Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery, felonious assault, (with firearm specifications) and possession of cocaine and sentenced to 258 months' imprisonment. On direct appeal he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudice due to the failure to suppress the photographic array identification, and insufficient evidence. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner did not file a timely appeal, but almost six years later, filed an unsuccessful motion for leave to file a delayed appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court. He also pursued post-conviction relief in state courts without success. The district court denied a habeas corpus petition as barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Petitioner was aware of the factual predicate of his claims at the time of his direct appeal, and the claims do not implicate sections 2244(d)(1)(B) or 2244(d)(1)(C). The limitations period began to run on the date that his judgment became final, at the expiration of the time for seeking direct review. Neither statutory nor equitable tolling apply and petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. .

Petitioner was indicted in state court on two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, Ohio Rev. Code 2907.04(A), and one count of gross sexualimposition, Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(A)(1). During trial, the court allowed the prosecution to amend the indictment to conform dates to testimony and declared a mistrial. The state proceeded toward another trial. The court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. The district court denied a pretrial petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Sixth Circuit affirmed after conducting de novo review. The court rejected a double jeopardy argument, finding that the mistrial resulted from prosecutorial negligence, and not from an intentional action by the prosecution because its case was going badly. The court concluded that the prosecution gained no advantage.

The university prohibits graduate students in its counseling program from discriminating based on sexual orientation and teaches students to affirm client values during counseling sessions. Plaintiff frequently stated that her faith (Christianity) prevented her from affirming same-sex relationships and certain heterosexual conduct, such as extra-marital relationships. In the last stages of the program, with a 3.91 GPA, she signed up for a required course in experiential learning, involving counseling real clients. When the university asked plaintiff to counsel a gay client, she asked her supervisor either to refer the client to another or to permit her to begin counseling and make a referral if the session turned to relationship issues. The supervisor referred the client. The university commenced a disciplinary hearing and eventually expelled plaintiff. The district court rejected her suit under the First and Fourteenth Amendments on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the school does not have a no-referral policy for practicum students and adheres to an ethics code that permits values-based referrals in general. A reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff's professors ejected her from the program because of hostility toward her speech and faith, not due to a policy against referrals.

Plaintiff, a new teacher, approached the principal to deny rumors that she had a sexual relationship with a minor student, JS. The principal spoke with JS, who denied the allegations. Days later, JS changed his story. The school called the police. JS stated he had consensual sex with plaintiff at her apartment and described her apartment and a tattoo and skin graft on her body. Plaintiff admitted to exchanging sexually inappropriate text messages, but denied having a physical relationship and that he visited her apartment. Photos matched JS's descriptions of plaintiff's tattop and apartment, and a warrant issued. Prior to execution of the warrant, plaintiff's attorney, asked for a polygraph. Plaintiff appeared for the polygraph, but the exam was never administered. At trial , JS significantly changed his testimony and plaintiff was acquitted. The district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of due process and claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Kentucky law. The state's attorney acted in the course of his prosecutorial duties, entitling him to absolute immunity, and his actions were not in violation of clear constitutional rights, entitling him to qualified immunity.

Petitioner was convicted in 1993 of a 1991 aggravated murder, was sentenced to death, and exhausted Ohio state court remedies. He filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas corpus in 1999 and amended his petition in 2003 to set forth 28 claims for relief, some with multiple subclaims. After filing, petitioner obtained information that the prosecution had withheld evidence that, before trial, a witness had been adjudicated delinquent for marijuana trafficking, contradicting his testimony that he never sold drugs. The district court held proceedings in abeyance while he exhausted state law remedies on the new Brady claim, then denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state court decision on the Brady claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. The court rejected claims of prosecutorial misconduct (vouching, inflaming the jury, and denigrating defendant and defense counsel) and ineffective assistance.

Among other provisions, the ordinance prohibited door-to-door canvassing and soliciting between 6 P.M. and 9 A.M. The district court struck licensing requirements as unconstitutional, invalidated a requirement that those going door-to-door honor a "do-not-solicit" list, but upheld the requirement that would-be canvassers obtain a copy of the list before going door to door. The court upheld the 6 P.M. curfew and held that that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a provision allowing the city manager to extend the curfew upon good cause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiff, an environmental advocacy organization, had standing to challenge the curfew. The curfew was unconstitutional as applied. The curfew is not narrowly tailored to serve city's interests in protecting residential privacy, allocating public safety resources, and preventing crime.

In 1975 federal court held that the city had discriminated against minorities in hiring entry-level firefighters. In 1977, the court approved a consent decree that included racial classifications as a remedy. A 2000 amendment noted that the percentage of minority firefighters had increased from four to 26 and set a goal of 33-1/3 percent; the court required that one of every three hires be minority applicants. During the years that followed, the city did not hire, but laid off firefighters. In 2009, the court declined to extend the decree and its racial classifications for another six years. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that the district court did not make findings concerning whether the racial classifications continue to remedy past discrimination.

Checking accounts were opened in the name of Diallo by a man with a passport bearing that name. The IRS deposited $3,787 into the account. Diallo withdrew $2,500 before the bank discovered that the money was a tax refund belonging to another. The account was blocked and the bank notified the IRS. The IRS made additional deposits for tax refunds. Diallo attempted to make a withdrawal, but the transaction was blocked. Later that day, at the airport, defendant was flagged for additional screening. The search revealed envelopes containing large amounts of cash and unsealed envelopes containing passports bearing defendant's picture but different names, including the name Diallo. He was indicted for possession of a false passport, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344 and 1028A(a)(1). The district court suppressed the evidence, finding that the government failed to establish that the search was constitutional, and barred admission of the bank records. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Although actual documentation seized during the search must be suppressed, evidence obtained legally and independently of the search is not suppressible, even if the government cannot show that it would have discovered its significance without the illegal search. The minimal deterrent effect of suppression is outweighed by the burden on the truth-seeking function of the courts.

Defendant, sentenced to death for the murder of his girlfriend and her two children in 1988, exhausted state remedies. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. The federal district court denied his petition for habeas corpus in 2001; the Sixth Circuit held appeal in abeyance while he exhausted "Atkins" claims in state court. Tennessee courts rejected his claim of mental retardation. The district court also denied an Atkins petition. The Sixth Circuit vacated the decision on the Atkins claim and affirmed on all other claims. On remand, the court must consider the relationship between mental retardation and mental illness and whether defendant displayed deficits in adaptive behavior by the time he was 18. Rejected claims concerned the court's failure to answer jury questions regarding whether defendant could be paroled from a life sentence; ineffective assistance in counsel's failing to object to the prosecution's penalty-phase closing argument that giving a life sentence would reward him for the additional killings of the children and by failing to hire a psychiatrist regarding his mental-health issues; and the court's determination of his competency to stand trial.

After state court rejected his challenge to the constitutionality of the law, defendant pled no contest to sexual battery for engaging in sexual conduct by means of sexual intercourse with his 22-year-old stepdaughter, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.03(A)(5), which makes it a crime to "engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when . . . [t]he offender is the other person's natural or adoptive parent, or a stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of the other person." He was sentenced to 120 days of incarceration and three years of community control and was classified as a sex offender. State court rejected appeals. The district court denied habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the state's interest in protecting families.