Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1993, a Tennessee jury convicted Sutton of premeditated first degree murder and felonious burning of personal property. Sutton’s trial counsel represented him through direct appeal, and filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In 2000, Sutton dismissed his trial counsel. New counsel amended his petition, raising ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims for the first time. The state trial court denied relief. Sutton was appointed new counsel for his federal habeas petition, which included new claims that his trial counsel failed to object to jury-selection procedures and to use of a “moral certainty” standard in jury instructions regarding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court denied the petition, finding the newly raised claims procedurally defaulted and that Sutton did not show “cause” for the default and “prejudice” from the error, or that a manifest miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. Days later, the Supreme Court heard argument in Martinez v. Ryan, ultimately holding that ineffective assistance by post-conviction counsel can establish “cause” to excuse procedural default of an ineffective assistance at trial claim where state procedural law prohibits defendants from raising such claims on direct appeal and requires they be raised in post-conviction proceedings. The district court found Martinez inapplicable because Tennessee’s procedural law does not prohibit ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court considered Trevino v. Thaler, and held that the rule also applies where state procedural law permits defendants to raise ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal, but makes it highly unlikely that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise such a claim. The Sixth Circuit remanded, holding that the Trevino ruling applies to Tennessee decisions. View "Sutton v. Colson" on Justia Law

Laster is an African American male who worked as a Public Safety Officer for the KDPS for 23 years. He alleges that KDPS subjected him to heightened scrutiny, selectively enforced policies, and was complicit when individual employees harassed and discriminated against him, and that the disparate treatment was attributable to race or to his complaints about discrimination. He specifically cited a 2006 performance evaluation downgrade, followed by a grievance and reversal; denials of a request to attend outside training and of other requests; reprimands; and tampering with his Obama screensaver. Laster filed two charges with the EEOC. While those were pending, Laster was involved in a conflict with other KDPS officers at an event during which President Obama was present. Information about the incident was released to a newspaper. Laster resigned and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), Michigan’s Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court analyzed the claims for “Race Discrimination” and “First Amendment Retaliation” and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit remanded, stating that activity protected by the First Amendment is different than the type of activity protected by Title VII. Analysis of the Title VII race discrimination claim was insufficient for dismissing the Title VII retaliation claim; the “materially adverse action” element of a Title VII retaliation claim is substantially different from the “adverse employment action” element of a Title VII race discrimination claim. That Laster cannot show that he was constructively discharged is not dispositive of the retaliation claim, given evidence of other adverse actions. View "Laster v. City of Kalamazoo" on Justia Law

Driving a stolen vehicle and wearing face masks, Jackson and Ivery arrived at a bank, intending to commit robbery, but were confronted by an off-duty Canton police officer working security. The officer drew his weapon and yelled “police!” After gunfire between Ivery and the officer, Jackson ran across the street. In a parking lot, he approached Sara Binegar, driving her car. Jackson opened the door, pointed a gun, and told her to “scoot over,” then tried to sit on her. Bineger escaped through the passenger door. Jackson drove away in Bineger’s car. Jackson was convicted of aggravated robbery and attempted kidnapping. At sentencing, Jackson argued that the convictions were for allied offenses of similar import under Ohio law and requested merger. The court denied the request, after comparing the elements of the offenses and stating that “one could [commit] the offense of kidnapping without committing the offense of aggravated robbery and vice versa.” The court imposed consecutive sentences of 10 years for aggravated robbery and five years for attempted kidnapping. State courts rejected appeals. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state court decision was not contrary to or unreasonable application of clearly established federal law concerning Double Jeopardy. View "Jackson v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2011, an Ohio man released more than 50 exotic animals before committing suicide. Partially in response, the state enacted the Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act, Ohio Rev. Code 935.01–935.99. All persons in possession of dangerous wild animals before September 5, 2012, were required to register with the Ohio Department of Agriculture and to microchip each registered animal upon registration. The Act prohibits possession of a dangerous wild animal after January 1, 2014. A person already in possession of a dangerous wild animal and wishing to continue to possess the animal after that date may obtain a wildlife shelter permit or a wildlife propagation permit. Owners of exotic animals challenged the Act as violating First Amendment rights to freedom of association and speech, arguing that the permitting requirements are so onerously expensive that the only viable means of compliance would be to join the Association of Zoos and Aquariums or the Zoological Association of America, for which there are exemptions. They argued that they are compelled to associate with those organizations and to subsidize the organizations’ speech and that the microchipping requirement constitutes a physical taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court denied injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The owners are not compelled to join the AZA or ZAA and the Act does not effect a physical taking.View "Wilkins v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Miller was convicted in Michigan of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and sentenced to life without parole. The evidence included email and instant-message conversations between Miller and her lover, Cassaday, in which Miller lied to Cassaday that she was pregnant with his children but that her husband abused her, causing her to miscarry; convinced Cassaday that her husband was involved in organized crime and that her life was in danger; and plotted her husband’s murder. Cassaday told his brother Mike that he was leaving town and that, if he did not return, Mike should look for a briefcase under Cassaday’s bed. Bruce Miller was murdered on November 9, 1999. Miller promptly ended her relationship with Cassaday and started dating someone else. Cassaday committed suicide. Mike found the briefcase and notes, which he opened in the presence of an attorney. The case contained copies of the emails and IM conversations. Its contents were admitted into evidence with evidence linking the communications to Miller’s and Cassaday’s AOL accounts. Cassaday’s suicide note was also admitted. Miller claimed that admission of the note violated her clearly established Sixth Amendment right to confront her accuser and sought habeas corpus. Following a remand, after the Supreme Court vacated an earlier decision, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Michigan Court of Appeals decision upholding the note’s admission did not violate clearly established law. View "Miller v. Stovall" on Justia Law

Reed, who suffers from seizures as the result of a motorcycle accident, filed suit based on two incidents. In the first, inside Reed’s cell at the Franklin County Corrections Center, deputies were unable to handcuff Reed for transport to a hospital following a seizure, due to his resistance. They twice used a Taser to subdue him. The incident was captured on videotape. Later that day at the hospital emergency room, a deputy used a Taser on Reed after Reed lunged at the deputy. Reed argued that the deputies used excessive force and that the county failed to train the deputies on the proper use of Tasers, creating a policy and practice of abuse. Finding that “no rational fact finder could conclude that the defendant deputies acted with conscience-shocking malice or sadism” toward Reed during either incident, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that it would not put the onus on the deputies to assess the seriousness of Reed’s seizure in order to determine whether it warranted immediate medical treatment. The decision to use a Taser to subdue Reed to take him to the hospital “might have been unwise, but it was not unconstitutional.” View "Shreve v. Franklin Cnty." on Justia Law

Responding to a report of underage drinking in a home, officers found a group celebrating eighth grade graduation. Police asked the teens to step outside individually for breathalyzer testing. Seven tested positive for alcohol. Police arrested them and notified their parents. In the morning, a juvenile worker arrived at the police station, and, after speaking with a judge, indicated that the children were to be detained for a court appearance the next day. At the regional juvenile detention center, the minors underwent routine fingerprinting, mug shots, and metal-detection screening. During a hygiene inspection and health screening, they were required to disrobe completely for visual inspection to detect “injuries, physical abnormalities, scars and body markings, ectoparasites, and general physical condition.” A same-sex youth worker observed the juveniles for several minutes from a distance of one to two feet, recording findings for review by an R.N. The minors were required to shower with delousing shampoo. They were released the following day. The charges were dropped. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the juveniles, based on a “clearly established right for both adults and juveniles to be free from strip searches absent individualized suspicion” that negated a qualified immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that no clearly established principle of constitutional law forbids a juvenile detention center from implementing a generally applicable, suspicionless strip-search policy upon intake into the facility.View "T. S. v. Doe" on Justia Law

The dismembered remains of Abby’s friend were found in plastic bags on a lawn in Buena Vista. Technicians found Abby’s fingerprints on the bag and bits of the victim’s flesh on a saw that Abby had borrowed. The police charged Abby with murder. Abby retained attorney Gust. Gust entered his appearance on Abby’s behalf. Abby retained another attorney, Piazza, weeks later. Both appeared on Abby’s behalf, sometimes separately and sometimes together. Only Gust was present when Abby’s trial began. After jury selection, Abby objected to proceeding without Piazza. The court indicated that it was inclined to proceed without Piazza. The next morning, both Gust and Piazza appeared. Piazza indicated that Gust was “lead counsel” but that “Abby is on a different plane with that.” The prosecutor rejected a proposal that he lead with less significant witnesses to accommodate Piazza’s schedule. Abby’s conviction was affirmed. The district court rejected a habeas petition in which Abby argued that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and that Gust was ineffective. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has not held that a defendant’s right to counsel of choice is necessarily violated when his secondary retained counsel has a scheduling conflict precluding attendance at trial. Abby was not prejudices by Gust’s performance. View "Abby v. Howe" on Justia Law

Officers Hampton and Lyons received a radio communication of a report of an ongoing breaking-and-entering. The caller, Mays, was home and people were attempting to break through her front window. The officers arrived about 10 minutes later, parked their marked cruiser a few houses away, and approached on foot. They noticed McMullin standing close to the caller’s home, then walking toward the officers. Hampton advised McMullin to stop and show his hands. McMullin complied, stating that he was “here for [his] people.” Concerned for their safety and believing that McMullin might be a suspect, the officers frisked McMullin. Mays and her boyfriend, testified that they attempted to tell the officers before the search that McMullin was not the perpetrator. Officer Hampton testified that he had no contact with them before searching McMullin. During the search, Hampton felt a gun in McMullin’s waistband and recovered a revolver. McMullin admitted that he did not have a gun permit and was arrested. Lyons then approached the home and that Mays believed that the perpetrator was her landlord. McMullin was not charged with breaking-and-entering, but was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, under 28 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). After the district court denied his motion to suppress, McMullin conditionally pleaded guilty. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers’ reasonable suspicion that McMullin was involved in the crime justified their stop and frisk. View "United States v. McMullin" on Justia Law

Kentucky law prohibits businesses that sell substantial amounts of staple groceries or gasoline from applying for a license to sell wine and liquor, Ky. Rev. Stat. 243.230(7). A regulation applies the prohibition to retailers that sell those items at a rate of at least 10% of gross monthly sales. A group of grocers sued the Kentucky Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, alleging that the law irrationally discriminated against them in violation of state and federal equal-protection rights; that it violated state separation-of-powers principles by granting the administrative board unfettered discretion to define the law; and that it violated state and federal due process rights by vaguely defining its terms. A liquor store intervened as a defendant. The district court granted summary judgment to the grocers on the federal equal-protection claim but rejected the other claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, upholding the statute. Applying the rational basis test, the court reasoned that the statute conceivably seeks to reduce access to high-alcohol products, and offends neither separation of powers nor due process principles. View "Maxwell's Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner" on Justia Law