Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Clay was appointed as public records coordinator for the City of Memphis. The volume of public-record requests increased substantially during an FBI investigation into awards of city contracts. Clay claims that her efforts to comply with requests were thwarted by delays in response from city employees and even delays in requests for office supplies and a place for the public to review documents. Clay was also concerned with the conduct of various other employees, such as not reporting absences, and “issues regarding nepotism and favoritism based upon personal relationships.” Clay repeatedly raised her concerns to various officials. When a new mayor was sworn in, she began to suspect the new city attorney of abuse of policies and sought records concerning employees in that office. Clay’s employment was terminated and she sued, asserting violations of the Tennessee Public Protection Act, common law retaliatory discharge and wrongful termination, tortious interference with at-will employment, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, deprivation of constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, and violation of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to a First Amendment retaliation claim, but otherwise affirmed. View "Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, TN" on Justia Law

In 2001, Bridges was convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence; the court did not impose a term of incarceration, but sentenced him to one year of probation. In 2010, Bridges was indicted for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). Bridges moved to dismiss, arguing that he qualified for one of the exceptions to the firearm restriction, listed in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). The district court denied the motion and sentenced Bridges to 21 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. An individual who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is prohibited from possessing a firearm, except that a “person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense . . . if the conviction . . . is an offense for which the person . . . has had civil rights restored.” Under Michigan law, misdemeanants lose their civil rights only while confined in a correctional facility, Mich. Comp. Laws 168.758b.The Supreme Court has held that the “civil rights restored” clause in an analogous provision does not apply to an offender such as Bridges who lost no civil rights. View "United States v. Bridges" on Justia Law

In 2008 the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Detroit International Bridge Company was immune from the City of Detroit’s zoning ordinances because it was a federal instrumentality for the limited purpose of facilitating commerce over the Ambassador Bridge, which connects Detroit to Ontario, Canada. The federal government was not a party to the suit. Commodities Export, which owned property near the Bridge, later filed suit against Detroit and the United States, claiming that the Bridge Company had unilaterally condemned roads around its property, cutting off the land and causing a regulatory taking. It claimed that Detroit was liable for failing to enforce its own ordinances and demanded that the United States take a position on the Bridge Company’s federal-instrumentality status and control the Company’s actions. The United States cross-claimed against Bridge Company, alleging that it had misappropriated the title of “federal instrumentality.” The district court granted summary judgment for the United States and dismissed the action. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that federal courts have jurisdiction over the government’s cross-claim and owe no deference to the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal common law. Bridge Company is not a federal instrumentality. View "Commodities Exp. Co. v. Detroit Int'l Bridge Co." on Justia Law

In 1997, 19-year-old Franklin beat his grandmother, grandfather, and uncle, set the house on fire and left them to die of blunt-force injuries or smoke inhalation. Franklin fled the scene in his grandfather’s car, taking his grandfather’s gun and his grandmother’s jewelry. The trial court found him competent; the jury found Franklin guilty on: seven aggravated arsons, two aggravated robberies, and six aggravated murders. The trial court sentenced Franklin to death and 91 years of imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court merged the escaping-detection aggravator into the aggravated-robbery and aggravated-arson aggravators then independently reweighed aggravation and mitigation before determining that death was the appropriate sentence. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims: challenging the pretrial competency hearing and determination of competency; alleging ineffective assistance; challenging denial of a continuance after a defense arson expert died before testifying; challenging admission of “gruesome” photographs; that execution would constitute cruel and unusual punishment and would violate his Equal Protection and Due Process rights because he committed the crimes when he was mentally ill; and that the definition of “reasonable doubt” given in the guilt-phase jury instructions was constitutionally inadequate.

Jolivette served as a Republican State Legislator and Butler County Commissioner, 1997-2010; he also served on the Butler County Republican Party’s Central Committee. In November 2011, Jolivette filed a Declaration of Candidacy to run as a Republican for the Office of State Representative for Ohio’s 51st House District. Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 3513.05, Jolivette submitted part-petitions containing 72 signatures; he failed to sign one, containing 17 signatures, and six signatures on the other signed petitions were of “questionable validity.” The Board of Elections met; Jolivette argued in favor of certifying his petition. Two weeks later Jolivette withdrew his candidacy as a Republican and resigned from the Republican Party Central Committee. He prepared a nominating petition to run as an independent candidate for the same office and did not vote in any party primary. Members of the Republican Party challenged his candidacy on the basis that he was not unaffiliated from the Republican Party. The Board of Elections approved Jolivette’s petition, but scheduled a protest hearing. After the protest was granted, Jolivette filed suit. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no merit to Jolivette’s constitutional claims.

In 1981, Standifer, a 23-year-old woman with diffused brain damage and mild retardation, was murdered in Knoxville, at the home of Thomas, where Miller was staying. Standifer had gone to the house, by cab, with Miller. When Thomas returned Miller was hosing the basement floor. Thomas found blood inside the house. The next day, Thomas discovered Standifer’s body in his backyard, with a t-shirt belonging to Miller stained with blood of the same type as Standifer’s. Miller was apprehended in Ohio. After waiving his Miranda rights, he admitted to hitting Standifer and dragging her outside, non-responsive and not breathing. A psychiatrist examined Miller and concluded that he did not believe Miller was insane at the time of the offense. Miller moved for appointment of psychiatric expert at state expense. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Miller was not entitled to a second medical expert. The jury convicted Miller of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Miller’s direct appeals and motions for post-conviction relief were unsuccessful in state court. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the state improperly denied him assistance from an independent medical expert and a challenge to jury instructions.

The Sheriff’s Office for Boyle County received an arrest warrant and emergency protective order for King, who had allegedly entered his ex-wife’s property, pointed a gun at her face, and said “I’m going to kill someone today.” The sheriff told Deputy Adams that he had seen King the week before, and that King had been acting “strange [and] violent” and to obtain assistance from the Kentucky State Police. Adams was aware that King, years earlier, had allegedly fired shots near a state trooper who entered onto King’s property. Deputies Adams and Issacs and State Trooper Taylor, who told a dispatcher that “one of us will have to kill—shoot him,” went to King’s home. Although no one answered the door, they saw King lying on a couch, knocked again, and showed badges. What happened next is disputed. Taylor claims that King aimed a gun; Taylor’s bullet killed King. King’s estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court ruled that Taylor had not been properly served and, in any event, was entitled to summary judgment on the merits. The Sixth Circuit vacated, stating that questions of immunity and superseding cause require resolution of disputed facts.

In 1997, Hanna was an Ohio state inmate, 19 years into a life sentence for murder and aggravated murder when he attacked his new cellmate, Copas, in his sleep. Copas died from his injuries several days later. Although trial counsel suggested that Copas’ death was at least partially attributable to errors committed in his medical treatment, Hanna did not formally pursue an intervening cause defense. Convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death, Hanna petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of Brady violations, challenges to jury instructions, claims of ineffective assistance, and a claim of failure to discover an ineligible juror.

Gassman and Wottrich went to the Hensley residenceto repossess a car. They requested police presence because Hensley’s conduct during a previous repossession resulted in an assault charge against Hensley. The deputies did not read Gassman’s documents. Sheila Hensley woke up, stated that her payments were up to date, got into the car, started it, locked the doors, and briefly dragged the towtruck. She refused to exit the vehicle, even after the car had been pulled to the road. The deputies used a hammer to break a window, unlock the doors, and pull Sheila from the car. After the car was towed, it was determined that Sheila was correct and the car was returned. Later the deputies obtained a warrant, charging assault with a dangerous weapon, based on her pulling the tow truck toward Gassman and Wottrich while they were on the ground. Sheila pled no contest to felonious assault and to misdemeanor attempted aggravated assault, then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court rejected Fourth Amendment claims, based on qualified immunity, and dismissed conspiracy and state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. A reasonable jury could find that extraction of Sheila from the vehicle she was entitled to possess was unreasonable.

cott was taken into custody near the scene of a robbery, given an oral Miranda warning, and given a written notice. He wrote “no” in response to the written question “Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now?” On his second day in custody he confessed to other robberies. He later claimed that the confession was coerced. He was convicted of 16 counts of robbery, attempted robbery, and use of a firearm in connection with the robberies and attempted robbery. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part and remanded for further factual findings to determine whether Scott or a member of the police initiated further discussion on the second day in custody. Scott invoked his right to counsel by his response to the written question. According to the language of the question itself, the “no” response is related directly to “these rights,” which include the right to have counsel present while answering questions.