Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Aponte sued four officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He brought one claim against each officer for unreasonably executing a warrant, and one against each for failing to prevent an unreasonable search and a state‐law claim for indemnification against the City of Chicago. See 745 ILCS 10/9‐102.) He claimed that because of damage done during the search, $9,462 was spent refurnishing his home. He also sought damages for emotional distress and punitive damages. The jury was instructed about compensatory damages and that if they found “in favor of Plaintiff but find that Plaintiff has failed to prove compensatory damages, you must return a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of one dollar ($1.00).” The jury form, however, had no space identified for the “one dollar” verdict. The jury found for Aponte on one claim against only one officer and awarded Aponte $100, which it recorded in the space designated for “compensatory damages.” Aponte sought attorney’s fees of $116,435 for 450 hours under 42 U.S.C. 1988, as a “prevailing party.” The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the verdict as a mere nominal victory with no public benefit. View "Aponte v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

After a collision, the driver of the struck vehicle chased the fleeing vehicle (Chandler), who turned into a dead-end alley. Rhodes, accompanied by Bridewell, Manuel, and Watkins, pulled up behind him and confronted Chandler. Hearing that Chandler had a gun, they backed off. Shots were fired. Chandler’s horn began to sound; his head was pressing the button. Witnesses indicated that two men, who may have been Manuel and Watkins, had a gun and left the scene. Police arrived. Bridewell and Rhodes told them that Chandler had shot at them. Detectives Eberle and Forberg, found Chandler dead, with a gun near his hand. They took Bridewell and Rhodes into custody, then located and arrested Manuel and Watkins. Rhodes and Watkins told police that Bridewell had shot Chandler. Bridewell, under indictment for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, was charged with murder. The others were released. After three years in custody, Bridewell pleaded guilty to a reduced drug charge; prosecutors dismissed the murder charge. Bridewell, Rhodes, and Manuel filed suit against Eberle, Forberg, and the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that their arrests were unlawful. Bridewell also claimed that the police took longer than the fourth amendment allows to present her to a judge, malicious prosecution, and emotional distress. The district judge granted summary judgment to all defendants on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Bridewell v. Eberle" on Justia Law

Bond was shot three times by her husband, who then killed himself. She survived and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, acknowledging that the state is not obliged to protect residents from crime but arguing that when the state chooses to provide protective services it cannot protect men while failing to protect women. She claimed that relatives of her husband had informed police that her husband was suicidal and potentially violent; that she reported that her husband had hit her and had acquired an arsenal of guns, some stolen, despite being disqualified from gun ownership; that she had an order of protection; that he was not arrested despite admitting violating that order; that she requested that the sheriff confiscate the guns; and that when he was arrested for domestic battery, her husband was released. The district court denied a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that the fact that officials assessed the risk to bond differently than Bond herself assessed the risk did not establish sex discrimination. View " Bond v. Atkinson" on Justia Law

Scottie Pippen won six championship rings with the Chicago Bulls and was named to the National Basketball Association’s list of the 50 greatest players in its history. Since he retired in 2004, he has lost much of the fortune he amassed during his playing days through bad investments. He has pursued multiple lawsuits against former financial and legal advisors. The media learned of Pippen’s problems and several news organizations incorrectly reported that he had filed for bankruptcy. Pippen contends that the false reports have impaired his ability to earn a living by product endorsements and appearances. He filed suit, alleging that he was defamed and cast in a false light. The district court dismissed, finding that the falsehoods did not fit any of the categories of statements recognized by Illinois law to be so innately harmful that damages may be presumed and that the complaint did not plausibly allege that the defendants had published the falsehoods with knowledge the statement was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false, as required for a public figure such as Pippen to recover defamation damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Pippen v. NBC Universal Media LLC" on Justia Law

After entry of a judgment of $650,000 in the Northern District of Texas as a sanction for failure to engage in discovery, Sharif filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the Northern District of Illinois. WIN, a judgment creditor, filed an adversary complaint, seeking to prevent discharge of Sharif’s debts under 11 U.S.C. 727, and a declaratory judgment that a trust of which Sharif was trustee was actually Sharif’s alter ego. Sharif failed to respond to WIN’s and the bankruptcy trustee’s discovery requests. Sharif eventually tendered some discovery, far short of full compliance. The bankruptcy judge entered default judgment in WIN’s favor and awarded attorney’s fees. After entry of judgment but before briefing on an appeal, the Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to enter final judgment on a state‐law counterclaim against a creditor, even though Congress had granted it statutory authority to do so. When Sharif finally raised the issue, the district judge held that Sharif’s failure to raise it earlier constituted waiver. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the constitutional objection is not waivable because it implicates separation‐of‐powers principles. The bankruptcy judge lacked constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on the alter‐ego claim but had constitutional authority to enter final judgment on objections to discharge of Sharif’s debts. View "Sharif v. Wellness Int'l Network" on Justia Law

In 2009, a political blog and a Chicago television station began reporting that Illinois State Rep. Froehlich offered his constituents reductions in county property taxes in exchange for political favors. The reports highlighted Satkar Hospitality, reporting that it and its owners donated hotel rooms worth thousands of dollars to Froehlich’s campaign. Satkar Hospitality and Capra appealed their tax assessments for 2007 and 2008 and won reductions, but after the publicity about Rep. Froehlich, both were called back before the Board of Review for new hearings. They claim that in these second hearings, the Board inquired not into the value of their properties but into their relationships with Rep. Froehlich. The Board rescinded the reductions. Satkar and Capra sued the Board and individual members under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district courts concluded that the individual defendants were entitled to absolute quasi‐judicial immunity and the Board itself is not. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but also held that the damages claims against the Board cannot proceed. They are not cognizable in federal courts, which must abstain in suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging state and local tax collection, at least if an adequate state remedy is available. View "Satkar Hospitality, Inc. v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Okoro was arrested without a warrant on suspicion of a misdemeanor property crime. For unknown reasons, Okoro never received a “Gerstein hearing” to determine probable cause during his two months of incarceration. Okoro, then 23, had Type I diabetes, which he could control by monitoring his blood sugar levels. While he was in college, however, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia, which compromised his ability to care for his diabetes. Immediately after his arrest, Okoro’s relatives began calling to inform correctional employees and medical staff of his conditions. Okoro was detained in his cell, usually in isolation, and was dependent on jail employees and medical staff to monitor his blood sugar level and provide insulin shots. On December 23, 2008, Okoro collapsed in his cell. An autopsy revealed that Okoro’s death was the result of diabetic ketoacidosis, a buildup of acidic ketones in the bloodstream that occurs when the body runs out of insulin. A doctor and a nurse, employed by the healthcare company that contracts with the jail, moved for dismissal of the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied their qualified immunity claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the record easily supports a finding of deliberate indifference to Okoro’s serious medical condition. View "Currie v. Chhabra" on Justia Law

In 2005, 10‐year‐old “Jessica” reported that she had been sexually assaulted by a man named “Ron” several years earlier. Based on her description, where she lived at the time, and the sleeping arrangements of the home, Jessica’s mother identified McElvaney, who had been her live‐in boyfriend and estimated that the assault occurred between August 2001 and February 2002. Based on additional information, McElvaney was charged with assaulting Jessica between September 26, 2001, and December 19, 2001. McElvaney’s attorney Celebre, moved to require the district attorney to indicate with greater particularity the time of the alleged assault and to prohibit modification of the time period at trial so that McElvaney could formulate an alibi and identify potential supporting witnesses. At a hearing, Celebre conceded that the state had authority to allege the three‐month date range. The trial court judge said that he would not allow the state to amend at trial. Convicted under Wisconsin law, McElvaney was sentenced to 15 years. Wisconsin courts rejected appeals asserting ineffective assistance of counsel based on Celebre’s failure to object to the way in which Jessica’s videotaped testimony was presented. State courts then denied post-conviction relief based on failure to pursue the more-specific-date issue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of a federal habeas petition. View "McElvaney v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Norman Green was convicted of first-degree murder. While an inmate, Green decided to adopt a spiritual name: Prince Atum-Ra Uhuru Mutawakkil. Atum-Ra was an Egyptian deity representing a fusion of the gods Atum and Ra; uhuru is the Swahili word for freedom; and al-Mutawakkil was an Abbasid caliph who ruled in Samarra. The addition of “Prince” is a mystery. He does not contend that he chose the name as part of his devotion to a particular faith. Wisconsin’s current policy is to permit an inmate to use the name on the conviction (the committed name), or the committed name in conjunction with a second name, but not to use a second name by itself unless a court grants a petition for change of name. Green claims that he suffers injury because, for example, a letter addressed to “Prince Atum-Ra Uhuru Mutawakkil” will be returned to the sender, while a letter addressed to “Norman Green” or to both names will be delivered to him. The Seventh Circuit rejected an equal protection claim and a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, finding that the policy does not create a “substantial burden.” View "Green. v. Huibregtse" on Justia Law

Cooney divorced; she obtained sole custody of their sons. Later, her ex‐husband petitioned for change of custody. A court‐appointed expert diagnosed Cooney as having Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, in which a person produces or feigns physical or emotional symptoms in another person under her care. A therapist reported to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services that Cooney was abusing the children; DCFS investigated and entered an indicated finding of mental injury. Cooney filed an appeal, during which the ALJ recorded proceedings on microcassettes. Cooney retained a private court‐reporting company to transcribe the hearing as it occurred, creating the “Fishman transcripts.” After the appeal was denied, Cooney sought judicial review. Ultimately, Cooney filed a federal complaint, alleging that the DCFS representatives conspired to deprive her of her due process rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983; she claimed that the DCFS transcripts were “altered” at defendants’ direction, and that this caused delay and expense to convince the court to use the Fishman transcripts. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that no reasonable jury could infer conspiracy from the mere existence of discrepancies in the transcripts, and ordered Cooney to show cause why a Rule 38 award should not be entered against her. View "Cooney v. Casady" on Justia Law