Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Shaw and two others were charged with aggravated battery after King was beaten to death outside a Fort Wayne motel. Shaw denied participating in the beating, but the other defendants, in exchange for prison sentences of less than three years, agreed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter and to testify against Shaw. The court allowed the prosecution to elevate the charge against Shaw to murder over Shaw’s objection that an Indiana statute limits the time for amending charging documents. Shaw was convicted and sentenced to 60 years. On direct appeal, Shaw’s new attorney abandoned the argument that the information was amended too late and argued, unsuccessfully, insufficiency of the evidence to support conviction. Appellate counsel dropped the case and did not file with the Supreme Court of Indiana. Shaw unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in state courts. The federal district court denied a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, which claimed that the lawyer’s decision to forgo challenging the amended information in favor of a frivolous challenge constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that the Indiana appellate court’s decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington (1984), and the 2000 elaboration in Smith v. Robbins. View "Shaw v. Mize" on Justia Law

In 1999, Quintana and his friends lured a woman into a van. Quintana restrained the woman, while his friend sexually assaulted her. The victim escaped by jumping nude out of the moving van. Quintana was arrested and charged with kidnapping and sexual assault. After a year in prison awaiting trial, the state offered Quintana a plea deal of a four-year sentence on the kidnapping charge and a four-year sentence on the sexual assault charge to run concurrently at 50% good time, so that Quintana could plead guilty and serve one more year in prison. Quintana declined the deal, opting to go to trial and face a minimum of two six-year consecutive sentences. He was convicted and the district court sentenced Quintana to a term of six years and a consecutive term of 21 years. After 13 years, Quintana sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial counsel failed to adequately inform him of the consequences of his plea under the Illinois “accountability law,” under which his sentence had to be served at 85%. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the writ, finding that Quintana did not establish deficient performance or prejudice. View "Quintana v. Chandler" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin state prison inmate filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that prison officials retaliated against him for speaking up about two guards allegedly assaulting him. He was placed in segregation and forbidden to discuss the alleged assault. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, by not filing a grievance that conformed to prison rules. He responded that he interpreted the prohibition against speaking about the alleged assault to extend to filing a grievance and was afraid to file it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. While the duty to exhaust administrative remedies as a precondition to suing under section 1983 is limited to those remedies that are “available,” and a remedy is not available to a prisoner prevented by threats or other intimidation from seeking an administrative remedy, Wisconsin regulations limit the offense of making false statements to prison staff to statements made “outside the complaint review system.” The inmate had no reason to fear filing a grievance about alleged retaliation. View "Schultz v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Maxwell was arrested after selling 2.9 grams of crack cocaine, 2.8 grams of powder cocaine, and five ecstasy pills to a confidential informant. The arresting officer searched Maxwell and found two straws and a bag hidden in his underwear. The bag contained an off-white substance, which the officer weighed, “field-tested,” and concluded was crack cocaine. The Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory analyst who originally tested the substance seized from Maxwell retired before trial, so the prosecution offered the testimony of his co-worker, who did not personally analyze the substance, but concluded that it contained crack cocaine after reviewing data generated by the original analyst. Maxwell did not object to this testimony and was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute five or more grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument based on the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Maxwell failed to show plain error, given that the testimony was subject to cross-examination at trial. The court issued a limited remand for consideration under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Smego agreed to civil commitment under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. During intake, he was seen by Mitchell, a dentist who found that 12 of his teeth had cavities. Throughout 2006, Smego’s cavities worsened and became painful, but he was not given a follow-up appointment. He made healthcare requests for unrelated medical issues, but not for his teeth. He claims that he believed requests were not necessary for problems already known to medical staff. During a chance encounter in 2007, Smego asked a dental hygienist who worked with Mitchell why he had never been called for the follow-up appointment. Smego, claims that she responded that the suction machine was inoperable and that Mitchell could not work on his teeth without it and warned that being a “pest” would not help him get an appointment. Smego saw Mitchell again 18 months after she told him about his cavities, but Mitchell repeatedly delayed treatment until 30 months after the first appointment. In Smego’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, stating that Smego offered sufficient evidence for a jury to find that some of the defendants violated his constitutional rights. View "Smego v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Blackout performs asphalt paving work and other construction services and had contracts with the Chicago Transit Authority that were terminable at will. The CTA informed Blackout that it would not do business with the firm for the next year (debarment) and did not give a reason. Illinois law allows judicial review of debarment by public bodies, but Blackout did not avail itself of that process, nor did it sue for libel, although it insists that public announcement of debarment is defamatory, but filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deprivation of “occupational liberty” without due process. The district court dismissed, noting that that inability to work for a single employer is not deprivation of occupational liberty and that there was no allegation of inability to work for public or private entities other than the CTA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Blackout won a school district contract after the CTA debarment. View "Blackout Sealcoating, Inc. v. Peterson" on Justia Law

McDonough is an engineering firm that frequently does design jobs for the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT). The Illinois Procurement Code provides that, absent required signatures, a contract of the type in dispute is not valid and not an enforceable debt, 30 ILCS 500/20-80(d). McDonough claimed that IDOT owed it $2 million for additional work on three projects, none of which had a supplemental agreement that was fully executed. McDonough claimed that it continued working without the agreements because it was IDOT’s normal business practice always to sign an agreement after a prior approval letter was sent. Based on findings that McDonough had made accounting errors that called its business integrity into question, the chief procurement officer suspended McDonough’s status as a “prequalified vendor” automatically eligible to bid on IDOT projects. McDonough claimed that refusal to sign the agreements deprived it of property interests in the debts without due process of law. Faced with threats, of bankruptcy, the district court entered a temporary restraining order, effectively ordering state officials to pay. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the suit is, in substance, an effort to have a federal court order state officials to make payments from the state treasury to remedy alleged breaches of contract and is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. View "McDonough Assocs., Inc. v. Schneider" on Justia Law

Wright met with an individual who was secretly cooperating with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the Chicago Police Department as a confidential informant and was wearing a wire. The CI told Wright that he had a customer, looking to buy cocaine. Wright said he was stocked up. The CI did not testify at trial, but the prosecution presented evidence that Wright admitted to stocking up drugs for sale. Wright was convicted of cocaine distribution and sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Wright’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the CI’s statements were admitted without live testimony. The statements, mostly confirmatory inquiries, were used to provide necessary context for Wright’s admissions, which does not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court also rejected an argument that the court should have told the jury that it could draw an adverse inference against the prosecution because it did not call the informant to the stand. The primary purpose of the missing witness instruction is to address situations where a defendant was unfairly deprived of and opportunity to elicit favorable testimony; Wright failed to show that the CI would have given such helpful testimony. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

Simpson, convicted of drug offenses, was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment, which the district court found to be the statutory minimum, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Simpson’s collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his lawyer had furnished ineffective assistance, was rejects. Three years later he filed another collateral attack, which the district court rejected as lacking required appellate authorization. At the time of Simpson’s sentencing, either the jury or the judge could decide whether a defendant’s conduct met requirements for a mandatory minimum sentence. In 2013 the Supreme Court held that a judge cannot make that decision unless the defendant waives entitlement to a jury. Simpson argues that the decision entitles him to a second collateral attack because it establishes a new constitutional rule, 28 U.S.C. 2255(h)(2), and proposes another ineffective assistance attack, which is barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1) and a claim based on the jury clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, stating that section 2255(h)(2) applies only when the new rule has been “made retroactive to cases on collateral review” by the Supreme Court. View "Simpson v. United States" on Justia Law

Thompson, convicted of a gun crime based entirely on the testimony of Chicago police officers, claimed that the officers planted a gun in the vicinity of his stop and arrest to fabricate a case. While he was imprisoned, the State’s Attorney uncovered widespread corruption in the department, implicating the officers who testified against Thompson. His conviction was vacated. Thompson sued the arresting officers, alleging due-process violations under Brady v. Maryland and sued the city. During discovery, the defendants and other potential witnesses from the department invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Thompson had to rely on his own testimony and the adverse inference from assertion of the Fifth Amendment. The court excluded much of Thompson’s proferred testimony from other victims of police misconduct and the guilty-plea testimony of officers who were convicted. The jury found one of the officers liable, only on the Brady claim. As damages for more than three years of wrongful imprisonment the jury awarded $15,000. Thompson challenged the evidentiary rulings and certain trial tactics by defense counsel that he claims were improper. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. While none of the errors were prejudicial standing alone, their cumulative effect had a substantial and injurious effect. View "Thompson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law