Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1972, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Paroled 20 years later, he was arrested in 1997 for aggravated robbery. Petitioner faked inability to walk and had to be transported to court in a wheelchair. During transport he attacked the officer, stole her pistol, carjacked a vehicle and killed the owner. He carjacked another vehicle and attempted another carjacking before surrendering and giving a lengthy, videotaped, confession. He was convicted of aggravated murder by prior calculation and design, aggravated murder during commission of a felony and 10 other counts. The jury recommended a death sentence. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. State courts denied post-conviction relief. The federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, finding that defendant was improperly prevented from presenting voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor but that any error was harmless. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek a change in venue, by introducing incarceration records during the penalty phase, and by failing to present mitigating evidence regarding juvenile incarceration, and that the trial court improperly prohibited defendant from arguing voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor.

Officers activated their lights and approached defendant's vehicle, which was parked in an otherwise empty coin-operated carwash in an area in which several drug arrests had been made. After seeing furtive movements, and observing marijuana on the dashboard, they requested that defendant leave exit the vehicle. He complied. The officers arrested defendant and searched the vehicle. They discovered a gun, crack cocaine, and marijuana. Defendant was charged with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The Sixth Circuit upheld denial of a motion to suppress. Defendant and the officers had a consensual encounter; no seizure occurred when the officers parked their cruiser and approached defendant's vehicle. They did not block his exit. Even if a seizure had occurred, the officers had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop.

Ohio law gives certain mayors jurisdiction to "hear and determine any prosecution for the violation of an ordinance of the municipal corporation, to hear and determine any case involving a violation of a vehicle parking or standing ordinance ... and all criminal causes involving any moving traffic violation occurring on a state highway located within the boundaries of the [city],” OH Rev. Code 1905.01(A). Plaintiff represents a 750-member class in a case under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the Due Process Clause based on the mayor presiding over no-contest traffic violation cases in Mayor's Court. The district court rejected the claim, relying on non-binding Sixth Circuit precedent stating that entering a judgment of guilty after a plea of no contest is a purely ministerial function that a mayor can undertake without violating due process. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a mayor presiding over a Mayor’s Court is per se unconstitutional. A mayor presiding over a Mayor’s Court does not violate due process when he acts in a purely ministerial capacity.

Plaintiffs, manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products, alleged that provisions of the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted partial summary judgment upholding the law and partial summary judgment to plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and ruled in favor of the government on most issues, declining to apply strict scrutiny and finding that warnings required by the Act reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing deception of consumers. The court upheld bans on event sponsorship, branding non- tobacco merchandise, and free sampling (loyalty and continuity programs); a requirement that tobacco manufacturers reserve significant packaging space for textual health warnings; the restriction of tobacco advertising to black and white text; and the constitutionality of the Act's color graphic and non-graphic warning label requirement. Reversing the district court, the court upheld the Act's restriction on claims that tobacco products are "safe or less harmful by virtue of” FDA regulation, inspection or compliance" 21 U.S.C. 331(tt)(4).

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison, exhausted state remedies and unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. The district court rejected his petition for habeas corpus, which was based on an argument that his Confrontation Clause rights had been violated at trial when, over his objection, the government played a tape recording of his co-defendant's custodial statement without affirmatively calling the co-defendant as a witness. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Though the trial court may have violated petitioner's constitutional rights, the court noted that granting habeas corpus under the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), requires "that fairminded jurists could not disagree." "Four such fairminded justices of the Kentucky Supreme Court did disagree" and concluded that confrontation only requires that a declarant be made available in the courtroom for a criminal defendant to call during his own case.

Defendant was convicted for failing to register under the Sex Offender Registration Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). Though the state's own sex registration form included notification of the federal duty to register and alerted registrants to federal criminal penalties of up to 10 years' imprisonment, Tennessee had not taken additional steps required to achieve substantial implementation of SORNA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that SORNA is effective in a state, even prior to its complete implementation. Refusing to address theoretical situations in which a state law would make compliance with federal law impossible or impractical, the court noted that defendant did not register under any possible definition of the term. Alternate arguments, that SORNA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, the nondelegation doctrine, and the Tenth Amendment, were found to be without merit.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to the mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Defendant did not comply with the officer's commands to stop and was not seized until the officer physically restrained him by taking him down and handcuffing him. The officer had reasonable suspicion based on: his knowledge that the area was known for drug activity; his observation that defendant and another man engaged in an apparent hand-to-hand transaction; defendant's fleeing and throwing items to the ground. The court upheld sentencing under the ACCA.

In 2006, U.S. Marshals worked with officers in 24 states on a fugitive round-up that led to arrests of 10,733 people, including plaintiff, who was wrongfully arrested because of clerical mistakes. All charges were eventually dropped, but news reporters had filmed her arrest and aired the story, including plaintiff's name and a statement that she was wanted for identity theft, after the dismissal. One station also placed the video on its website, along with a written story. Plaintiff's attorney faxed a cease and desist letter to the station, which removed the story, although it remained accessible by keyword search for several days. Most of plaintiffs' claims against the federal and city governments, the U.S. Marshals Service, the broadcast company and employees, and various named and unnamed Marshals, were resolved. The district court rejected defamation and false light claim against the broadcast company, based on the fair report privilege requirement of proof of actual malice, and a Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), claim against the U.S. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the discretionary function exception. Investigating and apprehending plaintiff was discretionary and not within the safe harbor for intentional torts.

Perkins was convicted of a fatal stabbing. He exhausted appeals. The conviction became final in 1997. He did not file a petition for habeas corpus within one year, as required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). In 2008, he filed a habeas petition, raising sufficiency of the evidence, jury instruction, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance claims. Arguing that the petition should be governed by AEDPA’s "new evidence" statute of limitations, Perkins introduced new affidavits that alluded to his innocence and to the guilt of a witness. The latest was signed in 2002, so that the limitations period expired in 2003; Perkins argued that the period should be equitably tolled because he is actually innocent. The district court denied the request because the evidence was not of the sort needed to pursue an innocence claim, was substantially available at trial, and pointed to the same theory argued at trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. While equitable tolling generally depends on the petitioner's diligence in pursuing his rights, a petitioner with a credible claim of actual innocence should be treated differently.

In 2003, petitioner pled guilty to unarmed robbery of $10 that occurred when he was 17 years old and had no prior criminal history. He suffered from A.D.H.D. and had been in special education since first grade. After being sentenced to “boot camp,” petitioner returned to court for violating rules. After a 20-minute hearing, at which supporters offered counseling and employment, the judge sentenced him to 1 to 15 years in prison. He served six years. He did not pursue direct appeal. The judgment became final in 2005. Efforts to obtain post-conviction relief in state court were unsuccessful. In September, 2006, a Michigan court rejected a second post-conviction motion as prohibited by state law. The supreme court denied appeal. In 2007, petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus. The district court found that the limitations period was tolled while the second motion was pending in state court despite the motion being barred. The court issued an unconditional writ on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and due-process grounds. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of whether equitable tolling of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2) applies. The second motion could not be accepted and, therefore, was not “properly filed,” so the petition was not timely.