Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Chicago police obtained a warrant and searched a two-bedroom apartment leased by Tucker’s mother. Tucker's mother and his niece were present. Officer Edwards found a rifle and documents bearing Tucker’s name under a mattress in a bedroom. Officers found eight clear baggies of heroin inside a potato chip bag and ammunition. Another officer apprehended Tucker a few blocks away and stated that officers had found the gun. Tucker responded that the rifle was not his and that he was holding it for someone. His mother testified that Tucker did not have keys to the apartment, was not listed on the lease, and did not keep possessions there, but only visited. His niece corroborated the testimony, adding that a neighbor brought Tucker’s mail to the apartment. Edwards testified that an officer asked Tucker’s mother which bedroom was Tucker’s, and that she pointed to the bedroom where the rifle was found. Tucker was convicted of possessing a firearm after conviction of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment longer than a year, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims based on sufficiency of the evidence of constructive possession and that Tucker was denied a fair trial because the court indicated it would admit evidence of six prior felonies if he testified. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Craig self-published a book of adult relationship advice, “It’s Her Fault,” in which he discussed sexually provocative themes and used sexually explicit terms. Craig’s employer, a school district, learned of the book and terminated his employment because of it. Craig sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliation for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court dismissed, reasoning that “It’s Her Fault” did not address a matter of public concern and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on an alternative basis. The book deals with adult relationship dynamics, an issue with which many members of the public are concerned, but the school district’s interest in ensuring the effective delivery of counseling services outweighed Craig’s speech interest. The district reasonably predicted that “It’s Her Fault” would disrupt the learning environment at Craig’s school because some students, learning of the book’s hypersexualized content would be reluctant to seek Craig’s advice. View "Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) investigated Burkhardt, a correctional officer at LCC and determined that Burkhardt had taken his cell phone inside and used it to make 30 calls from inside the facility, in violation of IDOC policies and of Illinois law. State’s Attorney Hahn filed felony charges against Burkhardt. A few days later, another correctional officer told other employees that Burkhardt was being prosecuted for accidentally bringing a cell phone into LCC. In response, Volkman, a casework supervisor, called Hahn and left a message that “as a citizen” he did not believe that incarceration should be pursued in Burkhardt’s case, and that Hahn should consider allowing the matter to be handled through the IDOC disciplinary process. Hahn called Volkman back. News of the conversation reached the internal affairs investigator at LCC, who investigated. Volkman received a written reprimand and was suspended for five days. Volkman sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was retaliated against for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that, even if they were not, Volkman had not proven his case as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Volkman v. Ryker" on Justia Law

In 2005, Indianapolis and Marion County passed an ordinance prohibiting smoking in most buildings frequented by the general public, with exceptions for bars and taverns with liquor licenses that neither served nor employed people under the age of 18, tobacco bars, and bowling alleys. In 2012, the City-County Council expanded the ordinance by eliminating many exceptions. As amended, the ordinance included exceptions for private residences, retail tobacco stores, tobacco specialty bars, and private clubs that voted to permit smoking. Bar owners affected by the ordinance sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting due process, equal protection, takings and freedom of association claims under both the federal and Indiana constitutions. The district court upheld the ban. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Goodpaster v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

In 2008 Huart pled guilty to possessing child pornography, and was sentenced to 65 months. In 2011, he was transferred to a private halfway house that contracts with the Bureau of Prisons. Rules provided to Huart included one that “[d]uring intake, all belongings will be searched and inventoried. Any new items brought into the facility or removed from the facility will be reported to staff so the inventory can be adjusted.” Huart was not permitted to possess a cell phone. Rules governing inmates who were allowed to have cell phones specified that “ANY STAFF may request at ANY TIME to view the contents of [an inmate’s] cell phone with or without reason.” Huart signed “Conditions of Residential Community Programs,” which stated that he was subject to frequent searches of his living area by staff. An employee conducting a random search of Huart’s room found a cell phone on his bed. A house director discovered 214 images, including child pornography. Huart admitted to possessing the phone and the images. The FBI obtained a search warrant, but thel phone was passcode protected and had to be sent to FBI Headquarters. Agents did not unlock the phone until February 14, 2012; the warrant specified that the search was to be conducted before December 15, 2011. The district court denied motions to suppress, finding that Huart did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and that the search of his phone was conducted properly under the warrant. Huart pleaded guilty, but he reserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Huart" on Justia Law

Indiana enacted the Automated Dialing Machine Statute, which bans “robocalls” unless the receiver has consented to the calls in advance, Ind. Code 24–5–14–1, with limited exemptions. School districts may send messages to students and parents and employers may send messages to employees. There is no exception for political calls. Patriotic Veterans, an Illinois not‐for‐profit corporation whose purpose is to inform voters of positions taken by candidates and office holders on issues of interest to veterans, uses automatically dialed calls. For example, its website states that “in 2010, Patriotic Veterans, in partnership with singing idol Pat Boone sponsored nearly 1.9 million calls to veterans and seniors across the U.S. about cuts in Medicare as a result of the passage of Obamacare.” Patriotic Veterans claims that it cannot afford to make the calls without using an automatic dialer and a recorded message and that live operators cannot make calls fast enough when time is of the essence, such as on the eve of an election, and sought a declaration that the law violated the First Amendment and was preempted by the Federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, which also regulates use of autodialers. The district court found that the TCPA preempted Indiana’s statute as applied to the interstate use of autodialers and entered an injunction against enforcement with regard to political messages. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to preemption and remanded for consideration of other issues. View "Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. State of IN" on Justia Law

Hamilton claimed that Lorincz, dying of Parkinson’s disease, hired her to help him at home. She was a friend of Lorincz’s daughter, a former physician who was serving jail time. After Hamilton had worked 88 hours, Lorincz gave her a check for $10,000. Hamilton told Lorincz’s other adult children, by phone, that their father was dying and had given her a $10,000 check. Knowing that Hamilton had a criminal conviction, they told the police that Hamilton was taking advantage of their impaired father and went to their father’s house. Although Lorincz told the police that he wanted Hamilton to have the money and wanted the police to leave, they remained for about two hours and learned that Hamilton had been a psychologist, but her license had been revoked after her felony conviction for a $435,000 Medicaid fraud, and that Lorincz already had professional home health aides when Hamilton had “rushed” to his side. Hamilton had a history of bizarre lawsuits against government officials. Hamilton claims that the police would not allow her to leave while they were there and, when they left, required her to leave without the check, although she wanted to stay. The district court dismissed her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging police misconduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hamilton v. Village of Oak Lawn" on Justia Law

Bailey was convicted in Illinois state court of one count of murder and two counts of attempted murder. His trial counsel, Swano, had not filed a discovery motion and did not know that one of the eyewitnesses had testified before a grand jury. Swano received a transcript of the grand jury testimony after the witness left the stand, and entered into a stipulation that the witness had not told the grand jury that Bailey was at the murder scene. Illinois state courts rejected Bailey’s claim that Swano’s performance was constitutionally deficient. A federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bailey did not show a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have differed but for Swano’s error. View "Bailey v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Four white male Chicago police officers, in plain clothes, in an unmarked car, were driving in a high-crime area that is largely nonwhite. A woman signaled them and, when they stopped, stated that men were gathered in a lot nearby and one of them, wearing a white jacket, was selling “rocks” (crack cocaine). The officers drove past the lot and saw a juvenile and three men; Morrow, age 20, wearing what appeared to be a white jacket. Officer May parked and watched the men, through binoculars, from across the street. May saw Morrow selling drugs and Bell, age 14, collecting money. Passersby were attracted by the yells of “rocks, rocks” from two older men. The drugs were in a vial on the ground. After about 20 minutes with three sales, May radioed the other officers and told them to arrest the group. May picked up the vial. At the police station the four were searched. Bell had $100 on him. All were charged. Morrow was charged with felony possession of an illegal drug. After being acquitted, Morrow sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful search and seizure and conspiracy. A jury exonerated all the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of procedural error.View "Morrow v. May" on Justia Law

Balthazar lived in one of two apartments on the third floor. Police had a warrant to search the other apartment. Both had rear doors about opening on a common landing. The officers climbed the stairs to the landing and used a battering ram on the door of Balthazar’s apartment. According to Balthazar they entered the apartment, screaming profanities and pointing guns; handcuffed Balthazar and her cousin; ransacked the apartment, dumping food on the floor, opening drawers, flipping mattresses, and throwing clothing; and left after about 15 minutes when another officer appeared and said they were in the wrong apartment. The officers claim that, while they did hit the wrong door, they immediately realized the mistake and none of them entered Balthazar’s apartment. Balthazar’s attorney later claimed that even looking inside the apartment constituted an illegal search. Neither a claims adjuster who visited the apartment the day of the incident, nor the Independent Police Review Authority employee who took a report, noted complaints about anything other than damage to the door. A jury rejected Balthazar’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A search resulting from an innocent mistake is not unreasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Even accepting Balthazar’s alternative theory, simply looking inside does not always constitute a search. View "Balthazar v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law