Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After his conviction in Ohio state court for two 1999 murders and the aggravated robbery and kidnapping of one victims, Scott was sentenced to death. Scott unsuccessfully appealed and pursued state court post-conviction remedies, then sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments: that Ohio’s “course-of-conduct” capital specification was unconstitutional as applied; that the trial court erroneously failed to merge two other aggravating specifications, for robbery and kidnapping; that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, by giving erroneous advice about the risks of making an unsworn statement, and by failing to present certain mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of trial; and that Ohio’s method of execution by lethal injection is unconstitutional. Scott did not present his first argument in state court, so it was procedurally defaulted. AEDPA’s stringent standard of review applies to Scott’s second and third claims, and Scott cannot show that the Ohio courts reached a decision that contravened or unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent. Scott is currently challenging Ohio’s execution procedures in federal district court, in a separate action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and consideration of this issue is properly confined to that forum. View "Scott v. Houk" on Justia Law

Aaron Hayward was driving home from his parents’ store around 4:00 a.m. when a Cleveland Clinic Police Department SUV followed him into his driveway without using a siren or lights. An officer yelled, “Hey you, come over here, boy,” as Aaron entered his home. It was not communicated to Aaron that he was under arrest. About 10-15 minutes later, five additional officers arrived and began pounding on the Haywards’ front door. Essex Hayward opened the main door and the officers tried to force their way through the outer security door. Essex shut the main door and used his body to prevent the officers from breaking down the door. The officers used the butt of a shotgun to shatter the main door’s window. Annie called 911. An officer stuck a taser through the window and blindly fired into the home, striking Aaron twice. The officers broke through the door, tased Aaron again, as he continued struggling, then dragged Aaron to the driveway, where they allegedly beat him with batons, kicked him in the head and other parts of his body, stunned him with a taser, and called him a “black nigger” before they handcuffed and arrested him. Aaron pleaded guilty to willfully fleeing a police officer and resisting arrest, admitting that he injured an officer. The Haywards brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. At the court’s request, they removed their claims based on pre-arrest conduct. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of the parents’ section 1983 claim for illegal home entry and state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, but affirmed dismissal of other claims, including Aaron’s section 1983 claims. View "Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found." on Justia Law

Williams, who was convicted in Michigan state court for the fatal shooting of the owner of a video store during an attempted robbery, filed a direct appeal, arguing that the introduction of the testimony of an eyewitness who died before trial at the preliminary hearings violated Williams’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of the testimony, and that the lineup in which Williams participated was unduly suggestive and violated the due process clause. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief, concluding that Williams’s constitutional rights were not violated and that, if they were, the errors were harmless. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The federal district court denied a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Williams v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Cordell was an inmate at the Greene County Jail in Xenia, Ohio until he pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter. As Deputy McKinney performed his initial rounds on the floor on which Cordell was housed, several inmates, including Cordell, requested haircuts. A verbal conflict ensued. McKinney commanded Cordell to step into the vestibule area to be placed in handcuffs. The conflict continued as McKinney placed Cordell in "escort position” to take him to a third-floor holding cell. Cordell claimed that during this trip McKinney ran him “head first into the wall” with force sufficient to lacerate Cordell’s forehead, cause severe neck and back pain, and leave him “very, very groggy.” The jail’s nurse (Jordan) found “a little cut above his eye,” and bandaged it. Later, at a hospital, Cordell was diagnosed with whiplash. Based on a witness statement, McKinney received a written warning for use of excessive force. The district court rejected Cordell’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. A genuine dispute as to several material facts exists. If Cordell’s version of events is credited, a reasonable jury could conclude that McKinney inflicted serious pain upon Cordell with malicious and sadistic intent. Any reasonable jail official would know that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the conduct that Cordell described.View "Cordell v. McKinney" on Justia Law

In 1991 Charlene filed a paternity suit naming McCarley as the father of her younger son. McCarley stated that he would kill Charlene before paying support. In January 1992 a neighbor went to Charlene’s apartment and found her dead, with a leather strap wrapped around her neck. Both of Charlene’s children were at home. Three-year-old D.P. repeatedly looked at uniformed officers and stated: “It was him. He hurt mommy.” Four days later, he made related statements in the presence of Charlene’s mother, including “Policeman hit my mommy. Put tape on her.” A child psychologist was able to elicit similar statements. In 1995, police officers made a surprise visit to McCarley’s home on an unrelated matter. In his garage, officer Balogh saw a deputy sheriff’s jacket and cap strewn across a moving dolly. Balogh remembered D.P.’s statements from years before and confiscated the jacket and cap. After a second trial in 2007, McCarley was convicted for aggravated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole in 20 years. The district court denied habeas relief, rejecting an argument that the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established Sixth Amendment law by allowing a child psychologist to read into evidence the testimonial hearsay statements of a three-and-a-half year-old declarant, where the declarant was not subject to any prior cross-examination. The court concluded that the error was harmless. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "McCarley v. Hall" on Justia Law

America’s largest law school, Thomas M. Cooley, has four Michigan campuses and one in Florida and about 3,500 students. . Anziska was “of counsel” at a New York law firm. On June 8, 2011, under the title “Investigating the Thomas Cooley School of Law,” Anziska posted on the website “JD Underground,” that the firm was investigating law schools for preying on the ignorance of “naive, clueless 22-year-olds. Perhaps one of the worst offenders is the Thomas Cooley School of Law, which grossly inflates its post-graduate employment data and salary information…. students are defaulting on loans at an astounding 41 percent… most likely … will continue to defraud unwitting students unless held civilly accountable. If you have any relevant information or know of anyone who has attended Thomas Cooley … correspondences will be kept strictly confidential.” On June 13, the firm received a cease-and-desist letter from Cooley, claiming that the post was defamatory. On June 15, under the title “Retraction re: Investigating the Thomas Cooley School of Law,” a partner posted on JD Underground that the earlier post “contained certain allegations which may have been couched as fact regarding employment and default data. These statements are hereby retracted.” Meanwhile, Anziska disseminated a draft proposed class action complaint involving 18 former or current Cooley students, containing the same allegations. The complaint became publicly available on the internet. Cooley sued, alleging defamation, tortious interference with business relations, breach of contract, and false light. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Cooley was a limited-purpose public figure and the record would not allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendants published the challenged statements with actual malice.View "Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Kurzon Strauss, LLP" on Justia Law

Hescott, a U.S. Army pilot, has been routinely deployed to the Middle East. He and his son own a rental property in Saginaw, Michigan. When the property became vacant and they were unable to sell it in 2008, they planned to remodel it. In 2009 Hescott found that the basement wall had given way. He hired contractors to repair the foundation and returned to his post. Before the contractors could begin work, a police officer noticed children playing at the house and contacted the Dangerous Buildings Inspector. The Inspector and the Fire Marshal, determined that the house should be demolished immediately due to the threat to public safety. The city did not notify Hescott before or after the demolition. The house was demolished and all fixtures and materials were taken to a landfill. The city did not take an inventory or consider whether any salvageable items remained. When Hescott returned to assist his contractors with purchasing supplies, he realized his house was gone. The Hescotts sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Partial summary judgment left a viable claim under the Fourth Amendment for unlawful seizure of aluminum siding following demolition. Before trial, the Hescotts rejected an FRCP rule 68 offer of judgment of $15,000. The jury rejected inverse-condemnation and punitive damages claims, based on exigent circumstances, but awarded $5,000 for the aluminum. The court awarded costs to the Hescotts as “prevailing parties” on their Fourth Amendment claim, but denied attorney fees based on “the degree of success obtained,” and denied the city sanctions under Rule 68. The Sixth circuit reversed in part, holding that no special circumstances warranted denial of the Hescotts’ attorneys’ fees, but that attorneys’ fees are not awardable to a losing party, even one otherwise entitled to post-settlement-offer costs under Rule 68.View "Hescott v. City of Saginaw" on Justia Law

Daily Services, owned by Mason, provided short-term temporary employment services. Mason also owned I-Force, which provided longer-term temporary employment services. After losing coverage under the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation group insurance rating plan, I-Force unsuccessfully applied for self-insurance status. I-Force owed $3 million in premiums. Unable to make payments, I-Force closed. Daily acquired some of its customers and began offering longer-term temporary employment services. Ohio law provides the employer with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Bureau may file a judgment or lien against it and allows the Bureau to deem one company the successor of another for purposes of an experience rating to calculate premiums, and, if an employer “wholly succeeds another in the operation of a business,” to transfer the obligation to pay unpaid premiums. The Bureau decided that Daily wholly succeeded I-Force, but did not provide notice of its assessment or an opportunity to be heard before it filed judgments and liens against Daily for more than $54 million. A state court vacated the judgments. The Bureau tried again and provided prior notice, but filed a lien before hearing an appeal. The court again vacated. The Bureau’s efforts to recover continue. Daily sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of procedural due process. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, recognizing that under the Supreme Court decision Parratt v. Taylor, a state may sometimes satisfy due process without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard pre-deprivation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Parratt doctrine does apply, and Daily did not plead that Ohio provided inadequate post- deprivation remedies . View "Daily Services, LLC v. Valentino" on Justia Law

Under investigation for drug trafficking, Kennedy learned from his attorney that he might be able to reduce his sentencing exposure by pleading guilty to an information. He consulted a second attorney, who promised to beat the case. Kennedy switched attorneys, heard from his new attorney the government might be bluffing, and decided not to negotiate a plea. The government indicted him on multiple drug-trafficking, firearms, and money-laundering charges and then caught him accepting a marijuana shipment. After changing attorneys twice more, Kennedy pleaded guilty and received a below-guidelines sentence of 180 months. Kennedy later moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that he would have negotiated a pre-indictment plea and received a lower sentence but for the ineffective assistance of his second attorney. The district court denied the motion based on precedent holding that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in pre-indictment plea negotiations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel at critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including some pretrial proceedings, such as post-indictment interrogations, post-indictment identifications, and post-indictment plea negotiations, but the Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel “does not attach until the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings.” View "Kennedy v. United States" on Justia Law

Mazzio, a federal prisoner serving two concurrent 240-month prison sentences for drug distribution, sought to file a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, relying on the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Alleyne v. United States, and claiming that he is entitled to relief because the factual basis on which his mandatory-minimum, 20-year sentence was imposed was not found by a jury. The Sixth Circuit denied his petition. To secure review of the substantive claim, “[a] second or successive motion must . . . contain . . . a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” 28 U.S.C. 2255(h)(2). Alleyne has not been made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. View "In re: Mazzio" on Justia Law