Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1997, the Miami Township police department fired Sergeant Young for allegedly forcing sex on a woman while on the job; the termination was overturned by an arbitrator. The arbitrator concluded that the department had not proven its allegations, noting that DNA samples from the scene did not match Young, that Young and his accuser had been in a relationship, and that the accuser had a history that cast doubt on her credibility. In 2010, the newspaper published the statement “Young had sex with a woman while on the job” in an article about the suspension of another officer. Young sued for defamation and obtained a $100,000 verdict. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a jury to decide that the editor knew that the accusation was probably false and published it regardless. View "Young v. Gannett Satellite Info.Network, Inc." on Justia Law

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, collectively, the Affordable Care Act require that most businesses employing 50 or more individuals provide female employees with health-insurance coverage that includes, at no cost to the employee, “such additional preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration.” 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4). Those guidelines require plans to cover “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity.” Eden Foods, Inc., and Potter sought an injunction to prevent federal agencies from enforcing that mandate against them. They contend that offering such contraceptive services to the employees of Eden Foods would substantially burden the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs and contravene protections under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb–2000bb-4 (RFRA). The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A for-profit corporation is not a “person” capable of religious exercise as intended by RFRA and individual shareholders/owners of a corporation have no standing to challenge provisions of laws that the corporation must obey. View "Eden Foods, Inc v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Under the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the district court denied pauper status to Coleman-Bey in his civil suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, although one of his previous dismissals was still on appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Counting a third dismissal still on appeal as a strike does not lead to the anomalous conclusion that the third dismissal was itself precluded from being appealed by the three-strikes rule. Each of the three civil cases that Coleman-Bey filed while incarcerated counts as a strike under the PLRA. View "Coleman v. Tollefson" on Justia Law

An officer found a tool bag outside the McNamara Federal Building. Thinking it was lost property, the officer stored the bag in the building for three weeks without inspecting it. Eventually, someone x-rayed of the bag and discovered objects consistent with an explosive device. The Detroit Police Bomb Squad detonated the bag, resulting in a sizable secondary explosion. The bag containing the bomb was sold exclusively at a chain hardware store that also sold the particular timer used in the device. Investigation led to identification of Mikulich, who was charged with attempting to destroy a government building by means of explosive while creating a substantial risk of injury to a person, 18 U.S.C. 844(f)(1)–(2); using and carrying a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B)(ii); and possessing an unregistered destructive device, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). Mikulich exhibited erratic behavior during his first appearance. After he was adjudged incompetent and remanded for treatment, the government requested that he be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs. The district court rejected Mikulich’s argument that the government lacked a sufficiently important interest in trying him, that he faced civil confinement in the absence of criminal sanction, and that he intended to raise an insanity defense The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Mikulich did not demonstrate that any special circumstances weaken the government’s clear interest in trying him for the serious crimes of which he is accused.View "United States v. Mikulich" on Justia Law

Nurse Turetzky and Doctor Desai opened a clinic in 1976. They fought, and sometimes the fights turned physical. In 1983, they agreed to dissolve their partnership once Desai repaid Turetzky’s investment. Weeks later, police found Turetzky dead in a parking lot, having been strangled. Gorski and Adams worked at Desai’s clinic. Gorski testified that, before the murder, Adams told him repeatedly that Desai wanted Turetzky killed. After the murder, Adams confessed to Gorski that he had killed Turetzky and that Desai wanted him to leave Michigan. State prosecutors charged Desai and Adams with first-degree murder in 1995. The month-long joint trial began in 2001. There was evidence that Desai solicited a hitman in 1982, took out insurance on Turetzky in 1983, asked whether Turetzky’s body had been found before it was discovered, drove to the crime scene that day, and gave Adams $2,000 after the murder. A jury found Desai guilty of murder; the judge imposed a life sentence. The jury failed to reach a verdict for Adams. Desai’s challenge to reliance on Adams’ confession was rejected by Michigan courts. A federal district court granted Desai’s habeas petition, but the Sixth Circuit reversed. The Confrontation Clause no longer applied to non-testimonial hearsay such as confession from Adams to Gorski. On remand, the district court granted Desai’s habeas petition based on his due process claim, after it was rejected by state courts. The Sixth Circuit again reversed. View "Desai v. Booker" on Justia Law

Youngstown Police receiced a call reporting that a man driving a black Jeep Cherokee was attempting to sell firearms at an auto parts store. The caller identified himself as a store employee and provided the vehicle’s Pennsylvania license plate number. A few hours later, officers encountered a Jeep with a license plate number matching the earlier report. Seeing it turn without signaling, they initiated a felony traffic stop, drawing their weapons, and patting down the occupants. Gray was driving. The vehicle was registered to passenger Hockenberry; neither had a valid driver’s license. There were active arrest warrants for occupant Hunt. The officers did not allow Hockenberry to call someone to retrieve the vehicle before having it towed; the officers performed an inventory search, pursuant to policy. They saw a handgun case and the barrels of long guns. The vehicle also contained tools and drug paraphernalia. An officer admitted there were items in the vehicle that were not inventoried. One week later the officer obtained a warrant and conducted another search, stating that he had received information that there might be stolen property in the vehicle. He found a crow bar and bolt cutters. After denial of a motion to suppress, Hockenberry and Gray pleaded guilty as felons in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Finding that both were armed career criminals,r 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the district court sentenced Hockenberry to 204 months imprisonment and Gray to 216 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, but remanded Hockenberry’s sentence. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law

AmEx is the world’s largest issuer of traveler’s checks, which never expire. AmEx and third-party vendors sell the checks at face value, and AmEx profits by investing the funds until the TC is redeemed. Although most are cashed within a year, AmEx uses the remaining uncashed checks for long-term, high-yield investments. Until recently, every state’s abandoned property laws presumed abandonment of uncashed traveler’s checks 15 years after issuance. This presumption requires the issuer to transfer possession of the funds to the state. In 2008 Kentucky amended KRS 393.060(2) to change thes abandonment period from to seven years. AmEx claims violation of the Due Process Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Takings Clause. Following a remand and amendment of the complaint to add a dormant Commerce Clause argument and a claim that the legislation did not apply retroactively to checks that were issued and outstanding prior to the effective date, the district court granted the state summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the amendment applies only prospectively and does not violate the Commerce Clause. View "Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc. v. Hollenbach" on Justia Law

Kennedy family members own a controlling interest in corporate entities that comprise Autocam. John Kennedy is Autocam’s CEO. The companies are for-profit manufacturers in the automotive and medical industries and have 661 employees in the U.S. The Kennedys are practicing Roman Catholics and profess to “believe that they are called to live out the teachings of Christ in their daily activity and witness to the truth of the Gospel,” which includes their business dealings. Regulations under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), 124 Stat. 119, require that Autocam’s health care plan cover, without cost-sharing, all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization, and patient education and counseling for enrolled female employees. Autocam and the Kennedys claim that compliance with the mandate will force them to violate their religious beliefs, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed for lack of standing. Recognition of rights for corporations under the Free Speech Clause 20 years after RFRA’s enactment does not require the conclusion that Autocam is a “person” that can exercise religion for purposes of RFRA. View "Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

In 2003, Henderson was stopped for speeding. The officer discovered that the vehicle had been reported stolen. A Detroit Police Officer attempted to organize a live lineup, but could not locate five males of defendant’s description. The officer then conducted a photographic lineup, at which Henderson was identified as the suspect in a carjacking. Police records indicate that an attorney representing Henderson’s interests, Corr, was present for the photographic lineup. After Henderson’s conviction, Corr wrote a letter to Henderson stating that he had not been present at the lineup. At trial, Henderson’s counsel challenged neither admission of the photographic lineup, nor testimony regarding it and presented no evidence. Henderson was convicted of armed robbery and carjacking. State court efforts were rejected as untimely because the filing arrived one day late due to failings in the prison mail system. Henderson filed a federal petition for habeas corpus. The district court found several claims to be procedurally defaulted based on the lateness of Henderson’s application for leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of his first motion for reconsideration, which caused the Michigan Court of Appeals to dismiss his application. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Sixth Circuit law, Maples v. Stegall, (2003), provides that “[w]here a pro se prisoner attempts to deliver his petition for mailing in sufficient time for it to arrive timely in the normal course of events” that circumstance “is sufficient to excuse a procedural default based upon a late filing.” View "Henderson v. Palmer" on Justia Law

An internal investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office found evidence suggesting that during the Jefferson trial on drug-conspiracy charges, the prosecution failed to disclose to the defense the extent of the promises of leniency that the prosecution made to cooperating witnesses. In a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, Jefferson alleged that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor violated his obligation under Brady v. Maryland to disclose material impeachment evidence. Following a remand, the district court again denied Jefferson’s motion, finding that Jefferson’s claims were not timely filed, that equitable tolling was not warranted, and that even if timely, Jefferson’s Brady claims failed on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the claims filed on the merits, because the material at issue was not prejudicial. The court rejected the conclusion that Jefferson failed to exercise due diligence in these circumstance. A section 2255 petitioner is permitted to rely on the government’s representation that it has fulfilled its Brady obligations. Reasonable diligence does not require a section 2255 petitioner repeatedly to scavenge for facts that the prosecution is unconstitutionally hiding from him. View "Jefferson v. United States" on Justia Law