Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Local resident Banks told police that on a specified date, he witnessed manufacture of methamphetamine, firearms, and a bomb at Hodge’s home. He observed a person shaking “sports drink bottles that appeared to have a grayish, sandy, sludge in the bottom with liquid and pieces of black chunks floating on the top,” characteristic of a “one pot style methamphetamine cook.” Banks gave a detailed description of a pipe bomb. Hodge claimed it could “blow up the entire house,” showed Banks a firearm that he called an AK-47, and told Banks that, if confronted, he “would shoot every cop that he could.” Officers obtained a warrant and found a pipe bomb, marijuana, prescription drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a rifle. Indicted for possession of an unregistered destructive device, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), and possession of a firearm while unlawfully using a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Hodge moved to suppress, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause and that statements he made alerting officers to the pipe bomb were obtained through custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. The district court denied the motion. Hodge entered a conditional guilty plea. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The questioning was permissible because officers had a reasonable belief based on articulable facts that they were in danger. View "United States v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Three minors told Cincinnati police that Rose had sexually molested them and had shown them pornographic images on a computer in his bedroom. Police obtained a warrant to search Rose’s computers; its front page identified “Kenneth Rose” as the subject, and immediately below, identified the search location as “709 Elberon Av. [sic], Cincinnati, Hamilton County, Ohio.” The warrant described physical attributes of the address, including that the name “Rose” appeared over the doorbell of apartment number one and included a photograph of the property taken from the Hamilton County Auditor’s website. The supporting affidavit summarized the testimony of the three victims, but did not provide Rose’s address. Forensic analysis of a computer seized during the search revealed numerous images of child pornography, with several of Rose engaged in sexual conduct with male minors under the age of 16. Rose entered into a conditional plea agreement, pleading guilty to three counts of production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251, preserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress and his motion to dismiss. He was sentenced to 51 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the warrant and an argument that the charged activities were only intrastate. View "United States v. Rose" on Justia Law

Peterson is a prisoner in Michigan’s Iona maximum-security penitentiary, convicted of murder. After a scuffle during an attempt to remove Peterson from his cell, an officer filed a major misconduct report, alleging assault and battery. Peterson appeared at his hearing, heard all the evidence, pled not guilty, provided sworn statements to support his account, called witnesses in his defense, and moved to disqualify the hearing officer for bias. The only evidence that the hearing officer did not permit Peterson to view was the video of the event, exercising his authority under Mich. Comp. Laws 791.252(h), stating that “to allow [the video’s] actual viewing would reveal the limitations and capabilities of the fixed security device.” The hearing officer gave Peterson a detailed description the video, including the time-stamped second of each event. The hearing officer imposed a sentence of 30 days in detention. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, alleging cruel and unusual punishment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that where a disputed issue of fact is resolved at a major misconduct hearing as a necessary part of the hearing’s judgment, it has preclusive effect in collateral litigation brought by the prisoner. View "Peterson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Grigsby, a middle-age man who lived in homeless shelters, was charged with three unarmed bank robberies, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Psychologists conducted examinations and filed reports that diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia and stated that Grigsby was not competent to stand trial. Neither party objected. The court committed Grigsby to custody (18 U.S.C. 4241(d)(1)) to determine whether he could be restored to competency to stand trial. Forensic evaluators concluded that Grigsby did not understand the seriousness of his legal difficulty; lacked ability to assist his lawyer during trial; and was not capable of waiving his constitutional rights rationally or of testifying on his own behalf. Grigsby refused to take oral medication. Because he was not gravely disabled and did not present a danger to himself, others, or the facility, he did not meet the criteria for involuntary medication. The evaluators requested an order authorizing them to inject Grigsby involuntarily with a first-generation antipsychotic drug, (haloperidol (Haldol) or fluphenazine), or a second-generation antipsychotic drug, risperidone, to restore competency. These medications can cause serious side effects. The district court granted an order under Sell v. U.S. (2003). The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that special circumstances unique to the case indicate that Grigsby’s liberty interest in avoiding involuntary medication outweighs the government’s interest in prosecution. View "United States v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

Officers responded to a call describing a male yelling for help outside an apartment, followed by a report that a naked male entered a nearby apartment. Approaching, Tieber encountered a naked male, Martin, age 19, running and speaking nonsensically. Martin asked for help, then “jogged away.” Tieber ran and fell on Martin’s back. Semanco dropped his knee into Martin’s side, fell on top of both men, and delivered “compliance body shots.” Martin bit Tieber; Tieber struck Martin’s face. Semanco struck Martin’s face, back, and ribs at least five times. Tieber folded his legs around Martin’s hips and gripped Martin’s chin with his arm. As Tieber and Semanco attempted to secure Martin’s arms, Zimmerman kneeled on Martin’s calves. Officers heard a “gurgling sound.” They rolled an unresponsive Martin onto his side, tried to resuscitate him, and called paramedics. Martin died. The coroner determined that Martin died from an acute psychotic episode with excited delirium due to LSD intoxication and cardiopulmonary arrest. The pathologist who conducted the autopsy noted injuries suggesting asphyxiation. A pathologist hired by Martin’s estate agreed. The department had a use-of-force policy, and a “Positional Asphyxia Policy” that warns that a person, psychotic due to mental illness or drugs or alcohol, is particularly susceptible to death. Two officers said they never considered this policy. In the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers summary judgment on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Martin v. City of Broadview Heights" on Justia Law

In 1997, Howell, then 17, and five friends left Kentucky, taking guns and a rickety car. At a rest stop in Tennessee, Lillelid, approached the group, sharing his religious views. Risner displayed a gun, directed the Lillelid family to their van even though Lillelid offered his keys and wallet. Risner, still armed, Howell, and others rode with the Lillelids to a secluded road where the Lillelids and their children were shot. Only two-year-old Peter survived, but lost an eye. When they were caught in Arizona, the group had the Lillelids’ possessions. All pled guilty in adult court in exchange for withdrawal of death-penalty requests and for certainty about other punishments. Howell received three life sentences without the possibility of parole and 25 years for attempted murder, each to be served consecutively, plus 25 years for especially aggravated kidnapping, 12 years for aggravated kidnapping and four years for theft, to run concurrently. State courts rejected Howell’s post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on her attorney’s failure to insist that she undertake a psychological evaluation The Tennessee Supreme Court held that, although the attorney had performed deficiently, Howell could not show prejudice. The federal district court rejected her habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Howell v. Hodge" on Justia Law

In October 2008, Deputy Kuhn, a black man, stopped Joseph, a white woman for a traffic violation. Joseph falsely reported that Kuhn had raped her during the stop. An internal investigation into the allegation was not closed until January 2009. Several months after the investigation closed, Kuhn requested medical leave based on stress. Kuhn eventually took approximately seven months of paid and unpaid leave that did not end until he was terminated in January 2010. He filed suit against the county, and his superior. Against the county only, Kuhn asserted claims for termination without due process of law, violation of Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 15.361, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Kuhn asserted a claim against his superior only for tortious interference with business expectancy. Against both, Kuhn asserted racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, racial discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII, and racial discrimination and harassment in violation of Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2101. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Kuhn v. County of Washtenaw" on Justia Law

In sight of Nixon and Greene, Ballinger had an argument with Jones, retrieved a rifle and began shooting, then fled. Two men died of gunshot wounds. There was no physical evidence tying Ballinger to the scene; the prosecution presented testimony by Nixon and Greene. Before trial, defense attorney Jackson filed a list of potential alibi witnesses, which included Krisel. After the government objected to the notice, Jackson withdrew it. The jury convicted Ballinger. Before sentencing, Ballinger argued ineffective assistance due to Jackson’s failure to call Cunningham, claiming that Cunningham was Krisel’s married name and Jackson was aware of her possible testimony. The court denied Ballinger’s motions. Michigan courts rejected appeals. On a habeas corpus petition, the district court held an evidentiary hearing at which Jackson testified that he did not argue alibi because Ballinger admitted committing the murders. Cunningham testified that she was Krisel and was with Ballinger when the crimes were committed, that Jackson never contacted her, but that she never tried to contact authorities. The district court considered that Jackson was later disbarred on an unrelated matter and granted the petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting an evidentiary hearing, given that a state court had issued a decision on the merits with respect to the claim. State courts did not violate clearly established federal law in rejecting Ballinger’s ineffective-assistance claim. View "Ballinger v. Preslesnik" on Justia Law

When her car was stopped, Villega, then pregnant, failed to produce a valid driver’s license. At the jail, an agent of the U.S. through Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 287(g) program, 8 U.S.C. 1357(g), determined that Villega was not lawfully in the U.S. A detainer was imposed, so that federal immigration officials would delay action until resolution of pending state charges. Unable to post bond, she was classified as a medium-security inmate because of the detainer and held for two days, until she informed a guard that she was about to have her baby. For transportation, Villega was placed on a stretcher with her wrists handcuffed in front of her body and her legs restrained together. At the hospital, the handcuffs were removed, but one of Villega’s legs remained shackled to the stretcher before and after the birth. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment on her shackling and denial-of-breast-pump claims; a jury awarded $200,000. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, noting material factual disputes surrounding whether Villega was shown to be a flight risk, whether officers had any knowledge about a doctor’s no-restraint order, and the conflicting expert testimony about the ill effects of shackling. View "Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty." on Justia Law

Moore was convicted in Ohio state court of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping. The district court conditionally granted his habeas petition based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and improper jury instructions. The Sixth Circuit reversed and rejected Moore’s additional claims of ineffective assistance for failure to employ a mitigation specialist, of prosecutorial misconduct in presenting testimony by the victim’s father and in making comments about the defense, and concerning police treatment of the then-19-year-old Moore. View "Moore v. Mitchell" on Justia Law