Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Adkins, a state prisoner, sued corrections officer Wolever under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Wolever assaulted Adkins by yanking his hands through a slot in the cell door before removing his handcuffs. Before Adkins filed suit, an inspector at the prison reviewed color Polaroid photographs of Adkins’s injuries and stationary video footage of the area. During discovery, Adkins asked Wolever to produce photographs and video footage. Prison officials could not locate the video footage or the color photographs. Because Wolever produced only black and white copies of the original photographs and did not produce the video footage, Adkins asked the trial court to instruct the jury that it could presume that the missing evidence would be favorable to Adkins. The district court applied state law and denied the request; Michigan’s spoliation instruction required Adkins to demonstrate that the spoliated evidence was under Wolever’s control, which it was not. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The en banc court reversed, concluding that federal law governs spoliation sanctions in federal court litigation. On remand, the district court allowed the parties to conduct more discovery and held an evidentiary hearing, then concluded that Adkins was not entitled to the requested inference. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Werth was charged with robbing a convenience store. Before he pleaded guilty to breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny and to possession of burglar’s tools, Werth attempted at least seven times to assert his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The trial court denied his request summarily the first six times. The seventh time, the judge explained the nature of the charges against Werth, told him that she could not give him special training or treatment, and denied his request without giving him an opportunity to speak. Three weeks later, the judge denied Werth’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, in which he argued duress. The Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court denied his application for leave to appeal. The district court denied Werth’s petition for habeas corpus. Applying AEDPA deference, it held that Werth waived his self-representation claim by pleading guilty. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It did not violate clearly established Supreme Court precedent for the Michigan appellate courts to conclude that Werth’s guilty plea foreclosed his challenge.

Hughes died after hanging himself from his bed in the Butler County Prison, where he was incarcerated on charges of robbery, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and abuse of the drugs cocaine and Concerta. Hughes showed no outward signs that he was suicidal, but he did have a history of depression and asked to see Tepe, the prison psychiatrist, about anti-depression medication. Hughes and Dr. Tepe never met. Hughes had told an intake worker that he had attempted suicide and had been hospitalized for suicidal ideation. There was a suicide alert in the computer system and Hughes told a paramedic that he had not been taking his prescribed medication. Hughes’s mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to her son’s serious medical need. Tepe sought summary judgment, arguing that he was The district court held that Tepe could not assert a qualified-immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent and public policy do not support immunity for a privately paid physician working for the public.

Tangled in a prolonged legal dispute over visitation rights to see his daughter, Jeffries wrote a song, “Daughter’s Love,” which contains passages about relationships between fathers and daughters, but also includes complaints about his ex-wife, ranting gripes about lawyers and the legal system, and threats to kill the judge if he doesn’t “do the right thing” at an upcoming custody hearing. Jeffries created a video of himself performing the song on a guitar painted with an American flag and posted the music video on YouTube. He shared it with friends, family and the media. In the video, Jeffries says “This song’s for you, judge.” Agents charged Jeffries with violating a federal law that prohibits “transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to . . . injure the person of another” 18 U.S.C. 875(c). A jury convicted Jeffries. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. All that the First Amendment requires in the context of a section 875(c) prosecution is that the threat be real; there was sufficient evidence to convict.

Seven times, Coles secured firearms in the U.S. and directed co-conspirators to deliver the firearms to purchasers in Canada. For the eighth sale, Coles arranged to deliver, in person on the U.S. side of the border, firearms in exchange for 50,000 tablets of Ecstasy. The buyers were actually undercover Toronto police officers. Coles was arrested by ATF agents. Coles’ continuing dissatisfaction with assigned counsel delayed the jury trial until the district court ruled that Coles waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Coles was convicted of seven counts of aiding and abetting unlicensed dealing in firearms; eight counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm; one count of aiding and abetting attempted possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance; one count of carrying and using a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime; and one count of conspiracy. He was sentenced to180 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no reversible error even though the court did not use the exact model inquiry set forth in the Bench Book. The court advised Coles several times about the difficulties in self-representation. An attorney was available throughout trial as stand-by counsel, and subsequent to conviction, assisted him during sentencing proceedings.

Smith filed a numerically second petition for habeas corpus that he claims is not “second or successive” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) because the claims included in the petition are newly ripe. The district court transferred the case to the Sixth Circuit, which vacated the transfer. A district court has jurisdiction to consider numerically second petitions that are not “second or successive” and needs no authorization. A district court may (and should) rule on newly ripe claims. The district court never ruled that Smith’s petition was successive and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction. There is no rule, statute, or case that permits a lower court to transfer a case to an appellate court when it is uncertain of its jurisdiction for an advisory ruling.

Patrizi, an attorney, was at Bounce nightclub in Cleveland with her friend Baron, Baron’s brother, and his girlfriend, Mills. Officers Huff and Connole arrived in the early morning hours in response to a reported assault. They met the victim reporting the incident, Wallace and she led them inside the nightclub to identify perpetrators. The officers escorted the group, which included Mills, toward the exit. Patrizi joined the group. Connole began to question Mills and Patrizi interjected; eventually, Patrizi was handcuffed and placed under arrest. The parties dispute the interactions leading to the arrest for obstructing official business. In Patrizi’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly established that nonaggressive questioning of police officers is constitutionally protected conduct. When the facts are viewed in her favor, Patrizi’s actions fall within the protected ambit because her conduct did not cross the line into fighting words or disorderly conduct prohibiting the officers from conducting their investigation.

Hagans, a middle-aged man under the influence of crack cocaine, became paranoid and went into a rage in his yard. He refused to allow police to subdue him. Officer, Ratcliff applied his taser in drive-stun mode, directly against Hagans’ upper back. Hagans, reached back and tried to grab the taser. Ratcliff applied the taser again, to no effect, then tried, unsuccessfully to use the taser in dart mode. Ratcliff tased Hagans two to four more times in drive-stun mode, then joined two other officers in trying to subdue Hagans. The officers finally secured Hagans’ wrists and legs. A medical squad arrived. Alert at the time, Hagans lost consciousness and stopped breathing about ten minutes later. Paramedics administered CPR in the ambulance, restoring Hagans’ pulse and respiration. Hagans never regained consciousness. He died three days later. The coroner found that the cocaine starved his brain of oxygen, leading to fatal respiratory complications. The report listed hardening of the arteries in the heart as “a contributing factor.” Hagans’ estate filed suit, alleging excessive force. The district court denied Ratcliff’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Ratcliff did not violate a clearly established right.

After September 11, 2001, the FBI assigned informant Griffin to embed himself in the Toledo Muslim community. Griffin enrolled in mosque classes and obtained employment with a Muslim charity. Griffin met El-Hindi, who discussed kidnaping an Israeli soldier or politician; Amawi, who suggested recruiting Mazloum; and Mazloum, who agreed to participate in jihad training. The three were convicted of conspiracy to kill and maim persons outside the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 956(a)(1), and conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists in furtherance of killing U.S. nationals, 18 U.S.C. 2339A. Amawi and El-Hindi were also charged with distributing information regarding manufacture of explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. 842(p)(2)(A) and sentenced to below-Guidelines terms of 240, 144, and 100 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court upheld the district court’s decisions: to delete classified information from discovery under the Classified Information Procedures Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; to exclude defendants’ proposed expert testimony concerning Islamist culture and social norms; to reject entrapment and outrageous-conduct defenses; not to provide requested jury instructions concerning the First Amendment; and rejecting a claim of Miranda violations during interrogation that occurred on a jet returning Amawi from Jordan.

Frankenmuth, “Michigan’s Little Bavaria,” is a tourist destination, famous for Bavarian-themed stores, family-style restaurants, and the world’s largest year-round Christmas store. Plaintiffs own a 37-acre tract just outside city limits. A 2003 property-tax appraisal valued the land at $95,000. It has been used as farmland for nearly 100 years. Under a joint agreement with the township, about 15 acres on the western portion of the property was zoned as Commercial Local Planned Unit Development, with the remaining 22 acres designated as Residential Planned Unit Development. In 2005, the plaintiffs agreed to sell 23.55 acres to Wal-Mart for $125,000 per acre. Wal-Mart had 180 days to determine the feasibility of its plan and was permitted to, for any reason, cancel and receive a refund of the $50,000 deposit.” The city first enacted a moratorium and then rezoned a relatively small area, including the property. Wal-Mart cancelled the agreement and a jury awarded plaintiffs $3.6 million for selective zoning. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the city harbored animus against the plaintiffs, as opposed to animus against Wal-Mart and gave inaccurate instructions on damages.