Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Davis, an insulin-dependent inmate chosen to participate in an off-site public works program, claimed that he was removed from his public-works employment because of his sexual orientation. He claimed that officers supervising his work crew ridiculed and belittled him and that when he believed he was suffering a low blood sugar incident at the work site, the supervisor refused to directly hand him a packet of honey. Supervisors had Davis complete a medical health care request and meet with a nurse upon his return to the correctional facility. Although the nurse determined that his blood sugar levels were normal and that the episode was a false alarm, the health unit manager, ordered that Davis be removed from the public-works program. Davis claimed that non-homosexual, insulin-dependent diabetic inmates were allowed to continue working in the program and filed a grievance, which was denied. The district court screened his pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act and dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed.

Plaintiff, an employee of the city since 2006, began training for a position at city hall under the supervision of the then-city recorder, Williams. Plaintiff and Williams are friends and landlord-tenant. In 2008, based on a recommendation from Williams, plaintiff was assigned to a deputy clerk position. A few months later, the city fired Williams. The mayor told plaintiff not to call or text Williams, forbade her from promoting any allegations by Williams, and specifically ordered her not to participate in or assist with any lawsuit. He followed up several times, asking plaintiff whether she had been in communication with Williams. Williams did file suit, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation for speaking out against alleged acts of public corruption. Plaintiff then filed suit against the mayor and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the mayor summary judgment of qualified immunity on a claim of First Amendment prior restraint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff's right to speak publicly and participate in a lawsuit addressing workplace discrimination and public corruption in city government was clearly established.

Wanting to place its advertising benches on private property and in public rights-of-way, the company first sued the city in 1993. The parties settled. The city granted the company 300 permits and amended laws to give the company access to place benches in rights-of-way. In 2006-2007, the city rescinded those amendments and amended other laws and the company again filed suit, alleging violations of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights and claiming non-conforming use protection. While the case was pending, the city again amended the laws at issue. The district court determined that certain claims were moot, that the company lacked standing to bring its First Amendment claims, that the company was not similarly situated for purposes of its equal-protection claim, and that it would not consider the non-conforming use claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Noting that there has been no admission or finding of unconstitutionality, the court agreed the claims were moot. The only claimed injury, the difference between fees paid by bench advertisers and those paid by the other advertising media, did not establish standing.

Defendant was sentenced to 51 months in prison after entering a conditional guilty plea to charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)), making counterfeit money (18 U.S.C. 471), and passing counterfeit money (18 U.S.C. 472). The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from an apartment and car pursuant to a search warrant. The affidavit supporting the search warrant described evidence that someone using the car in question tried to pass counterfeit bills of different denominations at different times, that the car and residence belonged to defendant, that the car was seen in front of the residence, and that defendant was identified as having attempted to pass a counterfeit bill on one of the occasions. There was probable cause to search the residence and car.

Plaintiffs, allegedly injured while working for Cassens, sought worker's compensation benefits under Michigan’ law. Cassens’s third-party administrator, denied each plaintiff benefits. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the denials were fraudulent and violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B), 1962(c), and 1964(c). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Supremacy Clause prevents the Michigan legislature from preempting a RICO remedy by declaring its worker"s compensation scheme to be exclusive of federal remedies. An expected entitlement to benefits under the state statute qualifies as property, as does the claim for such benefits, and the injury to such property creates, under certain circumstances, a RICO violation.

Defendant was convicted of knowingly possessing with the intent to distribute approximately 4.9 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. 2. Following direct review, he sought correction of his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise at sentencing that a portion of the 4.9 grams of cocaine base was for personal use and should be excluded from the drug-quantity calculation. The district court held that defendant could not establish either deficient performance or prejudice because the court believed that the conviction amounted to a rejection of defendant's testimony that the 4.9 grams of cocaine base was attributable to personal use. The Sixth Circuit vacated, concluding that the verdict did not establish that all 4.9 grams were intended for distribution and that the record was incomplete with respect to whether defendant suffered any prejudice.

Charged with possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver in 1988, petitioner was convicted of possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine. At the time, the offense required a mandatory sentence of life without possibility of parole. The court held that that sentence violated the state constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment and sentenced him to 40 to 100 years in prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the sentence. The court held a new sentencing hearing in 2004. Despite changes in stated law that eliminated mandatory life sentences in such cases, the court imposed a sentence of life without parole. The state appeals court affirmed; the supreme court denied appeal. The federal district court denied habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting the state's argument was untimely because the conviction was affirmed in 1993. Petitioner was no notice that he could be convicted of possession, even though the state charged only possession with intent to deliver. Federal law does not entitle him to retroactive application of amended sentencing laws

In 2002, defendant was convicted of sexual battery, requiring him to register as a sex offender under Ohio law. Three days before he was released from prison, in 2005, he signed a notice acknowledging his duty to register personally in each county in Ohio, or any other state where he resided, upon five days of arriving there. He did not register in Ohio. Some time before the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250, went into effect, he moved permanently to Kentucky and did not register. He made sporadic trips from Kentucky to West Virginia, including several after SORNA became effective. In 2009 he was arrested for parole violation. He entered a conditional plea to violation of SORNA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to SORNA as constituting an ex post facto law and invalid exercise of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.

In 2006, petitioner was convicted of rape and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, friend of his girlfriend's daughter and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. The Ohio Court of Appeal rejected a challenge to a ruling that denied him the opportunity to present evidence of the minor's sexual history through her friend's testimony, arguing that the state waived protections of Ohio's rape-shield law when it chose to introduce evidence about the minor's lack of past sexual activity. The Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the state court decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law on petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Defendant, charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)), moved to suppress evidence seized in the automobile search (a loaded revolver found under the driver's seat) and his later statements admitting that the firearm belonged to him. The court granted the motion and the government appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While the officer had probable cause to stop the car and arrest the driver, based on traffic violations, the occupants were not within reaching distance of the seat when the car was searched. The officer's testimony did not establish reasonable suspicion to justify a protective search.