Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001 Bunch, then age 16, committed robbery, kidnapping, and repeated rape of a 22-year-old female university student. He was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 89 years. Ohio courts rejected appeals. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial court violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments by sentencing him to the functional equivalent of life without parole for crimes he committed as a juvenile. Even if the 2010 Supreme Court holding, Graham v. Florida, that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide” applies on collateral review, it does not clearly establish that consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juveniles who have committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are unconstitutional when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole.

In 1993, Lancaster, a former police officer with a long history of mental illness, shot his girlfriend and was charged by the state of Michigan with first-degree murder and with possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At his 1994 jury trial, he was convicted on both counts despite his asserted defenses of insanity and diminished capacity. The judgment was overturned, however, due to a Batson violation. When Lancaster was retried in 2005, he opted to be tried without a jury. Lancaster had planned to limit his defense to diminished capacity. But the trial court prohibited Lancaster from asserting the defense because, in the interim between his two trials, the Michigan Supreme Court had abolished the diminished-capacity defense (Carpenter decision). Lancaster was convicted and sentenced to life plus two years in prison. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Lancaster claimed that his right to due process was violated by the state court’s retroactive application of Carpenter. The district court denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed, granting the petition unless the state commences a new trial within 180 days in which Lancaster is permitted to assert the defense of diminished capacity.

Convicted of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. in a check cashing scheme, Vreeland was sentenced to imprisonment, supervised release, and restitution. While on supervised release, he committed a home invasion and larceny. Co-defendant Russell later testified as to Vreeland’s role, disposal of stolen items and the getaway vehicle and their agreement to deny knowing each other. Vreeland informed Probation Officer Bobo that he and Russell were suspects in the case, but denied knowing Russell and stated that his vehicle had been sold to a junk yard. Officer Bobo requested documentation regarding the car, but Vreeland did not comply and was arrested for a supervised release violation and placed in a halfway house. Bobo began his own investigation and concluded that Vreeland had violated supervised release by committing the home invasion. Vreeland signed a written statement that he did not know Russell. Vreeland’s release was revoked when he was convicted of two counts of making false oral and written statements to a probation officer, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) (a)(3). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. False statements during monthly supervisory meetings are not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and do not fall within the “judicial function exception” to prosecution of 18 U.S.C. 1001(b).

Three petitioners received separate jury trials in Kent County, Michigan in 2001 or 2002. At jury selection, the petitioners did not object to racial composition of their respective venires; they were subsequently convicted. A few months later, the Grand Rapids Press published a story detailing how jury selection software had a computer glitch that had systematically excluded African-Americans from the jury pool. Petitioners each filed motions for post-conviction relief in state court. The state court found that the petitioners had waived these claims by failing to object to the racial composition of the jury venire during voir dire. A federal district court denied two habeas petitions, but another court granted the petition, holding that the petitioner could not have known of the computer glitch and presuming prejudice because the glitch caused a structural error. The Sixth Circuit remanded all three cases. Petitioners have shown cause to excuse their defaults, but federal-state comity requires that the district court find actual prejudice before granting relief.

Amos’s third wife died of a cocaine overdose while in a hotel room alone with Amos. He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree murder by poisoning and sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On remand, the judgment was amended to reflect only one conviction of first-degree murder under two theories. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. After state courts denied habeas relief, the district court found that three of the claims were procedurally defaulted and rejected remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no merit in claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations in the forms of prosecutorial misconduct and false testimony or withholding evidence with regard to the level of cocaine in the victim’s system.

Access to the Ambassador Bridge between Detroit and Windsor, Ontario necessitated traversing city streets. The state contracted with the Company, which owns the Bridge, to construct new approaches from interstate roads. The contract specified separate jobs for the state and the Company. In 2010, the state obtained a state court order, finding the Company in breach of contract and requiring specific performance. The Company sought an order to open ramps constructed by the state, asserting that this was necessary to complete its work. The court denied the motion and held Company officials in contempt. In a 2012 settlement, the court ordered the Company to relinquish its responsibilities to the state and establish a $16 million fund to ensure completion. Plaintiffs, trucking companies that use the bridge, sought an injunction requiring the state to immediately open the ramps. The district court dismissed claims under the dormant Commerce Clause, the motor carriers statute, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c), and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. 31114(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. For purposes of the Commerce Clause and statutory claims, the state is acting in a proprietary capacity and, like the private company, is a market participant when it joins the bridge company in constructing ramps.

Having served as an expert witness and attorney in Ohio and federal courts, Boland possessed and created child pornography by combining benign images of identifiable children and pornographic images of adults and used the images to suggest that his clients do not satisfy the mens rea requirements of laws under which they are prosecuted. The images constitute child pornography under 18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(C), but he claims that his use is legal an Ohio exemption for "bona fide medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other proper purpose, by ... person having a proper interest." Boland was detained by the FBI and his computers were seized. He signed an agreement admitting to creating and possessing child pornography in violation of federal law; the government agreed not to prosecute. The district court denied Boland an injunction preventing the government from prosecuting. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that federal laws do not preempt Ohio child pornography law exceptions; that the First Amendment prevents prosecution of creation and possession of child pornography for use in court; and that unless defense attorneys and experts may take advantage of the Ohio exceptions, defendants in child pornography cases will be denied a fair trial.

Plaintiff, an exotic dancer, challenged the nudity ordinances of Van Buren Township under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff works for Garter Belt, an entity that operates a strip club and is currently enjoined from violating the Van Buren nudity ordinances, as a result of a prior suit, in which Garter Belt unsuccessfully challenged the ordinances. In light of the previous suit, the district court dismissed plaintiff's action on res judicata grounds, reasoning that her interests had been adequately represented by Garter Belt in the previous suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. For purposes of her dancing at the club operated by Garter Belt, plaintiff became bound by the injunction when she accepted her employment-like contractual arrangement with a corporation that was bound by a permanent injunction. If a party litigates against a corporation, and obtains injunctive relief, claim preclusion should protect the party against future litigation raising the same issue and seeking the same result.

Plaintiffs are the sole shareholder and Chairman of Miami Valley Bank and also own stock in a mortgage lender with which the bank had loan agreements. In 2007, the FDIC began investigating the loan agreements. State and federal regulators closed the bank and appointed the FDIC as a receiver. The FDIC purportedly halted its investigation when an accounting expert confirmed that the loans were legal. The mortgage company then petitioned the receiver for $10 million that the bank owed the mortgage lender. In retaliation for the $10 million request, FDIC investigator Stevens allegedly prompted the FDIC to resume the investigation of the bank. The plaintiffs then sued Stevens, alleging that the retaliatory investigation violated the First Amendment, a “Bivens” action. Stevens died after the lawsuit began. The plaintiffs argued that their Bivens action survived his death, regardless of whether their claim would survive under state law. The district court held that state law controls the survivability of Bivens actions, subject to one inapplicable exception. The court applied Ohio law, under which the death of Stevens extinguished the claims against him. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Police received multiple 911 calls regarding Kevin’s threatening behavior. After verifying the threats, officers went to his father’s property, which was dark and surrounded by heavy woods. His father told officers that Kevin had been drinking, was possibly suicidal, and owned guns. Before officers could implement their plan, Kevin drove up, approaching the patrol cars. Officers activated lights and ordered Kevin to raise his hands and exit the vehicle. Kevin shifted into reverse and backed into the woods. During pursuit, Kevin’s truck became stuck in snow. Officers approached, ordering Kevin to show his hands. Kevin refused; an officer opened the truck door, yelled “Taser,” and deployed his taser. Kevin’s jacket prevented the taser from properly functioning. Kevin arose from the seat, yelled that he had a gun and turned toward the officers, his hands extended in a firing position. After shooting Kevin, officers began lifesaving procedures until an ambulance arrived. Kevin did not survive. Police found cell phone with the antenna extended on the front seat and a rifle in the snow, several car lengths away from Kevin’s truck. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants on the basis of qualified immunity.