Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was stopped by state troopers at the request of DEA agents who were watching a site and monitoring wiretaps while investigation a narcotics/Medicare fraud operation. Troopers discovered large bundles of currency and a suspended Michigan driver’s license in her purse. Between the car and the purse, troopers discovered over $11,000, cash, 39 bottles of codeine cough syrup, and mothballs. The incident report that indicated Defendant was pulled over for a vision obstruction (necklaces and air freshener hanging from rear view mirror) and was arrested based on the questionable status of her license and the illegal narcotics recovered from her vehicle; it did not mention the DEA’s investigation or instructions. Defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1); possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and criminal forfeiture allegations, 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(C), 28 U.S.C. 2461(c), & 21 U.S.C. 853. The district court granted her motion to suppress. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Because DEA had reasonable suspicion to order the traffic stop and the collective knowledge doctrine applied, the initial stop was valid. Upon detaining defendant, troopers obtained probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile exception.

Bruederle had a severe seizure two days after being booked into the Louisville Metro Corrections jail on assault charges that were eventually dropped. The seizure was likely caused by withdrawal from the many powerful prescription drugs Bruederle was taking at the time to control his back pain. Because police arrested him after business hours on Friday, and he did not manifest an imminent danger of suffering withdrawal symptoms, Bruederle's request for these drugs could not be reviewed until the Monday after his arrest. Bruederle brought a “deliberate indifference” claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that no reasonable juror could find that the defendants violated the Due Process Clause. There is no per se constitutional objection to reasonable policies that regulate the access of prisoners to controlled substances, including prescription drugs.

Jackson was convicted by an Ohio jury of two murders committed in 2002. The court sentenced him to two separate death sentences. The Supreme Court of Ohio on direct appeal vacated the death sentence for one of the murders based on the trial judge’s errors in limiting the voir dire, but it affirmed the other death sentence. The federal district court denied a habeas corpus petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the “difficulty” of Jackson’s claim that the trial court violated his right to due process of law when, after denying his counsel the right to question the jury concerning pretrial publicity, it denied his motion for a change of venue premised on the extraordinary pretrial publicity present in Lima, Ohio, the small community in which he was tried. There was no clearly established law governing the issue of what questions defense counsel is entitled to ask in order to examine jurors concerning non-racial bias against defendants accused of murdering a child. The court also rejected ineffective assistance claims.

Foster was convicted of second-degree murder in connection with a shooting death. After trial, the Michigan trial court conducted a Ginther hearing and concluded that Foster’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an alibi defense, stemming primarily from the testimony of a witness who said that Foster was with him at the time of the killing. The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the failure to raise the alibi defense was an exercise of sound trial strategy by Foster’s trial counsel. On habeas review, the district court held that Foster’s trial attorney was deficient for failing to raise the alibi defense, but that the deficiency did not prejudice Foster. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the deficient performance finding, but reversed with respect to the prejudice determination, and granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus giving the state 180 days to retry Foster or to release him. The relative weakness in the state's case and strength of the potential alibi defense created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different.

Holmes, a confidential informant, telephoned a man he identified as Gill and arranged to buy cocaine at a specific location. Police were present with Holmes, but did not record the call. Holmes told officers that Gill would drive a green Acura. Officers set up surveillance and observed Gill arrive in a green Acura, exit the car, and join a group of people. Officers approached and identified themselves as police. Gill ran about 20 feet, dropping keys, then responded to the officers’ commands. Officers discovered a small quantity of marijuana in Gill’s waistband and arrested Gill. Officers found a loaded handgun under a child safety seat at the place on the stoop where Gill had stopped and lain down minutes earlier. After a drug dog alerted on the car, officers used the dropped keys to open the car and found five ounces of cocaine. Gill was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(c); and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of a motion to suppress.

Following the death of Waeschle’s mother, the medical examiner performed an autopsy to determine the cause of her death. While the mother’s remains were returned to Waeschle, the medical examiner retained the brain for further study without Waeschle’s knowledge. After Waeschle discovered that her mother’s brain had been retained and later incinerated as medical waste, she sued, alleging due process violations. The district court dismissed state law claims but declined to dismiss the due process claim, finding that, under Michigan’s clearly established law, next-of-kin have an interest in their deceased relative’s remains/body parts. Following remand and certification of the question, the Michigan Supreme Court responded that: Assuming that a decedent’s brain was removed by a medical examiner to conduct a lawful investigation into the decedent’s cause of death, the decedent’s next of kin does not have a right under Michigan law to possess the brain in order to properly bury or cremate the same after the brain is no longer needed for forensic examination. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, declining to sanction plaintiff for frivolous appeal.

In 2001, a Tennessee jury convicted Rayner of five counts of rape of a child (his daughter) and five counts of aggravated sexual battery. He was sentenced to an effective term of 51 years: 21 years for each rape conviction, and nine years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction, with two rape counts and one sexual battery count to run consecutively, and the remainder to run concurrently. He exhausted state direct and collateral review. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that had not been raised in state court. At trial, the prosecution presented medical proof that the victim suffered from trichomoniasis, a sexually transmitted disease. No evidence was presented that Rayner had trichomoniasis. On cross-examination, defense counsel pointed out that trichomoniasis could be transmitted in ways not involving sexual contact. Defense strategy focused on the theory that the victim was lying about the abuse.

Woodall pled guilty to capital murder, capital kidnapping, and first degree rape in connection with the 1997 murder of a 16-year-old girl. After a penalty trial, the trial court adopted the recommendation of the jury and sentenced Woodall to death on the murder conviction and life imprisonment for the remaining convictions. Woodall unsuccessfully appealed his sentence to the Kentucky Supreme Court and then filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted the petition because the trial court denied him his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by refusing to give a requested “no adverse inference” instruction with respect to Woodall not testifying and made a constitutional error during jury selection in allowing the prosecution to use a peremptory challenge to strike an African-American member of the jury without holding a hearing pursuant to Batson. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Defendant pled guilty to an act of juvenile delinquency, 18 U.S.C. 5032, for possession of heroin with intent to distribute. He was 16 years old when arrested. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that he was responsible for distribution of 647 grams of heroin and sentenced him to five years’ official detention. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. The maximum period of a juvenile’s official detention is the lesser of five years or “the maximum of the guideline range ... applicable to an otherwise similarly situated adult.” The district court’s finding that defendant was responsible for 647 grams of heroin raised his maximum period of detention so that the district court was required to make the drug-quantity finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying the “Apprendi” holding, the court stated that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum” is treated as an element of the crime itself, rather than as a sentencing factor. Juveniles, like adults, are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when charged with violation of a criminal law.

A woman, who had worked as an informant in the past, was arrested for solicitation or prostitution and agreed to cooperate as a confidential informant in a controlled buy of crack cocaine. After the controlled buy, officers obtained a warrant and searched an apartment at which defendants were present. Officers discovered crack cocaine on Jenkins, a large amount of cash on Archibald, and a loaded pistol and a substantial piece of crack in the kitchen. A canine search of Archibald’s car, in the driveway, revealed $12,000 cash. The state court suppressed the evidence; the appellate court affirmed. A federal grand jury indicted Archibald, Jenkins, and Muse, the leaseholder, on charges including use of premises to manufacture controlled substances, possession with the intent to distribute cocaine near public housing, making false statements to federal agents, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court suppressed the evidence, finding that the affidavit presented probable cause, but the probable cause had gone stale when officers executed the warrant, eight days after the controlled buy. Without conducting a Franks analysis, the court concluded that the affidavit contained knowing or reckless falsities regarding the reliability of the informant. The Sixth Circuit reversed.