Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

During a traffic stop for speeding, a dog deployed to the scene alerted to drugs. A search revealed cash and false drivers' licenses. Defendants were part of a conspiracy that created the licenses, using genuine identity information of others, in order to cash counterfeit checks at Wal-Mart stores. They pled guilty to conspiracy to utter counterfeited securities, to knowingly possess five or more false identification documents with intent to use them unlawfully, and to commit aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 371 and to aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). Two also pled guilty to knowingly possessing five or more false identification documents with intent to use them unlawfully, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(3). They were sentenced to terms of 54 months, 42 months, and 61 months in prison and each was ordered to pay $68,742 in restitution to Wal-Mart. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, but remanded for resentencing of one defendant. The traffic stop was not unreasonably extended by deploying the drug-detection dog; the court rejected arguments that the dog was unreliable, and that the alert did not justify opening the envelope containing the first set of counterfeit documents.

A BOLO alert issued for a suspect involved in a shooting, thought to be driving a black Tahoe with stripes and chrome wheels. An officer, familiar with the suspect, spotted a similar vehicle and performed a traffic stop for failure to signal. Defendant and his passenger were each holding open, partially consumed bottles of beer. Neither had a valid driver’s license. The officer then realized that there was no connection with the incident that precipitated the BOLO, but conducted a background check and found a warrant for defendant’s arrest. The officer determined that, in accordance policy, the Yukon would have to be towed because it was illegally parked in the driveway of a residence with no discernible connection to either occupant and neither could drive it to another location. Before releasing the vehicle to the towing company, he performed an on-site inventory search; under the driver’s seat. He noticed that the carpet had been ripped up and appeared to be loose. Lifting it, the officer found a handgun. Defendant conditionally pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress the firearm. .

Hoover, a combat veteran who served in Iraq, alleged that police violated his rights by stopping his vehicle, prolonging the stop into an investigatory detention, transporting him to a police station and having him committed for psychiatric evaluation. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, with state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Officers had reasonable cause for an investigatory stop after they observed a vehicle, filled to the brim with personal items, traveling at random, through a neighborhood known for theft and property crimes, at 1:20 a.m. Suspicions were further aroused when Hoover informed them that he intended to leave the state with his 18-month-old child and that he did not know where his wife was. They had probable cause to arrest Hoover before they asked him to exit his vehicle; 36 minutes after they initiated the stop, they learned that Hoover’s wife reported a domestic incident and that he was trying to escape with the child. Hoover’s wife confirmed that Hoover had experienced problems after returning from Iraq, had become increasingly violent, had destroyed property, and had held a knife to his neck while threatening to take his life.

Following a traffic stop for failing to dim her high beams in the face of oncoming traffic, Green was arrested for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, based on her responses to a series of field sobriety tests administered by a state trooper. A more definitive test, her urine sample, later came back clean; all charges were dropped. Green sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the trooper violated her Fourth Amendment rights by conducting field sobriety tests without having a reasonable suspicion that she was impaired and arresting her without probable cause. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A reasonable jury could find that Green's conduct did not create a reasonable suspicion that she was driving under the influence, that Green acted rationally throughout the stop, that her relatively minor traffic violations were not indicative of impairment, and that the officer fabricated the alleged constriction of her pupils to create an after-the-fact justification for the detention.

Nali and O'Brien started a 10-year sexual relationship in 1992. O’Brien was married. Nali videotaped their sexual encounters without consent. O'Brien attempted to end the relationship; Nali threatened to give the videotapes to her family and the media. After O’Brien divorced, she ended her relationship with Nali, who refused to leave her alone. After she reported harassment to police, her ex-husband intercepted a package addressed to their daughter, containing a videotape of sexual encounters between Nali and O'Brien. Her brothers received similar packages. Convicted of extortion, Nali was sentenced to 50 months to 20 years. Both his direct appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeal and a motion to remand for development of the record to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed. The Supreme Court of Michigan denied review. The federal district court found the evidence insufficient to support conviction and granted an unconditional writ of habeas corpus, but concluded that Nali was not denied effective assistance of counsel; the court ordered immediate release. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The state court properly determined that a rational jury could find Nali guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that he was not prejudiced by any failings of counsel.

Plaintiff was arrested after police officers found her intoxicated, sitting in the driver’s seat of her running, but legally parked, Hummer. She was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, but the state trial court dismissed her case, finding that she was not "operating" her Hummer as that term is defined under Michigan law. Plaintiff sued her arresting officers, arguing, among other things, that they unconstitutionally detained her without reasonable suspicion and arrested her without probable cause. The district court held that the officers had qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was a reasonable basis to believe that plaintiff was operating her Hummer while intoxicated, and was therefore violating Michigan law.

In 1985, petitioner was convicted of distributing cocaine and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment to be followed by a mandatory ten-year term of special parole, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 841, repealed in 1984. In 2000, he was released on special parole. This began a cycle during which petitioner repeatedly violated the terms of his special parole, was incarcerated, and was re-released on special parole. By statute, each time he violated the terms of special parole, he forfeited credit for any time he spent in noncustodial supervision. As a result, the term of special parole is not set to expire until 2017. Petitioner filed a habeas petition challenging the re-imposition of special parole, and the district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the regulation illegally circumvented statutorily required exercise of case-by-case discretion. Regardless of whether the Parole Commission has authority to reimpose a previously revoked term of special parole, petitioner still would have forfeited his time in non-custodial supervision under current parole regulations.

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and felonious assault, each with a firearm specification, arising out of a 1997 apartment robbery that involved shotguns and two deaths. He was sentenced to death. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Following limited remand, the district court recommended that the Sixth Circuit grant habeas corpus based on the penalty-phase instruction, but otherwise dismissed the petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, finding no basis for relief. The penalty phase jury instruction did not violate the Eighth Amendment, either by requiring the jury to unanimously agree on the applicability of any mitigating factors or by depriving the jury of the opportunity to recommend life in prison as an alternative sentencing option to a death sentence.

Before the 2008 financial crisis, six AIG subsidiaries sold Sharia-compliant financing products. Sharia refers to Islamic law; an SCF product uses a portion of product reserves to fulfill the Islamic duty of charitable giving and does not invest premiums in industries dealing with pork, alcohol, interest, gambling, or pornography. The subsidiaries are consolidated in AIG financial statements and received part of the funds AIG received in 2008, when the Federal Reserve Bank of New York lent AIG $85 billion in exchange for AIG shares. The Treasury Department also took an ownership stake in AIG by committing $40 billion pursuant to the Troubled Asset Relief Program, established under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.C. 5201–61. Treasury committed $ 30 billion to AIG in 2009, in exchange for more stock. Plaintiff challenged EESA, arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause for the government to allow a portion of the capital given to AIG to support the marketing of SCF products. Plaintiff is a Michigan resident, a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a Catholic, and a taxpayer. His status as a federal taxpayer is his sole basis for asserting standing. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff-Appellant Buxton Craig Heyerman was imprisoned for more than seventeen years as a pretrial detainee after a state appellate court reversed his criminal conviction and remanded the matter to the trial court. He filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Defendants-Appellees, Calhoun County, the Calhoun County Prosecutor's Office, the Michigan Department of Corrections and the Michigan Parole Board, alleging that this lengthy detention violated his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial rights. Upon review, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Defendants-Appellees were not liable for the alleged constitutional violation under section 1983, and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in their favor.