Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, 16 years old at the time, was charged with first-degree murder and firearm possession during a felony after admitting that he was present at the scene of the 1984 murder. The juvenile court waived jurisdiction, so that defendant was tried as an adult. His counsel did not appeal and he was convicted. Evidence included three witnesses who testified that defendant had told them that he killed the victim. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus two years for the gun charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Multiple attempts at collateral relief failed. The district court denied a 2006 petition for habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, that it deemed to be "successive" under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed after finding that the petition was not successive because it followed a remedial appeal ordered on a prior petition. The credibility determination of the trial judge should not be overturned; given the evidence against him, defendant cannot show prejudice.

Based on a 1997 killing, defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack and to intentionally kill one or more persons in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, preserving the right to appeal denial of his motions to dismiss based on denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.The case, at times, involved 24 other defendants and numerous motions to continue, join, sever, and dismiss that delayed the beginning of defendant's trial. While at times he requested a speedy trial or wrote letters informing the court of the lengthy delay, defendant mostly caused or contributed to the delay through his admitted "vigorous" motion practice and requests for continuances; he never opposed any requested continuance. He did not show prejudice as a result of the delays. Taken as a whole, the "Barker" factors weigh against defendant, even with an 11-year delay from indictment to sentencing, they do not support a speedy-trial claim.

In 2001, petitioner was convicted of criminal sexual conduct. Following his arrest, while on bond for that charge, he was arrested for possession with intent to deliver cocaine. He was convicted of that offense as well. Petitioner became eligible for parole in 2008. The Michigan Parole Board used a guidelines scoresheet and assigned a score that gave him a status of "high probability of parole." Nonetheless, after an interview, the Board denied the application, indicating that petitioner required sex offender therapy and had no insight, empathy, or remorse. Petitioner filed a pro se motion, which the court interpreted as a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. After examining the state's parole system, the court concluded that petitioner identified only a basis for his hope of parole, but did not identify a protected liberty interest to which he is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Wife noticed her 72-year-old husband acting strangely and, fearing a stroke, called 911. When paramedics responded, husband refused to cooperate, demanding that they leave and threatening to retrieve a firearm. The paramedics retreated and radioed police for support. Police established a defensive perimeter around the home, called husband and told him to exit the house with his hands in the air, so that the officers could see he was unarmed. Although he acted confused on the first call and did not answer the second, he exited a few minutes later holding a shotgun skyward at a forty-five degree angle, with the barrel in his left hand and the stock in his right. None of the officers spoke to husband or told him to drop the gun. An officer fired a single shot, hitting his back and killing him. Police allege that he paused and leveled his gun in the direction of officers. Wife alleges that stopped and began to turn; as he turned, the gun barrel dropped. The district court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. 1983, but held that there were material issues of fact on whether officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no legal issue for appeal.

Husband learned of a problem on the school bus involving his 10-year-old daughter. He and his wife went to the bus stop, where they saw police cars and a school bus. They could not see their daughter, but saw their son being held against a police car. They stated that they were the parents and asked where their daughter was. The officer shouted, "Get back." They complied. An officer approached wife, who yelled "donât hit me." Husband told wife to return to their car. Husband claims that the officer grabbed him and began to kick him on his right side and groin. Other officers joined in and sprayed his face with pepper spray. The officers claim that husband and wife were aggressive. Husband was arrested and charged with assault on a police officer, but was found not guilty and filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court found that there were genuine issues of material fact and denied summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit remanded for trial.

Petitioner, arrested for rape on July 6, 2001, was not tried until February, 2003 because of continuances and motions by both parties and the court, some of which concerned DNA testing and unavailability of a defense expert. He was received four consecutive life sentences. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected a claim under speedy trial provisions in Ohio Rev. Code 2945.71 and the supreme court denied leave to appeal. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the deference owed state court decisions under the pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Ohio's manner of looking at the reason for delay is thus not contrary, or diametrically opposed, to federal precedent. The state court reasonably considered relevant factors and its finding that petitioner was not prejudiced was supported. At most, the delay in holding trial constituted official negligence, but petitioner did not put forth any facts to show that the continuances, failing to submit DNA samples on time, and failing to submit a bill of particulars were a calculated attempt to gain an advantage at trial.

Petitioner, convicted of the first degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254), arguing that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing present an insanity defense, despite knowledge of petitioner's long, well-documented history of severe mental illness. The Sixth Circuit reversed The Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law and unreasonably determined facts. That court acknowledged that counsel did not sufficiently investigate the insanity defense by obtaining an independent evaluation to rebut that provided by the forensic center, but instead relied on a self-defense strategy that was contradicted by the evidence. The court improperly looked at petitioner's actions after the shooting, rather than his state of mind at the moment of the offense, resulting in "a thinly veiled and unsupportable conclusion that it simply did not believe" that petitioner was legally insane, a factual issue that it should not have addressed. There is an "overwhelming probability" that knowledge of petitioner's history would have shed a different light on testimony that petitioner killed a complete stranger with minimal or no provocation, but then testified clearly and consistently that he believed the victim was trying to kill him and did shoot him.

A state court issued a judgment in forcible detainer and a notice of eviction, which was executed by defendants. Although the warrant did not mention personal property, the landlord and county attorney advised the officers that the landlord had the right to sell tenant's personal property. Tenant was threatened with arrest for his efforts to prevent removal of his personal property. Officers apparently assisted in removing the property to a truck and sent away state police officers called by the tenant. In tenant's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers' motion for judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers' participation amounted to an unconstitutional seizure of property in violation of a clearly established right; there was nothing extraordinary about the situation that entitled the officers to rely on advice given by the county attorney by phone.

After receiving an anonymous tip, police went to the home of defendant's mother-in-law, where defendant was staying, for a "knock and talk." Defendant, who stays at the house intermittently, objected to a search, during which media storage devices were found. Other occupants of the home consented. Defendant was charged with possessing counterfeit securities and fraudulent identification documents. The district court denied his motion to suppress. He pled guilty and was sentenced to 45 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bedroom, which he shared with his wife and which he used to store personal belongings.

In 1988 defendant was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated felony murder, kidnapping, and aggravated burglary, and sentenced to death. A federal district court concluded that the prosecution had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus, requiring the state either to set aside the convictions and sentences or conduct another trial within 180 days. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. About a week before retrial was to begin, the prosecutor notified defense counsel of additional evidence, including blood and soil samples. Defense counsel sought additional time. The court changed the scheduled trial date, which was within the 180 days, to May 4, 2009, which was not. The district court denied the state's motion for more time, issued an unconditional writ, ordered expungement of defendant's record, but declined to bar reprosecution. On remand, following the death of the state's key witness, the district court barred reprosecution.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court continued to have jurisdiction, despite the fact that defendant was no longer incarcerated, based on the collateral consequence: the threat of reprosecution.