Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Michigan law permits debtors in bankruptcy to choose exemptions from: 11 U.S.C. 522(d); a set of general exemptions available to all Michigan residents irrespective of bankruptcy status, Mich. Comp. Laws 600.6023; or a list of exemptions available solely to debtors in bankruptcy, Mich. Comp. Laws 600.5451. The debtor chose a homestead exemption under the last option, which permits only bankruptcy debtors to exempt up to $30,000 of the value of the home, or up to $45,000 if the debtor is over the age of 65 or disabled. The figures are adjusted for inflation triennially, such that the debtor, who is disabled, claimed a total exemption of $44,695 in the value of his home; the federal exemption would be $21,625 and the Michigan general homestead exemption was $3,500. The trustee filed an objection. The Bankruptcy Court upheld the exemption. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The phrase “uniform Laws” in the Bankruptcy Clause permits states to act in the arena of bankruptcy exemptions, without violation of the Supremacy Clause, even if they do so by making certain exemptions available only to debtors in bankruptcy .

After a participant in West’s operation was stopped carrying $362,000 to a marijuana supplier, DEA authorities learned that Apodaca would send marijuana from Mexico to Tennessee via couriers, using pay-as-you-go cell phones for couriers to communicate. Apodaca provided false names and addresses and was unaware that these phones were equipped with GPS technology. Authorities obtained orders authorizing interception of wire communications from two phones subscribed in West’s name and learned that a truck driver, Skinner, would meet Apodaca in Tucson to pick up marijuana in a “nice [RV] with a diesel engine,” with his son driving an F-250 pickup truck. Authorities obtained an order authorizing the phone company to release data for two secret phones and discovered that one was in Candler, North Carolina, West’s primary residence. Continuously “pinging” the other phone, authorities located Skinner and his son at a rest stop near Abilene, Texas, with a motorhome containing 1,100 pounds of marijuana. The district court denied Skinner’s motion to suppress; Skinner was convicted of drug trafficking and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Skinner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data emanating from his cell phone that showed its location.

Officers attempted to stop Austin, an African-American, for speeding through a construction zone. Austin fled and a high-speed chase ensued. When Austin’s car was blocked in a dead-end, he exited his vehicle and approached the officers with his palms open. Officer Paul’s canine attacked Austin, Officer Riley fired a Taser and Austin fell back to his car. The parties dispute what was said and other aspects of the incident. Austin filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the police department and officers Riley, Paull, and Morgan, alleging defendants used excessive force and engaged in ethnic intimidation in violation of Michigan law. The district court granted Riley summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with respect to his initial deployment of a Taser, but denied summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with respect to Riley’s subsequent use of the Taser, Paull’s use of the police dog, and Morgan’s use of the Taser. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence or allegation that Austin was belligerent, threatening or assaulting officers, or attempting to escape. Use of non-lethal, temporarily incapacitating force on a handcuffed suspect who no longer poses a safety threat, flight risk, and is not resisting arrest constitutes excessive force.

State Attorney-General and county-prosecutor candidates may not accept campaign contributions from Medicaid providers or any person with an ownership interest in a Medicaid provider, Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45. The plaintiff physicians are Medicaid providers who attempted to contribute to Cordray’s 2010 campaign for reelection as Ohio Attorney General. When the campaign learned that the plaintiffs were Medicaid providers, however, it refused to accept their contributions. The plaintiffs challenged the statute. The district court upheld the law as supported by a general interest in “preventing corruption,” stating that the court should not “second guess” the Ohio Legislature’s means of furthering that interest. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The contribution ban is not closely drawn to “avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” A claim that the law prevents corruption, is “dubious at best.”

Judge DeWeese sentenced Griffeth to prison for sexual battery and later oversaw his supervised release. Mayer supervised the agency responsible for monitoring Griffeth and suspected that his wife, Leech, was having an affair with Griffeth. Plaintiffs alleged that Mayer conspired with other officers and DeWeese to harass Griffeth. Mayer’s marriage ended. Plaintiffs allege that Mayer, who had been drinking, saw Griffeth and Leech in a car, pursued them, and called police to have Griffeth arrested for violating curfew. Mayer’s supervisor ordered that Mayer have no further involvement in Griffeth’s case. Plaintiffs allege that Mayer met with DeWeese and arranged to transfer Griffeth’s case to Mayer’s friend. DeWeese imposed a condition prohibiting Griffeth from contact with Leech or with her minor daughter. Griffeth was accused of associating with Leech and lying about it. Judge DeWeese refused to recuse himself, sentenced Griffeth to six months in community control, and ordered Leech removed from Griffeth’s home. The district court held that DeWeese had not established absolute judicial immunity to a claim concerning removing non-party Leech from her home. The Sixth Circuit reversed. DeWeese’s order requiring compliance with the no-contact condition of supervised release by removing Leech from the house fell within DeWeese’s subject matter jurisdiction over supervised release.

Plaintiffs, members of a religious group that believes that homosexuality is forbidden by God, attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. 249(a)(2). That Act makes it a crime to batter a person because of the person’s religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability. Plaintiffs claimed that expression and practice of their religious beliefs would lead to federal investigation and prosecution under the Act, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that plaintiffs’ underlying complaint is with the government’s heightened protection of homosexuals from criminal violence and that the lawsuit is really a political statement against the Hate Crimes Act. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated intent to violate the Hate Crimes Act or offered evidence that they will nonetheless face adverse law enforcement action.

After a private citizen placed a creche on a sixty-foot-wide median at Christmas time. Macomb County ordered the creche removed. The Thomas More Law Center applied for a formal permit to display the creche. The County denied the permit, stating that it violated the Establishment Cause of the First Amendment. The citizen filed suit, claiming the denial of the permit violated his free-speech rights, the Establishment Clause, and his equal-protection rights. During litigation, the County changed its explanation for denying the citizen's permit, claiming that safety was the reason for its decision. The district court granted summary judgment for the County. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the citizen's Establishment Clause claim but reversed on all other grounds, holding that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the County on the citizen's free-speech and equal-protection claims.

In 2005 Jones pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). He was classified as an armed career criminal based on three prior felony convictions and sentenced to a term of 188 months of imprisonment. One of those prior convictions was for reckless homicide under Kentucky law. His pro se motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 on the basis of Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) was denied. Holding that Jones qualified for equitable tolling of the limitations period, the Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing. The conviction for reckless homicide cannot be counted under the ACCA.

After Sharp was arrested on an unrelated warrant, police seized 154 grams of methamphetamine, 10.5 grams of marijuana and drug paraphernalia found inside a shaving kit on the seat of his car. When a police dog and his officer-handler arrived, the driver’s window of Sharp’s car was down. The dog sniffed the exterior of the vehicle, stopped, walked to the driver’s door, and, without formally alerting to the presence of narcotics, jumped through the open window, went into the back seat, then back to the front and looked up or alerted on the front passenger seat. The handler asked the dog to “show me,” and, with his nose, the dog poked the shaving kit on the front seat. Sharp, sentenced to 360 months in prison, appealed denial of his motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A dog’s sniff around the exterior of a car is not a search under the Fourth Amendment; the canine’s jump and subsequent sniff inside the vehicle was not a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the jump was instinctive and not the product of police encouragement

The Legislative Ethics Commission conducted a hearing regarding fund-raising by Kentucky Senate President Williams, which attorney Berry attended. Following an executive session from which the public, the media, and Berry were excluded, the Commission dismissed. Berry wrote a letter criticizing disposition of the matter and disseminated copies to the media. The Inquiry Commission of the Kentucky Bar Association issued a warning asserting that the letter violated Kentucky Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2(a), which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer,” by publicly implying that the Commission did not conduct its review appropriately. The disciplinary complaint against Berry was dismissed. Berry did not appeal because Kentucky does not provide for an appeal of the Commission’s findings. Berry sued, alleging that he wished to engage in further criticism of the investigation but has refrained from such speech because he fears professional discipline. The district court granted the KBA summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed; Rule 8.2(a) is unconstitutional as applied to Berry’s speech.