Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, Hickman County, received a referral regarding allegations of abuse concerning the Andrews. A social worker was attempting to make contact when DCS received a second referral concerning the Andrews. Due to references to guns in the home and because the site visit was to be carried out at night, DCSs requested law enforcement to assist. The Sheriff’s Department dispatched two officers. Andrews was outside working when the group arrived and asked the officers to wait outside while he called the sheriff’s office. The Andrews claim that when Mr. Andrews opened the door, he was immediately followed into the house by a “whoosh of presence.” The Andrews claim that they granted permission for interviews of the children because they feared arrest or losing their children. The officers left the house and the Andrews acquiesced to the walk-through. No charges were filed and the assessment was closed as “no services indicated.” The Andrews filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to the social workers, but affirmed with respect to an officer. View "Andrews v. Hickman County" on Justia Law

Minor political parties sought ballot access (Green Party of Tennessee and Constitution Party of Tennessee) and sued, alleging that requirements to qualify for the Tennessee ballot as a “recognized minor party” were overly restrictive and impermissibly burdened First Amendment rights and were unconstitutionally vague and constituted improper delegation of legislative authority; that provisions governing the order in which political parties are listed on the general-election ballot violate the Equal Protection Clause; and that prohibition on the use of the words “independent” and “nonpartisan” in minor-party names contravenes the First Amendment. The district court granted plaintiffs summary judgment on all claims, enjoined enforcement, ordered that the plaintiffs be placed on the November 2012 ballot, and directed the state to conduct random drawing to determine the order in which each party would appear on the ballot. The Sixth Circuit granted a stay with respect to the random-public-drawing. In the meantime, the Tennessee General Assembly amended some, but not all, of the invalidated provisions, relaxing the requirements. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the district court erred on some claims, that some claims were moot, and that the trial court should initially determine the validity of the amendments. View "Green Party of TN v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Moore voluntarily surrendered to Detroit police in connection with a shooting homicide. He asked an officer to call a number on an attorney’s business card. The officer called and reached an answering service and so informed Moore. Moore indicated he wanted to make a statement and signed a waiver of rights. The officer questioned Moore, who made an incriminating statement. There was no clear subsequent request for an attorney. The statement was admitted at trial, over Moore’s objections. Moore was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, being a felon in possession, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to life, three to five years, and two years imprisonment, respectively. His conviction was affirmed; Michigan courts denied his post-conviction motion. Moore sought federal habeas corpus. The district court denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The Michigan court unreasonably found a waiver absent a factual finding, and despite evidence to the contrary, that Moore, not the officer, had reinitiated communications. The trial court effectively required that Moore assert his right to counsel a second time in order to secure it. The error was not harmless. View "Moore v. Bell" on Justia Law

Michigan promotes recycling of beverage containers by offering a cash refund of a 10-cent deposit to consumers and distributors. Retailers are required to accept empty containers of beverages that they sell. The Bottle Bill requires containers to indicate the state and the refund value as “MI 10ç” on each container. To address under-redemption, Michigan mandated that unclaimed deposits escheat to the state. A 1998 study estimated that fraudulent redemption of containers originating outside Michigan resulted in annual loss of $15.6 to $30 million. Michigan criminalized fraudulent redemption and, in 2008, required that, in addition to the MI 10ç designation, containers for certain beverages bear a “symbol, mark, or other distinguishing characteristic” to allow a reverse vending machine to determine whether a container is returnable. An industry association claimed violation of the Commerce Clause. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding that Mich. Comp. Laws 445.572a(10) is neither discriminatory nor extraterritorial and that a question of material fact existed on the extent of the burden on interstate commerce. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, finding that the unique mark requirement is not discriminatory. However, because that requirement forces distributors to adopt the unique labeling system, without consideration of less burdensome alternatives, it has impermissible extraterritorial effect. View "Am. Beverage Ass'n v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Campbell and Gemperline were attacked on different dates by a canine unit police dog (Spike). They filed suit under 42 U.S.C 1983 against the canine’s handler, the chief of police, and the city, alleging excessive force, failure to supervise, failure to properly train, and state law claims for assault and battery. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Prior to both bite incidents, the handler notified supervisors that he had been unable to keep up with maintenance training and repeatedly requested that they allow him time to attend training sessions, but his requests were denied. Spike’s state certifications lapsed for several months. There was evidence that Spike was involved in biting incidents with growing frequency in the first three years of his deployment in the field. A jury could also reasonably conclude that the handler acted in bad faith or in a wanton or reckless manner, based on the plaintiffs’ allegations about his conduct and statements at the time of the attacks. View "Campbell v. City of Springboro" on Justia Law

Officer Martin was called to a grocery store following an alleged shoplifting. Martin took possession of a cell phone allegedly dropped by the perpetrator. Based on a conversation with a person listed in the phone’s “contacts” list, he went to Summit Medical Center where Sutton worked. The confrontation between the two resulted in Sutton’s arrest for shoplifting. A jury acquitted Sutton, who subsequently sued Martin and the Nashville and Davidson County Metropolitan Government for federal constitutional violations and state common law and statutory violations. The district court dismissed Sutton’s claims based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments but denied the motion as to Sutton’s Fourth Amendment claim regarding an unreasonable seizure, finding that he had adequately stated a cause of action and that Martin was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Martin is protected by qualified immunity with regard to his initial contact with Sutton and in continuing to detain Sutton after the latter was positively identified by the store’s security guard. Allegations concerning Martin’s conduct between those two events were, however, sufficient to state a claim that precludes qualified immunity at this stage in the litigation View "Sutton v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty." on Justia Law

In 2003, in the getaway from an armed bank robbery, Parks crashed his car while fleeing police and killed his passenger, a co-conspirator. Parks pled guilty to bank robbery resulting in the killing of another (18 U.S.C. 2113(e)) and agreed to a sentence of 372 months, but reserved his right to appeal whether a 2113(e) violation requires mens rea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, but remanded with respect to the mandatory minimum penalty. On remand, the district court held that Congress, in amending 2113(e) when it enacted the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, intended to increase the mandatory minimum sentence from 10 years to life imprisonment or death in all 2113(e) cases where death results. The district court also concluded that it was bound by the prior plea agreement. Parks moved to withdraw his plea and to declare 2113(e) unconstitutional. The district court concluded that the arguments were beyond the scope of remand and re-sentenced Parks to 372 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly applied the Circuit Court’s mandate and found that the statute requires a mandatory minimum sentence of life, even though Parks arranged for a plea agreement of less than life. View "United States v. Park" on Justia Law

In 1998, Rimmer was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Ellsworth. Rimmer later learned that the federal government had conducted a joint investigation of Ellsworth’s murder with the Memphis Police Department, which, he claims, produced exculpatory evidence. Rimmer instituted state post-conviction proceedings, and obtained some, but not all, of the allegedly exculpatory evidence from the police department. Rimmer submitted a FOIA request that sought all relevant FBI documents. The FBI released 189 full or partially redacted pages from a total of 616 pages. The U.S. Department of Justice upheld the limited release. Rimmer filed claims under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 702, the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. 1361, and FOIA, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(b). The FBI then determined that relevant files contained 786 pages and released them, but 704 pages were partially redacted. The district court dismissed Rimmer’s APA and mandamus claims as precluded by an adequate remedy under FOIA and granted the government summary judgment on Rimmer’s FOIA claim, holding that the redactions were proper under FOIA Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D) and that, in the case of the 7(C) redactions, there was not a “countervailing public benefit” to support disclosure of otherwise protected information. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Rimmer v. Holder" on Justia Law

Michigan adopted race-conscious admissions policies for public colleges and universities in the 1960s and 1970s, In 2003, the Supreme Court held that universities cannot establish racial quotas but could continue considering race or ethnicity as a ‘plus’ factor along with other relevant factors, On a 2006 statewide ballot, Proposal 2, to amend the Michigan Constitution “to prohibit all sex- and race-based preferences in public education, public employment, and public contracting” passed by a margin of 58 to 42 percent and eliminated consideration of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in admissions decisions. No other admissions criterion (grades, athletic ability, geographic diversity, or family alumni connections) was eliminated. Opponents filed suit, alleging that provisions affecting public colleges and universities violated the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes. The district court issued postponed application of Proposal 2. In 2008, the district court entered summary judgment, rejecting the suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the “existence of such a comparative structural burden” (making the policy constitutional in nature) undermines the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee that all citizens ought to have equal access to the tools of political change. View "Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of MI" on Justia Law

In 1985 Moreland lived with his girlfriend Glenna and seven others. After arguing with Glenna, Moreland left, returned with a rifle, and killed Glenna and four others. An 11-year-old child and another were injured but survived. When Moreland was arrested, he told officers that it was “too late” and was uncooperative. At trial, Moreland presented expert testimony that he would have had a blood alcohol level between .30 and .36 around the time the murders were committed, suggesting that he was too intoxicated to carry out the acts as described. Other witnesses reported seeing Moreland that night and called into question his intoxication defense. A three judge panel convicted Moreland and sentenced him to death. The Ohio Court of Appeals and Ohio Supreme Court affirmed; the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. State courts denied relief in state post-conviction proceedings. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254), rejecting claims of insufficient evidence, that the court did not conduct an adequate evidentiary hearing on a child eyewitness’s competence to testify, that the court wrongly excluded expert testimony concerning the child, and that Moreland was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Moreland v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law