Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

For many years, Warren, Michigan, has put up a winter holiday display in the atrium of its civic center, with a range of secular and religious symbols, including a lighted tree, reindeer, snowmen, a nativity, and a “Winter Welcome” sign. After the city refused to remove the nativity in 2010, the Foundation asked the city to add a sign: “At this season of THE WINTER SOLSTICE may reason prevail. There are no gods, no devils, no angels, No heaven or hell. There is only our natural world, Religion is but Myth and superstition That hardens hearts And enslaves minds…. KEEP THEM SEPARATE”. The city refused. The district court rejected the Foundation’s constitutional claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The nativity scene, when accompanied by a collection of secular and seasonal symbols, does not amount to an establishment of religion or an impermissible endorsement of it. View "Freedom From Religion Found. v. City of Warren" on Justia Law

The Nimers own land, zoned for residential use, where they operate a business that produces meat snacks. They began constructing buildings to expand the business to include butchering. They did not get zoning certificates. A state court enjoined the Nimers from putting the buildings to any use other than keeping and feeding animals, without the necessary zoning certificates. Several days after appealing the state court decision, the Nimers sued Litchfield Township in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court decided to abstain and dismissed without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit remanded with instructions to stay the case. While Younger abstention applies to section 1983 damages claims, a district court lacks the power to decide whether to dismiss such a damages claim. Where plaintiffs seek only legal relief (in the form of damages), relief that does not involve the district court’s equitable or discretionary powers, then the district court may not exercise its discretion to decide whether to dismiss the case; instead, the district court must stay the damages claim pending the outcome of the state court proceedings. View "Nimer v. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Trs" on Justia Law

Quigley was 23 years old, with no known life-threatening physical conditions when he was transferred from one Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) facility to an MDOC guidance center, where he was under the care of CMS, a service provider with which MDOC contracted. CMS employees Dr. Thai and physician’s assistant Garver treated Quigley for moderate depression and prescribed medications. After about a month, Quigley was found dead in his cell. The medication chart confirmed that Quigley had been administered both Amitriptyline and Trazodone the previous three days. The autopsy report concluded that Quigley died of an epileptic seizure disorder. Quigley’s estate obtained affidavits from a forensic pathologist, who concluded that Quigley likely died from a fatal drug interaction between the tricyclic Amitriptyline and tetracyclic Trazodone and from a psychiatrist, who similarly concluded that the fatal drug interaction likely killed Quigley. Thai provided three medical-expert affidavits, all concluding that the best explanation for Quigley’s death is epileptic seizure. Quigley’s estate sued Thai, Garver, and CMS under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied a motion asserting qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that there were unresolved material questions of fact concerning the cause of death. View "Quigley v. Thai" on Justia Law

Officers tried to serve an arrest warrant on Brown at 3171 Hendricks Avenue in Memphis. On Hendricks Avenue, they could not find a house with a 3171 address, but found two houses on opposite sides of the street with a 3170 address. Noticing that one of the two houses was occupied, they knocked, a woman answered, and she promptly shut the door. While one officer went to the back of the house, the other knocked again. After several minutes, the occupant opened the door. Instead of asking the woman what the address of the house was, whether Brown lived there or whether this was the odd-numbered side of the street, the officer represented to the woman that he had a warrant “for this address.” The woman let the officers into the house, owned by Shaw, where they performed a protective sweep and found a lot of cocaine. They arrested Shaw. The district court denied Shaw’s motion to suppress and pled guilty to distributing cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the officers had no right to enter the house based on a falsity and that their actions were not reasonable. View "United States v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Officer Parks stopped the car driven by Johnson based on a seat-belt violation. Approaching the vehicle, he smelled marijuana and noticed a license plate on the seat. A passenger admitted she had smoked marijuana in the car and initially provided her sister’s identification information. Johnson stated that he knew he would be arrested because a condition of release for a prior conviction required him to stay away from the passenger and that he was a convicted felon and had a loaded gun underneath the seat. Once the database (NCIC) confirmed that Johnson had been ordered to stay away from LuShanda Giles, Parks handcuffed Johnson; located the passenger’s identifying information, confirming that she was LuShanda; and recovered the weapon. The district court denied a motion to suppress the firearm. Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924. The court held that a Tennessee conviction of facilitation to commit aggravated robbery was not a violent felony, but that a conviction of first-degree stalking did qualify and sentenced Johnson to 180 months, the minimum mandatory under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to both the denial of suppression and the sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Coley was convicted in Ohio of aggravated murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery and firearm specifications, based on events that occurred in 1996. He was sentenced to death on the aggravated murder charges. His petition for state post-conviction relief was rejected at all levels. The federal district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to the indictment; ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to request that the trial judge recuse herself; prosecutorial misconduct for using inconsistent theories to convict; ineffective assistance of counsel during mitigation; ineffective assistance of counsel during mitigation for failing to request that trial judge recuse herself; ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; failure to consider mitigating evidence; and of error in the trial court’s decisions to not provide Coley with grand jury transcripts and to not sever certain counts. View "Coley v. Bagley" on Justia Law

D.W., age 13, alleged (42 U.S.C. 1983) that state defendants violated his procedural due process rights by listing him on the Tennessee child abuse registry. After an interview with a case manager, D.W. requested review and submitted information regarding the alleged victim’s inconsistent statements, but never was told the evidence against him. Children’s Services upheld the classification. Children’s Services then denied administrative review because the classification did not affect his employment. D.W. claimed that being listed deprived affected his liberty interest in pursuing common occupations, because Tennessee law prohibits his employment with child-care agencies and programs and adult-daycare centers and that the listing prohibits contact with children during the course of state agency employment. The district court held that D.W. did not present a justiciable controversy because the alleged deprivation was the possibility of future harm. The Sixth Circuit reversed. D.W. has standing to seek additional procedures because those procedures, if granted, could result in relief that is sufficiently concrete and particularized. The classification is complete and will not be expunged from state records; this is not a generalized grievance or an injury to a third party. No further facts are needed to determine whether the boy was afforded adequate process. View "Wright v. O'Day" on Justia Law

Deen was convicted of distributing five grams or more of cocaine base and sentenced to prison for 66 months, followed by four years of supervised release. Deen began his supervised release in 2011. Months later, at a revocation hearing, Deen pleaded guilty to violations stemming from domestic violence incidents, alcohol use, and failure to report and to attend behavioral therapy. The government pushed for “a significant term of imprisonment where [Deen] hopefully can get some treatment for alcohol abuse, and perhaps counseling in terms of anger management.” The court sentenced Deen to 24 months’ imprisonment, followed by 24 months of supervised release. The judge explained her decision in terms of the goal of rehabilitation. In 2012, Deen and the government jointly requested that this court vacate Deen’s sentence and remand for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court decision, Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011), that hat the Sentencing Reform Act does not permit a court to “impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.” The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the bar on sentencing decisions based on rehabilitative needs applies equally to supervised-release sentences. View "United States v. Deen" on Justia Law

The Memphis nightclub is located in a zoning district where adult entertainment has been prohibited since 1993. Although already allowed to present most forms of adult entertainment under a grandfather clause, the club desires to present adult entertainment in the form of compensated nude dancers and claims that an ordinance requiring a permit to present nude dancers is unconstitutional as an improper prior restraint and as vague. The club claims that a city official’s actions violated its procedural due process rights. Following a remand, the district court rejected its suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the club had forfeited its prior restraint argument, had not established vagueness, and had not established that it was deprived of a protected property or liberty interest when its dance permit was revoked and not reissued. View "600 Marshall Entm't Concepts, LLC v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

USCA is a non-profit national civic league with approximately 27,000 members that devotes itself to conservative values and opposes efforts of the federal government to interfere with market processes. Some of USCA’s uninsured members object to the purchase of private health insurance because they do not believe in the effectiveness of traditional medicine, prefer alternative and integrative medicine, or prefer to focus on preventative care that is not covered by traditional health insurance policies. Two individual plaintiffs do not have, nor do they wish to acquire, health insurance, but they are not exempt from the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate, 26 U.S.C. 5000A. They challenged the mandate as violating the Commerce Clause, rights to freedom of expressive and intimate association, rights to liberty, and rights to privacy. The district court dismissed in part, without substantive analysis, holding that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the “plausibility standard” and entered summary judgment on the Commerce Clause challenge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the Supreme Court’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius controls the outcome on the Commerce Clause count and the remaining constitutional claims were correctly dismissed for failure to state a claim. View "U.S. Citizens Ass'n v. Sebelius" on Justia Law