Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Grandberry sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 from a disciplinary sanction, loss of “good time” credits, imposed against him by a state prison. He claimed that the Indiana prison’s disciplinary proceedings failed to provide him with minimal due process protections. The district court denied the petition on the merits. The Seventh Circuit held that a certificate of appealability was not required in a habeas case challenging state prison disciplinary proceedings because in such cases, “the detention complained of” is the additional time the prisoner must stay in prison as a result of the disciplinary proceedings. The detention does not “arise out of process issued by a State court.” View "Grandberry v. Knight" on Justia Law

In 2012 the Seventh Circuit invalidated provisions of the Illinois gun law, 720 ILCS 5/24‐1,‐1.6, which, with limited exceptions, prohibited a person from carrying a ready-to-use gun outside his property or the property of someone who has granted permission. The court ordered its mandate stayed for 180 days to allow the state to craft a new gun law and extended the stay for an additional 30 days. In July 2013, the Illinois legislature, overriding a veto, enacted, the Firearms Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILCS 66/1, authorizing issuance of licenses for carrying guns outside the home. The Act requires an applicant to be at least 21 years old; have 16 hours of approved firearms training; have a currently valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card; not have been convicted of assault, drunk driving, or certain other offenses or be in pending proceedings; and not have been treated recently for alcoholism or drug addiction. The state moved to dismiss the underlying cases as moot. Plaintiffs, upset by the new law’s delay of 270 days between its enactment and issuance of the first permits, requested that the state be ordered, until the Act is fully implemented, to allow any resident to carry a gun outside the home with only a FOID card. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, stating that if plaintiffs “don’t like the new law, and wish to invalidate it, they must bring a new suit.” There was no prior order except a deadline for the state to enact a new law. It met the deadline. View "Shepard v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Prison official Meyerhoff wrote a disciplinary report on inmate Hardaway, charging damage or misuse of property, forgery, and trading or trafficking of official electronics contract forms. Hardaway was sentenced to six months of disciplinary segregation, demotion in status, and revocation of commissary rights. Due to a childhood incident involving rape and abuse, which Hardaway associates with closed metal doors, Hardaway requested a cell with bars. Prison officials denied this request. Hardaway initiated a grievance, contending that he knew nothing about the sale of the electronics contracts, the charge was based solely on information provided by a confidential informant, the disciplinary report failed to state a specific time, place, or date, and that the disciplinary committee denied him the opportunity to view the forged contracts or argue any defense during the hearing. His second grievance was considered by the Illinois Administrative Review Board, which recommended remand for more specific information. Meyerhoff failed to revise the report, so the ARB upheld Hardaway’s grievance and concluded that the charge should be expunged. Hardaway had already served his segregation time, and claims that he experienced mental anguish as a result of the solid door; was physically attacked by his cell mate; and was only released from his cell once per week to shower and use the yard. The district court rejected his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), finding that the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hardaway v. Meyerhoff" on Justia Law

Devbrow, an Indiana prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting that prison officials denied him access to the courts by confiscating and destroying his legal papers in retaliation for a prior lawsuit (concerning medical care) he filed. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Devbrow failed to show that prison officials actually destroyed his legal documents or took his papers for retaliatory reasons. The court noted testimony that Devbrow had created a fire hazard by stacking excess property by his bed, that prison officials had allowed him to keep some legal materials by his bed, that Devbrow stored the rest of them, and that the officials were unaware of Devbrow’s pending litigation. The court further reasoned that Devbrow did not suffer any actual injury from the alleged actions: Devbrow’s medical indifference suit had been terminated not on the merits, but on grounds of untimeliness and that Devbrow had not submitted any admissible evidence to discredit the officers’ explanation that they had removed his property from the dorm room because it was a fire hazard. View "Devbrow v. Gallego" on Justia Law

A 1980 fire in a Chicago apartment building killed 10 children. Kidd became a suspect following his arrest on unrelated charges. At his 1987 trial on charges of arson and 10 counts of murder, Strunck, a public defender, represented him. Kidd was convicted and sentenced to death. In 1992, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. At his new trial, Kidd waived assistance of counsel and represented himself, despite the judge’s repeated warnings and advice. Kidd expressed dissatisfaction with the public defender and requested that Dan Webb or Jenner & Block represent him. Kidd was unable to find private counsel. Strunck represented him at the penalty phase and presented evidence that Kidd was borderline mentally retarded. Kidd was convicted again and is serving a life sentence. In unsuccessful state postconviction proceedings, before the same judge who presided over his trial, Kidd argued that the court should have ordered a formal competency hearing because Kidd was taking psychotropic drugs under medical direction and that his waiver of counsel was not voluntary. The state denied his habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Sixth Amendment arguments. View "Kidd v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the Indiana Unclaimed Property Act, Ind. Code 32‐34‐1‐1, as authorizing confiscation of private property without compensation. The Act states that property is presumed abandoned if the apparent owner has not communicated in writing with the holder or otherwise indicated interest in the property within a specified period. When the presumption applied, the holder (here, a bank) is required to try to notify the owner and to submit, within 60-120 days after that, a report including the owner’s last known address to the state attorney general, and to simultaneously transfer the property to the attorney general. The following year, the attorney general must attempt notice by publication. Notice is also posted on an official website. The owner can reclaim the property from the state for 25 years after its delivery before it escheats to the state. An owner who files a valid claim is entitled only to principal, and not to any interest earned on it. Plaintiff’s ward had an interest‐bearing account. The presumption of abandonment applied in 2006, three years after the last communication. Because the statute does not require individualized notice if the value of the account is less than $50, plaintiff (guardian) did not learn about the account until 2011. The district court dismissed her challenge to the “taking” of interest on the account. The Seventh Circuit reversed. View "Cerajeski v. Zoeller" on Justia Law

Williams was returning home from work late at night. He smelled smoke, saw that his neighbor’s house was on fire, and went to the porch of the burning home to rouse anyone who might be inside. Chicago police officers O’Brien and Byrne also spotted the smoke and found Williams on the porch. They arrested him on suspicion of arson. A prosecutor declined to file arson charges that night. Officers O’Brien and Byrne then charged Williams with criminal trespass, but that charge was dismissed. Williams brought suit against O’Brien and Byrne under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging false arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and against the officers and the City of Chicago under state law for malicious prosecution on the trespass charge. The district court granted the defendants’ summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. Whether there was even arguable probable cause to arrest and charge Williams depends on disputed issues of fact. View "Williams v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Officers responded to reports of gunfire in a Chicago public housing complex. Two people stated that “gangbangers” were running guns and drugs into the building and pointed to apartment 501. No one answered when they knocked, so the officers entered the apartment with guns drawn. They found Perry and ordered him to get down against the wall, then searched the apartment, finding chunks of crack cocaine, clear Ziploc bags, and razor blades in a bedroom. Perry ran for the door, knocking an officer down. Perry claimed that he fled because the officers started punching him. Perry ran down to the third floor. Officer Keithley followed him, gun drawn, while Watts secured the apartment. Keithley testified that Perry popped out and rushed him, grabbed him, and tried to grab his gun. Keithley said he tried to punch Perry and his gun went off, striking Keithley in the arm. Perry again attempted to escape, knocking Keithley off-balance. Keithley shot at Perry while falling; one bullet struck Perry in the thigh, and another struck him in the back. Perry denied reaching for Keithley’s gun. Perry was acquitted of attempted murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and disarming a peace officer. Perry filed civil rights claims against the officers and the city. A jury rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of evidentiary errors. View "Perry v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2001 a burglar set fire to Frankton High School, causing millions of dollars in damages. According to the plaintiff, an officer coerced one of the suspects and others to accuse the plaintiff. The plaintiff was convicted of arson, burglary, and theft. He obtained post-conviction relief and was released from prison in 2006, after proving that a key witness had lied. In 2007 a retrial was scheduled. On advice of counsel, plaintiff deferred filing a civil rights suit pending retrial, but the trial kept getting rescheduled until charges were dismissed in 2010. In 2011, the plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming malicious prosecution, due process, violations, and other torts, by Indiana police officers, the town that employed them, and the sheriff. The district judge dismissed the claim as untimely and held that Indiana law provides an adequate remedy for malicious prosecution, barring recourse to section 1983. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that Indiana law does not provide an adequate remedy. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants intimidated him into delaying filing a civil suit until the criminal proceeding ended. If that is true, the limitations period did not start to run until then, so that his November 2011 filing was within the limitations period. View "Julian v. Hanna" on Justia Law

Davis was driving his tractor‐trailer on I-70 through Illinois toward St. Louis. The sleeping compartment had a hidden compartment in which Davis was hiding $304,980 in cash. Davis passed an unmarked police vehicle containing officers assigned to a DEA drug interdiction task force. The officers followed him until they observed Davis following another truck too closely and initiated a traffic stop. Preparing to issue a warning, the officers examined Davis’s log‐book and became suspicious because Davis had gone without work for long periods, but had expensive aftermarket parts on his truck. The officers then learned that Davis’s truck had previously been used in criminal activity. After Davis orally consented to a search, an officer handed Davis a written consent form to read and sign. Davis used his remote to unlock the truck for the officers, who began searching. Davis became agitated, but responded to the officers’ question of whether they still had consent, by scrawling something on the form and handing it over. After discovering the hidden cash, the officers found that Davis had scrawled “under protest.” Drug-sniffing dogs alerted to the cash. Davis was released, but the government sought forfeiture of the truck and money. The district court denied a motion to suppress, finding that Davis consented to the search. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding the search consensual. View "Davis v. $304,980.00 in U. S. Currency" on Justia Law