Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Carter, a police officer for 13 years, was with other officers outside a residence while a Tactical Enforcement Unit went inside to check for threats to the officers who would perform a search. Carter was taking Colonix, a nonprescription supplement to clean his colon, in an effort to lose weight. Carter went to his car after the tactical unit gave the all clear and drank Colonix, knowing that it made him need to frequently use the restroom. During the search, the resident complained that cash was missing. A supervisor ordered the officers to “freeze everything” until the Professional Performance Division arrived. Officers were not to leave. About 30-45 minutes later, Sergeant Eccher arrived. Feeling the Colonix and sweating profusely, Carter told Eccher that he needed to use the bathroom and did not want to use the residence bathroom because of its filthy condition. Eccher put his palm straight out, and said, “You can’t leave until I search you.” Eccher patted Carter down; he did not pat down Carter’s genital area and did not take Carter’s badge or police identification. Officer, Lopez, also needing to leave, was searched, but was allowed to keep his boots on. The searches were in plain view of the residents. The officers left. After PPD arrived, another officer was allowed to leave without being searched. The district court rejected a suit by Carter and Lopez under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging illegal search and seizure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable officer in Carter’s position would have feared arrest or detention if he did not comply with the search request.View "Carter v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

When basketball legend Michael Jordan was inducted into the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame in 2009, Sports Illustrated produced a special commemorative issue devoted exclusively to Jordan’s remarkable career. Jewel Foods was offered free advertising space in the issue for agreeing to stock the magazine in its 175 stores. Jewel submitted a full-page ad congratulating Jordan, which ran on the inside back cover of the commemorative issue. To Jordan the ad constituted a misappropriation of his identity for the supermarket chain’s commercial benefit. He sought $5 million in damages, alleging violations of the federal Lanham Act, the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, the Illinois deceptive-practices statute, and the common law of unfair competition. The district court accepted Jewel’s First Amendment defense, that its ad was “noncommercial” speech with full First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Jewel’s ad prominently featured the “Jewel-Osco” logo and marketing slogan, which were creatively and conspicuously linked to Jordan in the text of the ad’s congratulatory message. The ad was a form of image advertising aimed at promoting the Jewel-Osco brand; it was commercial speech and subject to the laws cited by Jordan.View "Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc," on Justia Law

Pineda was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 115 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court violated his right to a fair jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when it struck the sole Hispanic member of the jury for cause and replaced him with an alternate during trial and committed procedural error by failing to adequately consider all of the factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1) at sentencing. View "United States v. Pineda" on Justia Law

Sanders pleaded guilty to possessing more than 50 grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute. The district judge found that he possessed more than 500 grams of cocaine or cocaine base and calculated an offense level of 26, producing a recommended range of 110 to 137 months’ imprisonment, and sentenced Sanders to 120 months. Most of the cocaine that was included for the purpose of calculating the offense level had been seized from Sanders’s home, which the police searched with a warrant following his arrest. The district judge concluded that the warrant was invalid and ruled that the evidence seized from his home could not be used against Sanders at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the judge should have also prohibited use of that evidence at sentencing. All evidence is admissible at sentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3661. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Agent Lombardi received a tip from a confidential informant that he had seen “Cap” in possession of cocaine. The CI, who was familiar with cocaine distribution and had previously provided information that resulted in an arrest, provided the address at which he had seen “Cap.” Lombardi searched the name “Cap” in a law enforcement database. Todd Sutton was listed as a match for that alias. Lombardi obtained a booking photo of Sutton and showed it to the CI, who confirmed that “Cap” was Sutton. Lombardi drove the CI past the address. The CI confirmed the location and stated that the tenant was Foster, whom the CI believed to be Sutton’s girlfriend. A law enforcement database confirmed that Foster was the tenant; Lombardi later discovered that she was Sutton’s cousin. Lombardi took the CI before a judge; the CI signed a “John Doe” affidavit in support of a search warrant. During the ensuing search, agents found: 63 grams of crack cocaine in a bedroom closet; male clothing and shoes in the same closet; a digital scale with white powder residue and other items frequently used to cook crack cocaine in the kitchen; a handwritten letter on the kitchen table referring to “Cap”; and a computer, on which agents viewed a video showing Sutton in the apartment. Only Sutton and Foster had keys to the apartment; she rarely entered the bedroom where the cocaine was found. Sutton pleaded guilty, retaining the right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Sutton" on Justia Law

Officers arrived at Helman’s residence to execute warrants for his arrest. They hoped for a peaceful surrender. Helman exited the home and spoke with officers. In response to questions as to whether he was armed, Helman lifted his shirt to show a semi-automatic handgun. Helman handed the officers papers and returned to his house. The officers informed other members of the state police that Helman was carrying a loaded firearm. A six-hour stalemate followed, after which Helman walked into his yard carrying water and a cup. The Emergency Response Team moved in to prevent him from retreating back into his home and activated a flash bang device to distract Helmanhim. According to the officers, Helman turned, and, seeing the ERT, attempted to draw his handgun. Officers shot Helman multiple times. Helman claims that he did not reach for his weapon until after that device went off and shots were fired. Helman pled guilty in state court to resisting law enforcement with a deadly weapon. Helman sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The district court rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Helman’s version of the facts would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and, under the facts found in that conviction, the response of the officers was reasonable. View "Helman v. Smeltzley" on Justia Law

Wourms, age 16, was killed in a crash; he was driving erratically when an officer, warned by a 911 call from Wourms’ mother that her son was drunk and “going crazy,” turned on his emergency lights to signal him to pull over. Wourms increased his speed to about 80 mph in an area posted for 25 mph. His father sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the crash was caused by the police car intentionally ramming Wourms’s car, resulting in an unconstitutional seizure of his person and property. The officer denied that his car touched Wourms’s car. The district court entered summary judgment, finding the evidence insufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the cars had collided. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that without a collision, Wourms was entirely responsible; the police officer had every legal right to signal Wourms to pull over. Even ramming a recklessly driven car to induce the driver to stop or cause the car to crash, need not be unreasonable. In this case, however, there were no marks on the police car that matched marks on Wourms’s car, no debris on the road where Wourms started to swerve, and no skid marks from the police car. Witness testimony indicated that the police could not have caught Wourms in time to hit his car before the crash.View "Wourms v. Fields" on Justia Law

In November, 2005, Rooni and others went hunting. They shot three deer, which they took to a DNR post in a gas station for registration. While DNR employees tagged the deer, Rooni went inside. DNR agent Biser arrived and asked Rooni how many deer he had. Rooni did not respond. Biser proclaimed, loudly, that Rooni did not like the DNR. Rooni said “no, just people like you.” Biser left the station and leaned against the trailer while speaking to DNR employees. Rooni came out and attempted to walk around Biser. He had to pass closely because of slush on the ground. Biser extended his leg to block Rooni’s way. Rooni stopped and said, “let me get through,” and “brushed” between Biser and the trailer. Biser allegedly spit food at Rooni. As the encounter escalated, Rooni told his son to call the police. Biser told Rooni he was under arrest. While handcuffing Rooni, Biser allegedly jerked him back and made the cuffs too tight. While in the jail, Rooni did not seek medical attention. He had discoloration under his skin, painful hands and swollen fingers. Charges of disorderly conduct and obstructing an officer were dismissed. In April 2006, Rooni was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome. The district court dismissed his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the handcuffing claim, citing qualified immunity. The court remanded Rooni’s arrest claim; taking his reasonable allegations as true, neither probable cause nor “arguable” probable cause supported an arrest.View "Rooni v. Biser" on Justia Law

The Indiana War Memorials Commission requires a permit for even small gatherings at the Soldiers and Sailors Monument at Monument Circle in Indianapolis and at several other monuments. Smith and his young son were expelled from Monument Circle for protesting, without a permit, a proposed United Nations arms treaty. Smith sought an injunction against the policy’s enforcement. The district court denied his motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the U.S. has signed, but has not ratified the treaty and that the permit policy has changed since the district court denied the motion. The new policy retains the problematic features of the old, so Smith’s appeal is not moot. Smith seems likely to succeed in showing that the 14‐person limit on demonstrations without a permit, and a provision that, if a gathering has been advertised or the public has been invited, a permit is required even if the group ultimately is made up of fewer than 15 people, are not narrowly tailored. View "Smith v. Exec. Dir. of IN War Mem'ls Comm'n" on Justia Law

Executing an arrest warrant for Wilson, officers talked to people who had seen Wilson enter a particular house. The officers were invited inside to talk with the owner, Rawls, who gave them permission to look around to confirm that Wilson was not there. In the kitchen they smelled the burnt marijuana. Richards sat at the table. An officer saw what he thought was a rock of crack cocaine on a plate, and a marijuana cigarette, a small amount of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and plastic baggies on the table. An officer had to use pepper spray to subdue Richards. When officers handcuffed Richards and lifted him to his feet, a handgun fell from his waistband. A knife was sticking out of his pocket. The officers conducted a protective sweep of the house. In the unlocked bedroom that Richards used when visiting Rawls, an open briefcase on the bed appeared to contain cocaine. An officer read Rawls his Miranda rights. Rawls was never handcuffed or detained. Rawls told the officers that he understood his rights and willingly signed consent to search after one request. Although Rawls was 86 years old, neither officer observed signs of confusion. Richards was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); maintaining a place for using and distributing controlled substances, U.S.C. 856(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm having been convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court denied motions to suppress and sentenced him to 180 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Unted States v. Richards" on Justia Law