Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1999 Obriecht was convicted of attempted second‐degree sexual assault of a child, five counts of fourth‐degree sexual assault and one count of disorderly conduct and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment and probation. He was released pending his appeal, but probation was revoked when he violated its terms. In 2001, he was sentenced to seven years of consecutive imprisonment for the probation revocation. He exhausted direct appeal of the 1999 convictions. In 2002, Obriecht sought habeas relief in the district court, which was denied, because he had not exhausted state remedies. The court warned him concerning deadlines. Obriecht’ attorney apparently believed that an extension granted for appeal of the state parole violation conviction tolled the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act statute of limitations for the 1999 convictions. Obriecht was the placed in medical segregation and later in a mental health facility. His attorney withdrew and, when declared competent, Obriecht began to act pro se. The district court rejected his habeas petition as untimely and finding that he had not demonstrated entitlement to equitable tolling. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Obriecht could not establish that an extraordinary circumstance prevented his timely filing and that he pursued his rights diligently. View "Obriecht v. Thurmer" on Justia Law

Frey has owned the Peoria commercial property, which contains a shopping center, for more than 40 years, without prior incident. In 2009, a tenant, ShopRite, was found to be illegally selling Viagra without a licensed pharmacist. The city took legal action against Patel (the franchisee) personally, and the business, then revoked the liquor license for the store and “site approval for the retail sale of alcoholic liquors at the location.” Frey asserted due process violations. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected the claims. Frey did not adequately explain a substantive due process claim and had no property right such that it was entitled to any process at all before revocation of its site approval, but Frey nonetheless received due process of law before the Peoria Liquor Commission. View "Frey Corp. v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit previously held that Kaufman’s request to form an atheist prison study groups must be treated as a request for a “religious” group rather than a nonreligious activity group. Kaufman was later moved to another prison and encountered similar resistance to creation of an atheist group. After submitting grievances, he filed suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, and the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, also citing denial of his request to wear a “knowledge thought ring,” which he regards as a religious symbol, and failure to make donated atheist books available in the prison library. The district court recognized that the atheist study group is a religious one, but found that the prison supplied a legitimate secular reason for its actions: Only two inmates were thought to have any interest. The court found that prohibition of the ring did not impose a substantial burden on religious practice and was justified by the secular interest in security. There was no evidence that the defendants were responsible for losing the books Kaufman donated or that the loss was more than isolated negligence. The Seventh Circuit vacated with respect to the study group, but otherwise affirmed. View "Kaufman v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Belbachir, an Algerian citizen, 27 years old, entered the U.S. as a visitor in 2004. She overstayed and, in 2005, flew from Chicago to England, where immigration authorities returned her to Chicago. She was placed in the McHenry County Jail, which has a contract with the federal government to house detainees. She planned to seek asylum on the ground that she had a well‐founded fear of being persecuted if returned to Algeria. She committed suicide by strangling herself with her socks about eight days after arriving at the jail. Her estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that defendants had deprived Belbachir of her life without due process of law, and under Illinois tort law. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect to the section 1983 claims. The plaintiff appealed only with respect to McHenry County; the county sheriff and the director of the jail; and three employees of Centegra, a private firm, hired to provide medical services at the jail. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to one Centegra employee, who was aware of Belbachir’s suicidal thoughts and depressed condition, but failed to take action. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Belbachir v. McHenry Cnty., IL" on Justia Law

A child services case worker and detectives went to the home Hurlow shared with his fiancée, Funk, to check on Funk’s children. Hurlow claims that he requested that they leave unless they had a search warrant; the detectives asked Funk for permission to search, stating that her children would be taken if she did not consent. Funk gave written consent. The detectives found methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a handgun. In custody, Hurlow stated that all of the illegal items were his and that Funk had no knowledge that drugs were in the home. Harlow claims that his attorney did not listen to his version of events, did not investigate, and persuaded him to plead guilty to avoid a sentence of “30 years to life.” Hurlow entered a plea with an agreement not to contest his conviction or sentence in a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The stipulated basis for the plea stated that Funk granted consent to search in writing. Hurlow affirmed the factual basis for the plea before the district court and stated that he was satisfied with his representation. The district court denied Hurlow’s subsequent request for an evidentiary hearing and concluded that his 2255 motion was barred by the plea agreement. The Seventh Circuit remanded for a hearing, finding that the waiver did not bar his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in negotiating the agreement. View "Hurlow v. United States" on Justia Law

After Newman, then 16 years old, turned himself in to police and was arrested, his mother told Newman’s attorney that her son was a “special child” who attended a “school for the handicapped, the mental school.” She gave him a two-inch-thick stack of educational and psychological records reflecting Newman’s lengthy history of severe mental and cognitive deficits, including a diagnosis of mental retardation from the Social Security Administration and a psychologist’s report indicating that Newman’s IQ was 62. Newman was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 47 years’ imprisonment. Following unsuccessful appeals, Newman filed a state post-conviction petition. The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal. Newman filed a federal habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to investigate his fitness for trial and failing to seek a fitness hearing. The district court held an evidentiary hearing days and determined, on the basis of the state court record, that the Illinois courts unreasonably concluded that Newman was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate his fitness to stand trial and that counsel’s failures to investigate known deficiencies in Newman’s mental capacity and to raise the fitness issue constituted ineffective assistance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Melvin Newman v. Michael Atchinson" on Justia Law

From 2006 until he was fired in 2011, Chrzanowski was an assistant state’s attorney. In 2011, a special prosecutor began investigating Chrzanowski’s boss, Bianchi. Bianchi allegedly had improperly influenced cases involving his relatives and political allies. Under subpoena, Chrzanowski testified before a grand jury, and later, again under subpoena, he testified at Bianchi’s trial. A few months later, Chrzanowski was interrogated by Bianchi and fired. Chrzanowski believed that the firing was retaliation for his testimony and filed suit, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights and state statutes. The district court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, finding that First Amendment protections did not apply because the testimony was “pursuant to [his] official duties” and, in the alternative, that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because any First Amendment protections were not “clearly established” at the time. The Seventh Circuit reversed. When Chrzanowski spoke out about his supervisors’ potential or actual wrongdoing, he was speaking outside the duties of employment. Providing eyewitness testimony regarding potential wrongdoing was never part of what Chrzanowski was employed to do; his rights were clearly established at all relevant times. Unlike restrictions on speech made pursuant to official duties, punishment for subpoenaed testimony chills civic discourse “in significant and pernicious ways.” View "Chrzanowski v. Bianchi" on Justia Law

In December, 2005, Chicago police officers Malaniuk and Shields arrested then-14-year-old Barber. Barber claims that the arrest was without probable cause and that Malaniuk used excessive force in shoving him into a holding cell, causing him to strike his head on a hard surface. The officers deny those allegations and say that the head injury occurred because Barber was intoxicated and fell over his own feet. In Barber’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1982, a jury sided with the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding merit in Barber’s claims that the district court erred when it allowed defense counsel to cross-examine him about a subsequent arrest for underage drinking and about his intervening felony conviction. View "Terrence Barber v. City of Chicago, et al" on Justia Law

Six-year-old D.B. and five-year-old twins C.C. and her brother W.C., were “playing doctor” in D.B.’s backyard when the twins’ mother arrived. She interpreted D.B.’s conduct as a sexual assault of her daughter and reported to the Department of Social Services. The Sheriff’s Department also responded. After an aggressive investigation, the District Attorney filed a petition alleging that D.B. had committed first-degree sexual assault and was in need of public protection or services. The petition was not adjudicated; the case was closed by consent decree. D.B.’s parents filed a civil-rights suit, alleging that county officials overzealously investigated and maliciously prosecuted D.B. They asserted a “class of one” equal-protection claim, noting that the twins engaged in the same behavior as D.B., but the twins’ father is a “high-ranking local political figure.” The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Allegations of improper subjective motive are not enough to state a class-of-one equal-protection claim; a complaint must allege sufficient facts to plausibly show that the plaintiff was treated differently from others similarly situated and that the discriminatory treatment was wholly arbitrary and irrational. Here, there was an objective rational basis for disparate treatment. The twins’ mother witnessed D.B.’s conduct and reported it; there was no adult witness to the twins’ behavior. View "Kurtis B. v. Kopp" on Justia Law

McGee was convicted of rape, home invasion, aggravated battery, and burglary, and was incarcerated in Illinois from 1980 until 2005, when, pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1, he was civilly detained and placed in the Rushville facility. In 2001, while serving his criminal sentence, McGee was diagnosed with liposarcoma cancer and underwent surgery to remove a tumor and adjacent muscle tissue in his right thigh. Since then he has undergone extensive treatment, biopsies, and other procedures to prevent or detect possible recurrence. McGee alleges that he suffers from edema and “neuropathic pain” in his legs as a result of the cancer treatments. Rushville has a policy, requiring detainees who are transported outside of the facility to wear metal leg irons. McGee complained several times to his treating physician about being required to wear restraints, but was never exempted. He was, on occasion, denied use of a wheelchair, and suffered cuts. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants in McGee’s action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that 23 state officials, employees, and private medical professionals were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "McGee v. Adams" on Justia Law