Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Jena is a 19-year-old with a genetic disorder that causes physical defects and severe mental disability. She apparently communicates at the level of a child between the ages of five and seven and has the social skills of a child between four and eight. She reportedly told a teacher that her mother, Suzanne, “hit me.” The Oakland County Sheriff’s Department and Adult Protective Services (defendants), part of the Michigan Department of Human Services investigated. APS obtained an order appointing a guardian for Jena and authorizing her removal from the family home to a group foster facility. The family alleges that the defendants gave false testimony that Jena’s father made sexual comments about Jena. Following allegedly assaultive behavior, the probate court entered an order temporarily denying the family contact with Jena. Ultimately, Jena’s father was granted full custody and charges against her mother were dropped. The district court dismissed the family’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the court was the final decision-maker with respect to Jena’s custody. The court rejected substantive and procedural due process claims and a claim of violation of First Amendment right to family association. View "Kolley v. Adult Protective Servs." on Justia Law

In 2004, Ray was convicted on five counts of conduct involving child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252(a)(1), and 2252(a)(4)(B), and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 180 months, 300 months, and 600 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the district court failed to adequately explain its upward departure from the recommended sentencing guideline range, but noting that the evidence of Ray’s guilt was “overwhelming.” On remand, Ray was sentenced to concurrent terms of 180 month, 300 months, and 360 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court dismissed a pro se motion to vacate the sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, in which Ray argued that there was an illegal search and seizure, because the person who consented to the search of his home lacked authority to do so, and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering judgment without an evidentiary hearing. View "Ray v. United States" on Justia Law

A Juvenile Court standing order provided that social workers had authority to remove and provide temporary emergency care for children at imminent risk of serious physical or emotional harm and to request assistance by law enforcement officers. At a 2002 meeting, social workers determined that exigent circumstances required immediate removal of the children from Nancy’s home. A Temporary Emergency Care Order was completed in consultation with an assistant prosecuting attorney and a supervisor. A social worker, accompanied by police, went to Nancy’s home and took the children into temporary custody, and, the next day, filed a complaint for abuse, neglect, and temporary custody, with a notarized document detailing supporting reasons. A magistrate found that probable cause existed to support removal. In November 2005, Nancy and the children sued the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services, the social workers, and others. In 2010, the district court granted in part and denied in part the social workers’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of absolute immunity, denied the social workers’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and granted the children partial summary judgment on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to both absolute and qualified immunity. View "Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Nichols, a Tennessee state prisoner awaiting execution, had an “oppressive and forlorn childhood, due to his father’s abuse, his mother’s illness, their poverty, and the church-dominated society into which he was born” in 1960. Nichols graduated high school; he enlisted in the Army in 1981. He was discharged two years early. In 1984, he pled guilty to burglary and assault with attempt to rape. A psychological report found nothing remarkable. He married and had a stable relationship. In 1987 Nichols returned to jail for a prowling conviction and parole violation. He was released and returned to his wife and job. He began disappearing at night. Following rapes or attempted rapes of 12 women (Pulley died as a result) in 1988-1989, police received an anonymous tip identifying Nichols. Police showed photo-arrays to four victims, each of whom identified Nichols immediately. Nichols waived counsel and Miranda rights and videotaped a confession to four rapes. After being allowed to sleep, Nichols confessed to other rapes. Additional victims identified Nichols. Nichols directed a detective to recover the board used to murder Pulley. Nichols’s wife stated that Nichols had confessed to her. A Ph.D. and an M.D. found Nichols competent to stand trial. State courts rejected his appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief. In 2005 DNA testing confirmed Nichols as the source of sperm on Pulley’s clothing. The district court rejected his federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance and multiple procedural arguments. View "Nichols v. Heidle" on Justia Law

Romo was sleeping in the driver’s seat of a parked car, intoxicated, when he was approached by Officer Largen, who arrested Romo for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, based on Largen’s observation of Romo’s having driven the car minutes earlier. Romo claimed that he had not been driving and filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit claiming that Largen violated his constitutional rights and committed several intentional torts. The district court denied Largen’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified-immunity, finding that a jury could disbelieve Largen’s claim that he had seen a very similar car being driven in violation of traffic laws. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that it was bound by the district court’s finding that a genuine dispute of material fact existed. View "Romo v. Largen" on Justia Law

In 2001 Fitzpatrick killed his girlfriend, her 12-year-old daughter, and a neighbor. There were questions about his mental health. A pretrial hearing was held because of Fitzpatrick’s confession to his cousin that the devil had made him commit the crimes. The court took no action, based on the statement of the lead investigator that officers had no concerns about competence. After opening statements, in a sidebar, defense counsel stated that Fitzpatrick had indicated his desire to plead guilty and that he recommended against such action. The trial court advised Fitzpatrick of its disinclination to accept a guilty plea. Fitzpatrick insisted that he did not want to wait or to “put his family through this.” When the judge disagreed, Fitzpatrick demanded to be taken out of the courtroom and reiterated that he wanted to stop the trial. Following some discussion of competency and inquiries directed to Fitzpatrick, the court accepted the plea. A panel sentenced him to death. Ohio courts affirmed the convictions and sentence, and denied post-conviction relief. The district court denied petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Fitzpatrick’s statements did not give the trial court reason to believe that he did not understand the consequences of waiving a jury trial and pleading guilty. All three attorneys involved consistently represented that they thought that he was knowingly waiving his rights. View "Fitzpatrick v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Harkness, a reserve Commander in the Navy Chaplain Corps, was denied a promotion to the rank of Captain by an annual selection board. The Secretary of the Navy denied his request to convene a special selection board (SSB) to review that decision. Harkness filed suit, claiming that promotion policies and procedures for chaplains violated the Establishment Clause. The district court dismissed, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies required by 10 U.S.C. 14502(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that non-promoted officers must first petition the Secretary to convene an SSB. The Secretary must weigh certain factors, including whether an administrative error caused the original selection board not actually to consider the officer, or whether a material error caused the original board to mistakenly fail to recommend promotion. If the Secretary determines that an SSB is not warranted, the officer can seek review of that denial in federal court. The language of Harkness’s request apparently challenged only the composition of the board and fell short of giving the Secretary a meaningful opportunity to respond to Harkness’s constitutional contention. View "Harkness v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1986, Harrison was charged with second-degree murder and carrying a firearm during commission of a felony, but was convicted of reckless use of a firearm resulting in death (a lesser-included Misdemeanor) and felony-firearm. Harrison received consecutive sentences, although, under Michigan law, the crimes were subject to concurrent sentencing only. Released in 1990, Harrison committed another firearm offense in 1991, was convicted, and returned to prison. On collateral review of the first conviction, the Michigan Court of Appeals held, in 2008, that Harrison had been improperly sentenced and ordered issuance of a corrected judgment. Harrison sued the state and other defendants, seeking damages and reduction of a subsequent, unrelated prison sentence that he was still serving. The district court dismissed, holding that some defendants were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment; that claims against the remaining defendants were time-barred; and that a claim concerning the failure to commute his 1991 sentence was noncognizable. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding no error in the rulings on sovereign immunity and commutation, but holding that Harrison’s claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is not time-barred. View "Harrison v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

Toledo police officers, near a shopping center with few stores and in an area with many complaints of robberies, thefts, drug activity, and loitering, noticed a group of people, not going in or out of stores, but remaining together without any visible purpose. They also noticed a man on a bicycle, who rode across the parking lot. Jeter arrived on a bicycle, but was not a member of the group, nor was he the individual seen traversing the parking lot; he entered a store and purchased a snack and bottled water. Exiting the store, he consumed the snack, placed his water on his bicycle, and then began to leave just as officers arrived to “saturate” the plaza and prevent anyone from leaving. TPD implements this “bum rush” tactic “every couple weeks” in areas of suspected criminal activity, to get “more gun[s] off the street” or “more person[s] with outstanding warrants.” Thinking he was the person they had seen earlier, officers stopped Jeter, who ran. When officers caught Jeter, they found a handgun. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Jeter pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion. His advisory Guidelines range was 30 to 37 months. The district court sentenced Jeter to 45 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Jeter" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Adult-Oriented Establishment Registration Act of 1998 is a county-option state law to address deleterious secondary effects associated with adult-oriented businesses, including crime, spread of venereal disease, and decreased property values. Adult-oriented establishments that are subject to the Act, and their employees, must obtain licenses. The Act prohibits nudity, certain sexual activities, touching of certain anatomical areas, all physical contact during performances, sale or consumption of alcohol on the premises; it requires that all performances occur on a stage at least 18 inches above floor level with all performers at least six feet away from customers and other performers. Shelby County adopted the Act in 2007. Owners of adult establishments challenged the ordinance. Following denial of a preliminary injunction, the district court granted summary judgment upholding the law, except with respect to a claim of facial invalidity attacking the reasonableness of coverage of establishments featuring “briefly attired” dancers. The court then rejected that challenge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting First Amendment challenges. View "Entm't Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cnty." on Justia Law