Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff began experiencing severe headaches and swelling in his left eye in 2007 while incarcerated. Shortly after his release, plaintiff was diagnosed with Ewing’s Sarcoma, a serious form of bone cancer. According to plaintiff, surgery would have been sufficient to treat the disease had prison staff detected it earlier. However, due to the late diagnosis, chemotherapy and radiation are now necessary. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court held that plaintiff pled sufficient facts upon which one could draw the inference that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment and committed medical malpractice. The doctor and nurse filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that their involvement with plaintiff was minimal and cannot form the basis for a finding of deliberate indifference or gross negligence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the defendants entitled to qualified immunity. Neither negligent medical care, nor delay in providing medical care, can rise to the level of a constitutional violation absent specific allegations of sufficiently harmful acts or omissions reflecting deliberate indifference.

In 1978, 70-year-old Keegan was found dead on the floor of his store. Witnesses saw blood on Strouth’s hands and clothes; the medical examiner testified that the spots were consistent with his having cut Keegan’s throat; Strouth’s girlfriend testified he had confessed; and Keegan’s wound could have been inflicted by Strouth’s knife. The police found items from Keegan’s store in Strouth’s possession and Strouth’s friend testified that Strouth had confessed. Convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and felony murder, Strouth was sentenced to death on findings that the murder was “heinous, atrocious or cruel” and occurred during a robbery. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. His state habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, was denied. In 1988, Strouth filed a federal habeas petition, which was dismissed when the Tennessee Supreme Court held the state may not use the underlying felony as an aggravating circumstance in felony murder convictions. The state court deemed the error harmless, reasoning that the jury would have imposed the same death sentence based on the other aggravating circumstance. Strouth filed a new federal habeas petition in 2000. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.

An inmate with the Michigan Department of Corrections sued several MDOC employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating his First Amendment rights when they transferred him from a Level II security facility to a Level III facility in 2000. He claimed that the increased security level and corresponding transfer were retaliation for his participation in a state-court class action regarding inmate property, as well as for his assistance to other inmates in filing grievances. Following two appeals, the district court held that participation in the class action and assistance to other inmates in filing grievances are protected activities and that the increase in security level, though not the transfer itself, was an adverse action, but entered judgment for defendants for lack of proof of causation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to two defendants and reversed with respect to others, who produced no evidence that they would have taken the challenged actions absent the inmate’s protected conduct.

Petitioner was living with her uncle and his wife, when the uncle died. No autopsy was performed. The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was heart attack and the body was cremated. The death certificate was amended to list asphyxia by smothering as the cause of death, with acute alcohol intoxication as a contributing factor, based on photographs showing scrapes around the nose consistent with impressions of a woven pillow. Petitioner’s paramour informed police that petitioner told him that the wife paid to be rid of uncle and that petitioner and wife found uncle passed out and poured vodka down his throat. Petitioner apparently left and wife smothered uncle. Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to manslaughter and testify against wife, but withdrew her plea. Convicted of second-degree murder, she was sentenced to 20-to-40 years, rather than seven-to-15 for manslaughter. At sentencing, petitioner stated that she would have testified, "had I not been persuaded to withdraw my plea … because an attorney promised me he would represent me." The district court denied habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Petitioner established an ineffective-assistance claim. The Michigan court’s conclusion that her second attorney was not deficient in advising her to withdraw the agreement was unreasonable because the attorney failed to investigate before making the recommendation.

Investigating a methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy, officers conducted two controlled purchases of methamphetamine at defendant’s property. Within three days, they executed a search warrant on the property, which contained a house, a recreational vehicle, and a garage. They found a revolver between the bed and wall of the RV, near drug paraphernalia, including electrical tape similar to that used on methamphetamine in controlled purchases. A handgun was found in the garage laundry room; an unloaded rifle and ammunition were in a tool room. Near the garage, officers found a canister of methamphetamine buried in the ground. A smaller package of methamphetamine was wrapped in electrical tape outside the RV. Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine or at least five hundred grams of a substance containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and (b)(1)(A). The district court applied a two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon during a drug offense, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1), increasing the advisory range from 70 to 87 months to 87 to 108 months in prison, and sentenced him to 87 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the enhancement violated defendant's Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.

Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Because he had prior convictions, two for aggravated burglary and one for robbery committed at age 17, he was sentenced to the statutory minimum of 180 months' imprisonment, because of enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C 924(e). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an Eighth Amendment argument. Defendant, 33 years old at the time of his felon-in-possession offense, remained fully culpable as an adult for his violation and fully capable of appreciating that his earlier criminal history could enhance his punishment.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and appealed denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. After the officer radioed for a license plate check and discovered a mismatch, he stopped the car, noticed a brake light not working, and noticed that the occupants had a boost phone and were nervous. They could not produce a rental agreement for the car. Learning that one occupant had been investigated by the DEA, the officer called for backup. A canine unit responded and the dog alerted to drugs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to suppress and exclusion of defendant’s expert from testifying at the suppression hearing, but reversed imposition of the special condition of supervised release that defendant obtain and maintain employment outside the field of boxing. Although the officer unreasonably prolonged the initial stop, the circumstances created independent reasonable suspicion to support the canine search.

Plaintiffs, former city employees terminated after the city determined that they had tampered with their water meters, claimed that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when city officials came to their homes to inspect their water meters, that their consents to inspection were involuntary, and that they were terminated in retaliation for asserting those rights. One plaintiff claimed that he was discharged in violation of his First Amendment right to association. The district court dismissed Fourth Amendment claims against individual officials on qualified immunity grounds and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the retaliation, right to association, and municipal liability claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent was not sufficient to put defendants on notice that their progressive series of questions and orders, with no attendant threat of termination, rose to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation. Plaintiffs were terminated for reasons related to water usage and meter inspection, not for asserting Fourth Amendment rights.

Mosholder, a corrections school officer since 2001, patrolled the school and, as necessary, disciplined inmates. In 2005, the facility began housing youthful offenders. Mosholder believed that these offenders were coddled. She claimed that during a 2008 rap competition they referred to gangs and flashed signs. Defendants claim otherwise. Mosholder sent a letter to Michigan state legislators, expressing concerns that the competition created a volatile situation, with promotion of gangs, and that loss of control over youthful offenders increased incidents at the facility. She urged legislators to attend a rap event. The warden responded to inquiries, explaining the purposes of the events. In the meantime, Mosholder had multiple run-ins with the school's new administrator, who viewed Mosholder as too strict. Inmates complained about Mosholder. Mosholder was transferred to a general corrections position, where she would come into contact with more prisoners, and no longer have weekends and holidays off. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on her First Amendment retaliation claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Whatever her personal motivation, Mosholder wrote primarily on a matter of public concern; there is no indication that the letter would materially disrupt her work environment or performance of her duties.

Plaintiff, born in 1946 in Mexico to a U.S.-citizen mother and a Mexican national father, allegedly entered the U.S. in 1949. It is disputed whether the entry was legal. His mother remarried a U.S. citizen in 1960. Plaintiff alleges that he has lived in the U.S. continuously for 60 years, has been married to a U.S. citizen since 1967, and is the primary caretaker of his son, who has spinal meningitis and requires constant care. In 2003 plaintiff requested a Certificate of Citizenship based on his mother’s citizenship (8 U.S.C. 1401); he separately claimed citizenship through his stepfather. The Administrative Appeals Office denied both, ruling that plaintiff’s mother did not meet the physical presence requirement of law in effect at the time because she gave birth at age 16 and there was no evidence that his stepfather had adopted him. Plaintiff had not proven that he had been admitted as a lawful resident prior to age 18, as required to establish prima facie eligibility. The district court dismissed claims that the Nationality Act of 1940 violates the equal protection clause and that this interpretation of the Act creates an arbitrary and inequitable outcome. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the language of the statute is clear.