Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties. In 2011 Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager under then-existing law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of retired city employees and severance benefits, including pension benefits, for retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. Retired employees sued under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied an injunction. In 2013, the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters later rejected Public Act 4 by referendum. Following rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit again vacated and remanded for consideration of whether, under section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, Public Act 4 prescribed a method of composition of indebtedness that binds the retirees without their consent and, if so, whether principles of state sovereignty preclude application of section 903(1) in this case; whether the emergency manager’s orders were legislative acts under the Contract Clause; whether the reductions and eliminations of health care benefits were “necessary and reasonable” under the Contract Clause; whether the retirees’ procedural due process claim is viable; and, assuming the Due Process Clause’s procedural protections apply, whether the collective bargaining agreements, considered in their entireties, establish protected property rights. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party of Ohio (LPO) sought to enjoin Ohio Secretary of State Husted from enforcing Ohio Rev. Code 3501.38(E)(1) and to restore its candidates to the May 2014 primary ballot. The Code requires that, to appear on the primary ballot and qualify for the general election, candidates must file petitions with (for statewide office) signatures of at least 500 qualified electors who are members of the same political party as the candidate. A petition consists of separate papers, each with signatures of electors of only one county; only one circulator can circulate each paper. Signatures must be in ink and include the location of the signer’s residence, as it appears on registration records. The circulator must note the number of signatures on each paper, and sign a statement that the circulator witnessed every signature and that, to the best of the circulator’s knowledge, each signature was that of a qualified voter and of the person whose signature it purports to be. The circulator must also identify the circulator’s name, address of permanent residence, and the name and address of the person employing the circulator to circulate the petition, if any. LPO previously successfully challenged an Ohio residency requirement for circulators. Hatchett collected signatures for LPO candidates and was paid about $2300. Hatchett, an independent contractor, believed it was unnecessary to fill in the employee information box, having circulated about 10,000 petition papers without completing that box. In response to a protest, papers submitted by Hatchett were invalidated. This was the first time enforcement of the employer disclosure requirement resulted in the disqualification of a statewide candidate. Absent a protest, practice had been not to check petitions for that disclosure. Because of the disqualification, LPO will likely lose its recognition as an Ohio political party. The district court rejected due process and First Amendment challenges to the statute. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Libertarian Party of OH v. Husted" on Justia Law

Ohio State Trooper Reno noticed a tractor-trailer stopped on the shoulder of the ramp connecting Route 46 to I-80. Worried that the truck posed a safety hazard, Reno approached and noticed that the engine was running and that no one appeared to be in the cab. Reno knocked on the truck door and, after a few minutes, Bradley emerged from the sleeper area of the cab. As he spoke to Bradley, Reno noticed that Bradley’s breath smelled of alcohol, his eyes appeared red and glassy, and his speech was slurred. When asked, Bradley admitted that he had consumed a “couple” “small pitchers” of beer and a “couple” bottles of beer an hour or two earlier at a truck stop 15 miles away. Bradley stated that he had parked on the shoulder to sleep, but he could not explain why he had stopped on the ramp rather than at a rest stop 200–300 feet away. Bradley failed two field sobriety tests and was swaying, losing his balance and failing to follow basic instructions. Reno arrested Bradley. A breathalyzer test at the Highway Patrol office confirmed that Bradley’s blood-alcohol content (.111%) exceeded the Ohio limit for commercial drivers (.04%). Denying a motion to suppress, the state court found that Reno had probable cause to arrest Bradley, but a jury acquitted Bradley. Invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, Bradley sued. The district court awarded the defendants summary judgment, finding that the state court’s ruling precluded Bradley from relitigating probable cause. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that issue preclusion did not bar the suit. View "Bradley v. Reno" on Justia Law

The prosecutor offered petitioner a plea that would have eliminated the mandatory-minimum sentence of 10 years for drug trafficking with a sentence of three to 10 years. Petitioner was then 18 years old and had no felony record. The prosecutor disclosed the nature of “exceptionally compelling” evidence planned for trial Petitioner did not accept the plea because, he alleges, his attorney encouraged him to go to trial “if I got 10 years on a plea bargain, I had no chance to appeal … I was never told that if I had never been to prison before, the Judge was required to at least consider giving me the minimum sentence … that if I took the plea bargain and got the maximum 10 years sentence, it could be appealed.” After his conviction, petitioner’s mother explained the rejection of the plea to his first counsel on appeal, Long, who viewed the conviction as “shooting fish in a barrel.” He did not advise them of the filing deadline, but let the 180-day period for challenges outside the trial record pass. After the Ohio appeals court affirmed the conviction another attorney unsuccessfully tried to reopen the appeal on the basis of ineffective assistance by Long. Petitioner then sought federal habeas relief, acknowledging that his ineffective trial counsel claim should have been raised in a post-conviction proceeding, but arguing that failure to do so should be excused by Long’s actions. The district judge denied relief, reasoning that appointed appellate counsel was not obligated to provide advice outside the direct appeal, for which there is no constitutional right to an attorney. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "Gunner v. Welch" on Justia Law

In1983, Leach was shot to death in the van from which he sold produce in Cleveland. Tyler and Head were indicted for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery. Head pled guilty to both and the death-penalty specification was dismissed. Tyler was twice convicted of aggravated murder. At both trials, Head testified against Tyler. After the second trial, the asked: If one group of jurors is positive that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors and wishes to recommend the death penalty, but the remaining jurors are just as positive that the mitigating factors are strong enough not to recommend the death penalty—and neither group is willing to change that decision, what is the proper procedure…. The court urged them to reach a decision, referring to time and expense. Tyler was again sentenced to death. Ohio courts affirmed. In 1999, Tyler sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, with 64 claims, including that the prosecution failed to disclose that Head received sentencing consideration for testifying and was threatened with adverse consequences at the second trial if he did not testify. Another claim argued that the court improperly charged the jury. Head invoked the privilege against self-incrimination; the prosecutor refused to extend immunity. The district court denied a motion to compel and rejected the petition. In 2002, Tyler sent a letter to his habeas counsel, stating that the court failed to address the improper jury instruction. Tyler requested that counsel alert the court to its omission and reiterated the request twice. In 2013 he moved for relief from the judgment pursuant to FRCP 60(b)(6), asserting counsel’s inexcusable neglect. The district court denied the motion. The Sixth circuit affirmed.View "Tyler v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Kilgore was performing community service at a police station when he stole two unloaded firearms from an evidence room and took them home. Convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2), he was sentenced to 70 months. He did not contest a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4) for “stealing” the pistols that created his status as a felon in possession of firearms, but argued that the court erred in applying a four-level enhancement to his base offense level for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense” under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The Seventh Circuit agreed with his argument that the “another felony offense” language from the guideline means that the offense triggering application of the enhancement must be separate and distinct conduct from the underlying offense. The enhancement violated the language of the guideline, amounted to double counting and appeared to subject Kilgore twice to punishment for the same offense. View "United States v. Kilgore" on Justia Law

While being held in Saginaw County Jail on a misdemeanor charge relating to failure to pay court fines, Rouster succumbed to sepsis and died as a result of a perforated duodenal ulcer. Before his death, he had complained of stomach pain, engaged in bizarre behaviors indicative of mental-health problems, and displayed signs of agitation. His estate, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the medical staff members who interacted with Rouster during the final 36 hours of his life, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Experts agreed that prompt medical attention could have saved his life and that Rouster received substandard care. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that it could not conclude that the medical staff became aware of Rouster’s serious medical need and deliberately refused to provide appropriate treatment.View "Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs deal in silver and gold jewelry, ingots, numismatics, and other related items. They challenged the facial constitutionality of the Precious Metals Dealers Act, Ohio Rev. Code 4728, alleging violation of the commercial speech rights of businesses dealing in precious metals, vagueness, and violation of the Fourth Amendment by imposing overly burdensome retention, reporting, and record-keeping requirements. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the Act violated the First Amendment because only those engaged in commercial speech are subject to its licensing requirement. The injunction prohibited the state from requiring licenses or fining those, like plaintiffs, who previously violated the statute. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying “rational basis” review. The Act does not burden the commercial speech rights of unlicensed precious metals dealers. Such dealers do not have a constitutional right to advertise or operate a business does not comply with reasonable requirements of Ohio law and cannot “hold themselves out” to the public without a license, regardless of whether they advertise. The issue is not advertising, but whether a business holds itself out to the public, which can occur by posting a sign, placing goods in a window, or simply conducting business in a manner that is visible to the public. The court noted the public interest in the statutory scheme .View "Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman" on Justia Law

After 20 years on Ohio’s death row, D’Ambrosio was granted habeas corpus relief on the grounds that the Cuyahoga County prosecutor violated his obligations under Brady v. Maryland. The state attempted to reprosecute him through mid-2009, but continued to fail to disclose exculpatory evidence and failed to alert D’Ambrosio or the court that its key witness had died. Ultimately, the district court granted an unconditional writ of habeas corpus, citing “extraordinary circumstances” and barring Ohio from reprosecuting. The state conviction was never vacated. After his release, D’Ambrosio filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that defendants violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the complaint did not plausibly allege any viable constitutional claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed after rejecting a statute of limitations defense. The prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for the non-disclosure of exculpatory information at trial and the complaint’s allegations were insufficient to plausibly allege the existence of an official county policy of violating criminal defendants’ constitutional rights. View "D'Ambrosio v. Marino" on Justia Law

Bray is an antiabortion activist and wrote a book, A Time to Kill. In 1985, Bray was convicted for a felony relating to physical damage to abortion centers. He spent four years in prison. Planned Parenthood (PPCW) was a plaintiff in a 1995 suit against antiabortion activists (including Bray) for intimidation by threat of force under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. 248. In 2005, PPCW sought to collect its $850,000 judgment and obtained a writ of execution authorizing seizure of specified property. The Bray family filed a “Bivens” suit, claiming that U.S. Marshals conspired with PPCW to seize their property in an unconstitutional manner. The complaint alleged that during a “surprise raid” Bray was required to sit on his couch while flak-jacketed Marshals, advocates for political positions that Bray despised, plus unknown persons, seized the books, papers, computers and cameras, of Bray and his family, excepting only children’s books and Bibles. Bray was not allowed to leave the couch or to call his lawyer. Eventually a Marshal called Bray’s lawyer. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Bray had settled with all defendants, except the Marshals, who were entitled to qualified immunity in carrying out a presumptively valid federal court order, even by “highly questionable ways.” The unconstitutionality of certain actions was not then clearly established with sufficient specificity. If the alleged facts are true, the incident was “more like home raids by Red Guards during China’s Cultural Revolution than like what we should expect” in the U.S., even if Bray’s ideas are “repugnant.”View "Bray v. Planned Parenthood Columbia-Willamette, Inc." on Justia Law