Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Bovee contends that his sister, Broom, violated the due process clause when, in her role as guidance counselor at his children’s school, she criticized his parenting methods and called him a “bad father.” Bovee claims that this alienated his children’s affections, violating his fundamental liberty interest in familial relations. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal should have been on the merits. “The suit is about words, and only words.” Bovee’s lawyer conceded that Broom has not taken any official act adverse to his interests. Defamation, words not accompanied by any other official action, does not violate the due process clause. View "Bovee v. Broom" on Justia Law

At age 15 Jimenez was convicted of a murder he did not commit. He spent 16 years in prison before he was exonerated. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against the City of Chicago and former Chicago detective, Bogucki, for violating his constitutional right to due process of law and for malicious prosecution. Bogucki tainted an identification by showing the witness a picture of Jiminez in advance. A jury awarded him $25 million in compensatory damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a Batson claim because the defendants did not show that a biased juror was seated or any harm. The court properly instructed the jury concerning Jiminez’s Brady claim and was not required to provide the entire transcript of the original trial. View "Jimenez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 a prisoner alleges that officials of an Illinois jail willfully failed to prevent other inmates from assaulting him. The district judge conducted a telephonic “merit‐review hearing” with the plaintiff shortly after the complaint was docketed and dismissed for failure to state a claim. There is no transcript of the hearing, and no explanation of why the judge thought the guards’ knowledge of the assault material. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the “inquisitorial” procedure employed by the judge has no basis in American law other than in proceedings before some administrative agencies, and was conducted without any safeguards. The judge may dismiss a frivolous complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a), (b)(1), but, if the validity of a claim depends on the accuracy of the plaintiff’s factual allegations, as in this case, and their accuracy cannot be resolved without an oral hearing, those matters must be resolved in conformity with the procedures that govern trials. A judge may clarify an unclear pro se complaint by interviewing the plaintiff, but must not turn the interview into a judicial cross‐examination designed to elicit admissions. View "Williams v. Wahner" on Justia Law

Police responded to an anonymous 911 call reporting a group of 25 people acting loudly and displaying hand guns in a parking lot, but actually found a smaller group of individuals, none of whom appeared to be acting inappropriately. The officers approached the group, which had begun to disperse slowly. For no apparent reason, an officer singled out Williams and performed a frisk. Williams began to resist and tried to escape, but was ultimately restrained. Officers searched his body and found a handgun and several ‘ecstasy’ pills. The district judge denied a motion to suppress and Williams pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, reserving his right to appeal. The district judge applied two sentencing enhancements, which significantly increased William’s offense level and applicable range of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the conviction, finding that the search was unlawful. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Fallon purchased a one‐way train ticket from Chicago to Seattle, causing DEA Agent Romano to suspect that Fallon might be a drug courier. Romano approached Fallon, who provided identification with an out-of-date address and stated that he was unemployed and was going to visit a friend. Fallon refused to provide a current address; Romano noticed that Fallon was sweating and trembling. Fallon allowed a search of his duffle, but declined to permit agents to open a locked brief case, stating that it contained $50,000 and that he intended to purchase a house. Romano directed Fallon to exit the train. While waiting for a drug‐detection dog, Romano pried the briefcase open, and observed that it contained currency. Fallon then claimed that the currency belonged to a third person to be used for investment. The dog alerted to the briefcase, which contained $100,120. The government initiated civil forfeiture and the owner of the Funds, Marrocco, filed a claim. Marrocco, who was not charged with any crime connected, moved to quash the seizure, arguing that it was the fruit of an illegal search. The district court held that the agents lacked probable cause to open the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed, based on the inevitable discovery doctrine. Ultimately, the district court entered summary judgment, holding that the currency was either the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction, or was intended to facilitate such a transaction. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Marrocco’s testimony, recounting his employment history and relatively expense‐free living, created a dispute of material fact regarding whether the Funds could have been Marrocco’s legally-acquired life savings. There was also expert evidence challenging whether the dog’s alert demonstrates that the Funds recently were in contact with illegal drugs. View "Marrocco v. Funds in the Amount of One Hundred Thousand, One Hundred Twenty Dollars." on Justia Law

Bolton was convicted of first degree murder for a 1994 shooting. On appeal, Bolton argued insufficient evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to join a stipulation between the state and a co‐defendant concerning an exculpatory pre‐trial statement; and that his 50-year sentence was excessive. The Illinois appellate court affirmed. Bolton did not appeal, but filed a state post‐conviction petition, claiming that the state fraudulently withheld photographs of the lineup and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial on that basis. The court rejected Bolton’s Brady claim because there was no reasonable probability that the photographs would have altered the outcome of the trial, characterizing the evidence against Bolton as “overwhelming,” and rejected Bolton’s Strickland challenge as waived because it was not raised on direct appeal. After unsuccessful appeals, Bolton filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming newly discovered evidence in support of his constitutional claims; prosecutorial misconduct in withholding photographic evidence of the lineup that was favorable to the defense; and that counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the petition, finding that Bolton did not preserve the claim that he was denied due process because the lineup was suggestive. View "Bolton v. Pierce" on Justia Law

While executing a search warrant, police found illegal drugs and a firearm in Scott’s home. Scott was indicted for two drug offenses and two firearms offenses. The affidavit submitted to obtain the warrant described two controlled drug buys in which detectives used a confidential informant to purchase heroin from Reynolds. On each occasion, after meeting the CI, Reynolds drove alone to Scott’s house and returned to the CI with the requested heroin. The affidavit contained one sentence describing an audio recording of a conversation between Scott and Reynolds, in Scott’s driveway, during the first controlled buy. The district court denied a motion to suppress. Scott pled guilty to possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence apart from the driveway conversation to establish probable cause for the search warrant so that it was not necessary to reach the issue of whether Scott had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his driveway conversation. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 1981, Hooper was convicted of three murders and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, but ordered a new penalty trial. That trial ended in another capital sentence, which was affirmed. State court collateral review left the convictions in place, but the Governor commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. The district court denied a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the Supreme Court of Illinois applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s Batson decision unreasonably to Hooper’s situation in concluding that the evidence did not make out a prima facie case of race discrimination in jury selection. The venire drawn for Hooper’s trial had 63 members; seven were black. Two of the seven were removed on challenges for cause. The prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against the remaining five. The decisions of the trial judge, who was subsequently convicted of accepting bribes, are entitled to no deference. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a fruitful Batson hearing may not be possible 32 years after the trial and that a new trial, 33 years after the crime, may be challenging. View "Hooper v. Ryan" on Justia Law

ATF agent Foreman investigated Wiseman’s purchase of eight handguns at Indiana outdoor‐gear retail stores. Wiseman told Foreman that she purchased the guns for Ghiassi, who was prohibited from possessing firearms because he had prior felony convictions for stalking and taking another person’s vehicle without consent; he was also the subject of a protective order. Wiseman stated that Ghiassi wanted to sell an AK‐47 assault rifle. Foreman arranged an undercover purchase, using Wiseman as an intermediary. After Ghiassi turned the weapon over to Foreman, a search of Ghiassi’s vehicle produced multiple weapons that had been purchased by Wiseman. Ghiassi admitted that Wiseman had illegally purchased weapons for him, but did not acknowledge any particular number of weapons. Foreman also reviewed surveillance footage in which Ghiassi could be seen at the firearms counter looking over guns with Wiseman. Ghiassi pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court imposed a sentence of 70 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in finding Ghiassi responsible for eight or more firearms and deprived him of due process by relying, in substantial part, on his co‐defendant’s testimony at her sentencing to make that finding. View "United States v. Ghiassi" on Justia Law

Wiza was staking out a parking lot, to arrest Johnson for an attack at a bar and as a suspect in a recent shooting. A van known to be associated with Johnson arrived. Johnson exited the vehicle with Carthans; Wiza exited his vehicle and drew his gun. Howard and Williams then exited the van. Wiza ordered the men to the ground. Officer O’Keefe arrived, and while O’Keefe attempted to handcuff Johnson, Carthans fled. Howard and Williams were compliant. O’Keefe found 11 grams of crack cocaine in Johnson’s pocket. All of the men had bloodstains on their clothing. The officers frisked the men and, in Howard’s pocket, found half an ounce of crack cocaine. Wiza searched the van and found a baseball bat and a gun wrapped in a bloody shirt. Soon after, Madison police arrived and said that the men were suspects in an armed robbery that had occurred in Madison less than an hour earlier. Howard later told police that he used the shirt to wipe the robbery victim’s blood off the gun at Johnson’s request. The district judge concluded that the stop and the frisk were reasonable to protect the officers during an unexpectedly chaotic encounter and refused to suppress the drugs or Howard’s statement. Howard entered a conditional plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Once Howard was stopped, the discovery of the drugs in his pocket became inevitable. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law