with his hand on his weapon. Hinojosa, with his window rolled up, asked why he wanted to talk. The officer responded that they had suspicions about his odd behavior in the other driveway. After Hinojosa provided a driver’s license, a dispatcher stated that the license was suspended and that Hinojosa was on parole. Hinojosa was arrested. Hinojosa stated that he was carrying a pistol, which the officer removed from Hinojosa’s waistband. After denial of his motion to suppress, Hinojosa pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed: the questioning leading up to Hinojosa’s arrest and search occurred during a consensual encounter. A reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter. Hinojosa was not seized. View "United States v. Hinojosa" on Justia Law

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Vandiver filed a pro se civil action against Prison Health Services (PHS) and five medical professionals, alleging that the defendants violated and are continuing to violate his Eighth Amendment rights by deliberate indifference to the health care needs associated with his serious chronic conditions, including Hepatitis C and diabetes and that as a result, he has undergone partial amputations of his feet and suffered visual impairment. He claimed that he is at risk of further injury, including additional amputations, coma, and death. He acknowledged having previously filed three complaints that were dismissed as frivolous. The district court denied his application to proceed in forma pauperis, applying the three-strikes rule, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that alleging a danger of serious physical injury as a result of being presently denied adequate medical treatment for a chronic illness satisfies the imminent-danger exception to the three-strikes rule. Allegations of incremental harm culminating in serious physical injury may present a danger equal to that of an injury that occurs all at once. View "VanDiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

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The Michigan anti-begging statute, Mich. Comp. Laws 900, has existed since at least 1929 and provides that “[a] person is a disorderly person if the person is any of the following: ... (h) A person found begging in a public place.” A person convicted under section 750.167(1)(h) is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both. The Grand Rapids police recorded 409 incidents of police enforcing the anti-begging law from 2008–2011. Plaintiffs, two homeless adults, were arrested. One was holding signs saying: “Cold and Hungry, God Bless” and “Need Job, God Bless.” The other, a veteran, needed money for bus fare, and asked a person on the street: “Can you spare a little change?” The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the law was unconstitutional. Begging is a form of solicitation that the First Amendment protects and the statute cannot withstand facial attack because it prohibits a substantial amount of solicitation, but allows other solicitation based on content. View "Speet v. Schuette" on Justia Law

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The Contributor produces a street newspaper to educate people about homelessness and poverty and helps develop job skills for homeless and formerly homeless persons, employing them as street vendors. Two such vendors were cited for attempting to sell issues of the newspaper on the streets and sidewalks of Brentwood, Tennessee, under an ordinance that provided that no person could use or occupy any portion of the city street, alley, sidewalk or the public right-of-way to sell any goods or materials. The city then revised the ordinance to provide that it should not “be construed as prohibiting the sale or distribution of newspapers, magazines, periodicals, handbills, flyers or similar materials, except that: (1) Such activity shall be prohibited on any portion of any street within the city. (2) Such materials shall not be handed to the occupant of any motor vehicle that is on a street, nor shall any action be taken which is intended or reasonably calculated to cause the vehicle occupant to hand anything to the person selling or distributing the materials." The district court upheld the revised ordinance as leaving open adequate alternative channels of communication. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "The Contributor v. City of Brentwood" on Justia Law

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Like many Michigan municipalities, Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties, especially since 2008. Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager. Acting under Michigan’s then-existing emergency manager law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of Pontiac’s retired employees and modified severance benefits, including pension benefits, that Pontiac had given retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. The retired employees claim that Schimmel and Pontiac violated their rights under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied the retirees an injunction. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters have since rejected Public Act 4 by referendum, which may have rendered Schimmel’s actions void.The court also questioned whether two-thirds of both houses of the Michigan Legislature voted to make Public Act 4 immediately effective. The court noted that similar issues face many Michigan municipalities. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law

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In 2007 Hamilton Township imposed impact fees of about $2,100 per lot on developers of residential property. Salt Run, a residential developer, sought to avoid the fees by annexation to the Village of Maineville. Unable to stop the annexation in court, Hamilton Township imposed a lien on the property. Salt Run ultimately defaulted on its loan as a result of funding an escrow so that it could sell the property, despite the lien. Salt Run sued the Township, alleging a takings claim. While the case was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Hamilton Township had no authority to impose the fee. The district court granted judgment in favor of Salt Run on some claims but denied its claim that the lien amounted to an unconstitutional taking. Salt Run appealed that ruling and sought attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Salt Run was not a prevailing party and characterizing the suit as, at most, asserting an improper “collection mechanism.” View "Vill. of Maineville, OH v. Hamilton Twp. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

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In 2006, Shearson, the executive director of the Cleveland chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, was stopped by U.S. Customs and Borders Protection as she and her daughter were returning from Canada, removed her from her car, handcuffed her, and detained her for about 2-1/2 hours. Shearson claims that an officer swiped her passport and an “armed and dangerous” warning came up. After being allowed to enter the U.S., Shearson filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act for documents related to her detention. Following a suit, she obtained documents indicating that her name returned “an Armed and Dangerous” designation in Customs’ terrorist database and was a positive match to the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File. The FBI declined to discuss the matter and recommended that Shearson use an administrative remedy, the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, 49 U.S.C. 44926. Shearson did not seek redress through that Program, but filed suit claiming due process, First Amendment, Privacy Act, Administrative Procedures Act, and equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Shearson v. Holder" on Justia Law