Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The city disbanded its dive team because of budget cuts, after which two children drowned. Plaintiff, a fire department employee and member of the disbanded dive team, spoke at a city council meeting, indicating that the budget cuts caused the deaths and would cause more deaths. Plaintiff was ordered to serve unpaid suspension, equivalent to three 24 hour shifts, on grounds of insubordination, malfeasance, misfeasance, dishonesty, failure of good behavior, and conduct unbecoming of an officer. After a grievance hearing the mayor affirmed the suspension, finding that plaintiff’s statements had been false. The district court granted summary judgment for the city. The Sixth Circuit remanded for determination of whether the statements were false; whether any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; whether a reasonable official would have believed any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; and, if necessary, whether plaintiff’s interest in speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern outweighed the city’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.

Defendant, convicted of several felony offenses in state court and sentenced to a maximum term of 27 years, exhausted state court appeals and filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court five days after the one-year statute of limitations (28 U.S.C. 2254) had run. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of equitable tolling. Although defendant proceeded pro se after his appellate attorney withdrew and did not turn over documents related to the case, and was limited to one law library visit per week, he was not diligent. His lack of access to the trial transcript and lack of notice of the nearly two-month gap between when he submitted his motion for a delayed appeal to the prison mailroom and when that motion was ultimately filed with the Ohio Supreme Court were "unfortunate" but did not excuse the delays.

When defendant was indicted in Tennessee in 2005 for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. 846, 841(b)(1)(A)) he was in custody in Georgia on unrelated charges. The government obtained writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, but because of superseding indictments, defendant's transfer to another county, and misplaced paperwork, defendant did not appear in Tennessee until August 2008. The district court rejected Sixth Amendment and Speedy Trial Act claims, but dismissed without prejudice under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act and FRCP 48(b). Defendant pled guilty to a new indictment and was sentenced to 110 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for dismissal. The district court erred by finding that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated; there was no basis for concluding that the government was less than grossly negligent and the court should have presumed prejudice, based on the length of the delay.

Defendant was convicted of intentional murder and of possession of a firearm at the time of the commission of a felony. At sentencing, counsel expressed that defendant, due to long term mental illness, was not responsible for his actions and needed extensive psychiatric treatment. The trial court imposed a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and a two-year sentence for the firearm conviction. The court noted that a clinical report classified defendant as suffering from schizophrenia paranoid type in remission in an individual who displays passive-aggressive tendencies, mal-depression and non-compliance with medical treatment, but concluded that his mental issues did not rise to the level of useable defense. After exhausting state appeals, defendant petitioned for habeas corpus. The district court dismissed, denying a motion for equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether the extraordinary circumstances of his mental illness prevented defendant from diligently pursuing his rights.

Convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death in 1983, petitioner exhausted Ohio state appeals and collateral attack. After dismissing his first habeas corpus petition, the federal district court granted conditional relief, was overturned by the Sixth Circuit, reopened the petition, and granted relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. At sentencing, counsel's mitigation strategy was to portray petitioner as a good person who lost his temper under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Counsel pursued this strategy despite having available the reports of several court-appointed mental health experts, which hinted at petitioner's difficult upbringing but did not provide specific details about his severely impoverished and abusive childhood. Despite these reports, counsel did not conduct an investigation into petitioner's background or interview any of his family members. Had they done so, there is a reasonable probability that the additional mitigating evidence would have led at least one of the panel judges to vote against the death penalty.

Petitioner murdered his three sons as they slept in their home, two days after his wife served him with divorce papers. An Ohio court sentenced him to death. His appeals and collateral challenges in state court were unsuccessful and federal courts denied. habeas corpus. His execution for November 15, 2011. The district court denied his Rule 60(b) motion to reopen his habeas petition and a motion to stay his execution. The Sixth Circuit denied a stay of execution. Petitioner waited too long to file his Rule 60(b) motion and offered no justification for the delay. He has known about the factual underpinnings of his conflict-of-interest and ineffective assistance of counsel arguments since 2006. Those arguments have already been addressed and are barred from further review. Petitioner also cannot overcome the bar on second or successive habeas petitions.

Plaintiffs bred their dogs to each other and advertised 11 puppies for sale. Undercover animal services officers visited on the pretense of interest in the puppies. Without a warrant or consent, officers re-entered the home and took all the dogs, stating that they could confiscate the dogs because plaintiffs did not have a breeder's license and that if more than one dog were unlicensed, they could seize all the animals. Neither adult dog was licensed. Before the dogs were released, the adult dogs were neutered, all had identification microchips inserted, and plaintiffs purchased a breeder's license and paid $1,020.95. Plaintiffs were never provided written notice of alleged ordinance violations. The dogs contracted infections that required expensive veterinary treatment. The district court rejected plaintiffs' state law and constitutional claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs were not operating a kennel and were not required to obtain a license for a single litter. The court rejected an argument that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by using subterfuge, but found that plaintiffs stated a claim with respect to the second, warrantless entry. Characterizing the release of the dogs as having elements of a shakedown, the court found that plaintiffs stated a claim for procedural due process claims. The court rejected substantive due process and equal protection claims.

During an investigation of home invasions, officers were told that plaintiff's boyfriend was a participant and that property had been taken to plaintiff's apartment. Officers executed a no-knock search. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court found that an officer had violated the Fourth Amendment, but was entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Even if a disparity between the warrant affidavit and the warrant led to the inclusion of items without the requisite probable cause, a reasonable officer would not have recognized the discrepancy and would have believed that probable cause for the warrant existed. The warrant established probable cause to search and the officer could seize any items that constituted evidence of home invasions. The district court erred in granting qualified immunity on a claim that the warrant was constitutionally deficient because it failed to describe with particularity some of the items to be seized. The warrant listed broad categories of stolen property, providing no basis to distinguish stolen items from plaintiff's personal property, although the officers had additional information about the stolen items that they could have included in the warrant.

Petitioner was convicted of murder in connection with a homosexual encounter and sentenced to death in the 1980s. Ohio courts denied relief. After several remands by the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that defense counsel's failure to obtain an independent mental health expert and reliance on a presentence investigation report could not be the basis for issuing a writ of habeas corpus. On remand, the district court denied the writ. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted and petitioner did not establish that the default should be excused do to fault and prejudice. A "Brady" claim concerning evidence of a psychological report indicating that the murder may have occurred as a result of "homophobic panic," failed in light of other evidence.

Petitioner, convicted in Michigan of aiding and abetting a carjacking and of receiving and concealing stolen property, exhausted state appeals and sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court (28 U.S.C. 2254). The district court denied. On rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction and rejecting an argument that trial counsel was ineffective in refusing to call a co-defendant, who had already pled guilty to the actual carjacking, as a witness.