Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005 the Blewetts were convicted of crack cocaine offenses and sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 10 years each under the 100-to-1 crack cocaine law. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 as implemented by new sentencing guidelines, substantially reduced crack cocaine sentences, including the mandatory minimum sentences, 21 U.S.C. 841(b). If the Blewetts were sentenced today the quantity of crack would fall below the threshold for any statutory minimum. The district court denied retroactive resentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)2 and 28 U.S.C. 994(u)3. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the old crack cocaine ratio led to mass incarceration of thousands of nonviolent prisoners under a law widely acknowledged as racially discriminatory. Although the Act was not made explicitly retroactive by Congress, the court stated that judicial perpetuation of the discriminatory mandatory minimum crack sentences would violate the Equal Protection Clause. On reconsideration, en banc, the court held that the Act does not retroactively undo final sentences. The court noted a 142-year-old congressional presumption against applying reductions in criminal penalties to those already sentenced, 1 U.S.C. 109, and the 2012 Supreme Court decision,n Dorsey v. United States. View "United States v. Blewitt" on Justia Law

Marshall pled guilty to receiving child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a) and (b)) from the time he was 15 until he was 20 years old. The district court varied downward from the guideline range and sentenced him to five years in prison, the mandatory minimum sentence for the offense, expressing concerns about the perceived harshness of that sentence. Marshall has a rare physiological condition, Human Growth Hormone Deficiency, which he believes entitles him to the Eighth Amendment protections accorded to juveniles. Although diagnosed with an I.Q. score of 87 and a mental age of 15, Marshall attended a community college part-time for four semesters, pursuing a career as a lab technician and paying his own tuition. He worked as a machine operator for a commercial bakery. He owned a car and had a credit card. He claimed that he felt like he was viewing images of his peers and that he often felt like a 15 or 16-year-old individual because of his small frame and stature. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that Marshall was an adult at the time of his crimes. View "United States v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of murder and rape in connection with the 1987 deaths of two officers in the Army Nurse Corps, was sentenced to death in Tennessee state court. After exhausting state remedies, he sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The district court denied his petition in its entirety, but granted a certificate of appealability on a claim that the state improperly excluded mitigation evidence at his resentencing hearing. The Sixth Circuit expanded the certificate to cover claims concerning alleged prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal at resentencing; ineffective assistance of counsel at his resentencing; suppression of favorable, material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, improper review of the exclusion of mitigation evidence at the resentencing; and unconstitutional vagueness in the Tennessee aggravating factor applied at resentencing. The court then affirmed, except with respect to the claim of prosecutorial misconduct. The court granted a conditional writ based on the prosecutor’s statements comparing defendant to two of the most widely despised criminals of the then-recent past, repeated references to defendant as “the evil one,” and reference to the Lord’s Prayer, creating an inference “that the death penalty is mandatory through their appeal to a higher authority.” View "Cauthern v. Bell" on Justia Law

In 2004, Lampe won a $25,000 judgment against Kash. Kash could not pay his debts and sought bankruptcy protection in 2012. When he submitted a list of creditors, under Bankruptcy Rule 1007(a) Kash omitted Lampe’s residential address, listing her in care of the law firm that represented her eight years earlier. The firm stopped working for Lampe in 2004, and the notice never reached Lampe, who did not participate in the bankruptcy case, which discharged the judgment debt. After the discharge, Lampe returned to the district court, seeking to revive her judgment. The district court rejected her claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. A debt is a creditor’s property, and the Due Process Clause entitles her to service of notice “reasonably calculated” to reach her before she is deprived of that property. Notification to a former attorney provides little assurance that the notice will reach the creditor. Lawyers have “no general continuing obligation” to pass information along to people they no longer represent. Nothing in the record suggested that the search for Lampe’s address would have imposed an unreasonable burden on Kash; without further investigation, any belief that the firm still worked for Lampe in 2012 was unreasonable. View "Lampe v. Kash" on Justia Law

While employed at an insurance company, Huff used customer information to obtain credit cards, and, with the help a teenager, cell phone contracts, resulting in loss of more than $350,000. Huff pleaded guilty to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371; identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7); and access device fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2). The plea agreement stipulated that the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines Manual applied, calculated an offense level of 22, and agreed that no other adjustments applied. There was no upward adjustment for abuse of a position of trust or for use of a minor. The pre-sentence report included upward adjustment for abuse of trust, adjustment for more than 10 victims, and adjustment for use of a minor: a net offense level of 25 after acceptance of responsibility. Huff’s criminal history included prior offenses for forgery theft and attempted misuse of a credit card with concurrent sentences. The district court used the 2006 manual, applied the abuse of trust enhancement and imposed concurrent 60-month prison terms. Huff’s attorney allegedly stated that the judge would be unhappy if reversed and would impose a sentence substantially greater than originally imposed. Huff dismissed an appeal. Huff later moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that an evidentiary hearing was necessary on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "Huff v. United States" on Justia Law

Inmate Santiago, complaining of severe pain and a rash, was seen by Dr.Mosher on January 31. Mosher prescribed Tylenol for pain and antibiotics to treat what she thought might be Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). The next day Dr. Ringle diagnosed erythema nodosum (EN), an uncomfortable but non-dangerous skin inflammation that typically disappears in about six weeks but may recur. EN has no known cure. Ringle prescribed an anti-inflammatory and an antibiotic. Four days later, Santiago was transferred to OSU Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with EN and arthralgias, a severe joint-pain condition, and prescribed an anti-ulcer agent and a different anti-inflammatory. Santiago was seen on February 20 by an OSU dermatologist, who recommended a topical steroid, compression hose, and SSKI, which may help treat EN but is not standard treatment. Each day, February 22- 25, Santiago asked prison nursing staff about the treatments. Staff denied knowledge until, on the 25th, nurses found Santiago’s unsigned chart on Ringle’s desk. Ringle had been on vacation. Mosher signed the order on February 27. Santiago received the topical steroid on February 29 and compression stockings on March 10. Santiago waited longer for the SSKI, which is a non-formulary drug. The district court rejected Santiago’s suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) based on the delays. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Santiago did not prove that the delay caused a serious medical need or deliberate indifference.View "Santiago v. Ringle" on Justia Law

Letters sent between LaDeau and his incarcerated brother, David, came to the attention of authorities. The letters, written in code, allegedly communicated ways to obtain and conceal child pornography. Investigators executed a search warrant at LaDeau’s residence and discovered flash drives containing child pornography. LaDeau was indicted for possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(A), which carried a sentencing range of zero to 10 years’ imprisonment. LaDeau moved to suppress inculpatory statements and evidence seized from his home, claiming that officers had interviewed him in a hospital while he was attending to his wife and improperly coerced his responses by threatening to inform his wife about their investigation moments before she underwent life-threatening surgery. The court granted the motion; there was no longer any admissible evidence that LaDeau had possessed child pornography. Five days before the scheduled trial the government obtained a superseding indictment, adding David as a codefendant and charging both with conspiracy to receive child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2), which carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence, based on evidence that had been in its possession since before the initial indictment. A charge of conspiracy to possess would not have carried the same mandatory sentence. The district court held that the charging decision warranted a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness, because there was a realistic likelihood of retaliation for the successful suppression motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Ladeau" on Justia Law

Phillips was indicted in 2004 on charged that he had travelled to Thailand and knowingly engaged in illicit sexual conduct (18 U.S.C. 2423(f), 2246) with a minor male, not yet 16 years of age, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2423(c), the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act). Phillips pleaded guilty to the single count and was sentenced to 37 months in prison, followed by lifetime supervised release. Phillips was released from prison in 2007, violated several terms of his supervised release, and was sentenced to an additional 30 months. Released from his second incarceration in 2010, he unsuccessfully moved to vacate judgment under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that PROTECT, which punishes “[e]ngaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places,” applied only to individuals who both traveled in foreign commerce and engaged in illicit sexual conduct after its enactment and that his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto clause. The district court found the motion time-barred and procedurally defaulted, noting that the illicit sexual conduct (not the travel) occurred after the enactment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the “actual innocence exception,” to the limitations period should be applied only in case of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The exception cannot be so broadly defined as to be premised upon changes in statutory interpretation of the term “travels.” View "Phillips v. United States" on Justia Law

Burgess was pulled over for speeding and found to be under the influence of alcohol and a prescription drug. After failing sobriety tests, Burgess was arrested for DUI. His resistance caused officers to perform a “takedown,” a tackle to the ground, to place him in handcuffs. Burgess did not suffer any apparent injuries at the scene. Burgess’ disruptive behavior continued during transport. Upon his arrival at the jail, officers attempted to search him and also performed a takedown. The parties dispute whether Burgess was noncompliant and the effect of the takedown. Burgess asserts that he woke several hours later, with pain in his face and head, and a broken tooth. Burgess signed a “Medical Screening Form,” indicating that he had “no visible signs of trauma or illness,” and “no other medical/physical conditions of which the Jail should be aware.” After release, Burgess admitted himself into a hospital where CT scans revealed fractures that required surgery. The district court dismissed his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims of excessive force, failure to intervene, and deliberate indifference, and found the defendants entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The right to be free from excessive force during booking was clearly established so that the claim should have been reviewed for reasonableness. Material facts are also in dispute on the negligence, assault, battery, loss of consortium, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and spoliation of evidence claims. View "Burgess v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Selby is serving a life sentence for murder, a two-year sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and a sentence for attempted escape from prison. Michigan prison authorities confined Selby in administrative segregation for almost 13 years based on a determination that he posed a serious escape risk. Selby served most of those years in a maximum security facility. Correction officials released Selby into the general prison population about 18 months after he filed a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he had been confined in segregation and denied access to worship services without meaningful review and in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the RLUIPA claim, but held that summary judgment was not appropriate on the due process claim. There were material disputes of fact, including whether Selby’s four misconduct reports over 10 years supported the decision to retain him in administrative segregation, whether the decision to override his qualification for a lower security classification in 2010 was warranted, and whether the aging escape history justified continued restraint in administrative segregation. View "Selby v. Caruso" on Justia Law