Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Under the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977, the Secretary of Labor protects the health and safety of miners, acting through the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Regulations under the Act require mine operators to report all mine-related injuries and illnesses suffered by employees. In 2010, MSHA acted on a new and broader interpretation and informed 39 mine operators that they would be required to permit MSHA inspectors to review employee medical and personnel records during inspections. Two operators refused to provide the records. MSHA issued citations and imposed penalties. An ALJ and the Review Commission found that the demands and enforcement were lawful under 30 U.S.C. 813(h) and 30 C.F.R. 50.41. Mine employees intervened to raise personal privacy challenges. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting arguments that MSHA does not have authority for the requirement; that 30 C.F.R. 50.41 is not a reasonable interpretation of the Act and was not properly promulgated; that the requirement infringes operators’ Fourth Amendment right not to be searched without a warrant; that the demands violate the miners’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights in their medical records; and that penalties imposed for noncompliance violate the operators’ Fifth Amendment due process rights. View "Bickett v. Fed. Mine Safety & Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2005 Smith was charged with impersonating a police officer and was detained in the Sangamon County Detention Facility pending trial. Because he had a parole hold and a history of problems during a prior detention, Smith was housed in a maximum-security cellblock. While there, he was severely beaten by another inmate who was awaiting trial on armed-robbery and aggravated-battery charges. Smith filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that the Department’s approach to classifying inmates for cellblock placement ignores serious risks to inmate safety by failing to separate “nonviolent” from “violent” inmates with assaultive tendencies. A magistrate entered summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Department. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To avoid summary judgment, Smith needed evidence that the jail’s security classification policy systematically fails to address obvious risks to inmate safety. He had no such evidence. View "Smith v. Sangamon Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

Collins fled police officers by car and then by foot after he was stopped for speeding. An officer kicked Collins repeatedly and dosed him with pepper spray, but Collins did not stop resisting until another officer deployed his Taser. Afterward, the officers discovered a bag containing crack and powder cocaine that Collins had discarded during the foot chase, and a wad of cash in his pocket. The district court denied a motion to suppress, reasoning that use of excessive force during an arrest is not a basis for suppressing evidence and that the drugs and money were not seized as a result of the alleged use of excessive force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

Stitts was convicted of murder in Indiana state court and sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment. The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Stitts claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, because, before deciding not to present an alibi defense, he only interviewed one alibi witness, Stitts’s father, unreasonably failing to investigate whether there might be more. The state court found that such a limited investigation was sufficient under Strickland. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded to state court for a factual determination of the amount of investigation actually conducted. Stitts’s alibi was that he was at a nightclub, where there could be any number of potential alibi witnesses, so failure to explore that possibility would be unreasonable. The state court unreasonably applied Strickland when it found no prejudice, because the prosecution’s case rested entirely on the shaky testimony of two witnesses which could have been neutralized by alibi witness testimony. View "Stitts v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Cromwell was fired from his position as a Momence police lieutenant, after an incident of alleged misconduct involving alcohol that was followed by lying and insubordination during the investigation. Cromwell sued, arguing that his termination was procedurally inadequate and that that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued public employment derived from the city’s Police Department Rules and Regulations, which provide that probationary employees may be terminated at any time for any reason but omit similar language with regard to nonprobationary employees. The district court rejected this argument and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The regulations on which Cromwell based his claim do not contain the clear language needed to overcome Illinois’s presumption of at-will employment. Something more than inference from silence is required. View "Cromwell v. City of Momence" on Justia Law

In 1956, Sister Ephrem of the Most Precious Blood, experienced apparitions of the Virgin Mary, during which, Sister Ephrem claimed, she was told: “I am Our Lady of America.” The Archbishop supported a program of devotions to Our Lady of America. In 1965 Pope Paul VI approved creation of a cloister, which lasted until at least 1977, when surviving members left and formed a new congregation, dedicated to devotions to Our Lady of America. Sister Ephrem directed it until her death in 2000. Sister Therese succeeded Sister Ephrem, who willed to Sister Theres all her property, mostly purchased with donated money. Sister Therese worked with McCarthy, a lawyer, and Langsenkamp until 2007, when Langsenkamp and McCarthy established the Langsenkamp Family Apostolate in the chapel in which the Virgin Mary allegedly appeared to Sister Ephrem. They sued Sister Therese, claiming theft of physical and intellectual property, fraud, and defamation. She counterclaimed, alleging theft of a statue and of the website and defamation by calling her a “fake nun.” The district court denied McCarthy’s motion that the court take notice of the Holy See’s rulings on Sister Therese’s status in the Church. The Seventh Circuit reversed, with “a reminder” that courts may not decide (or to allow juries to decide) religious questions. Determination of the ownership of the property is likely possible without resolving religious questions. View "McCarthy v. Fuller" on Justia Law

The Pekin Board of Fire and Police Commissioners determined that Simmons, an officer of the city’s police department, had disobeyed an order. It suspended him without pay for 20 days. A state court of appeals reversed, concluding that the chief of police lacked authority to issue the order. Campion, a psychologist, had concluded that Simmons was unfit for duty. Simmons told the chief that he had been evaluated by other psychologists who thought him able to serve. The chief ordered Simmons to ensure that these other psychologists provided Campion with their conclusions, supported by evaluations and data. The appellate court held that the chief could require an officer to provide no more than a psychologist’s bottom line. Simmons then sued under 42 U.S.C.1983, contending that the due process clause requires the city to make up the pay he lost. The district court dismissed, holding that Illinois requires back pay only when the board rules in an officer’s favor, while here the favorable ruling came from a court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the district judge should not have used a section 1983 suit to resolve a claim that rests entirely on a proposition of state substantive law. View "Simmons v. Gillespie" on Justia Law

Bracey, an inmate at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, was injured in a 2005 altercation with officers after refusing to exit his cell as requested by officers executing a random search. Two days later, Bracey filed a complaint claiming that an officer “viciously attacked” him; by the time he notified the prison that tapes of the incident probably existed, the tapes had been recorded over. Bracey filed suit in 2010 alleging that corrections officers used excessive force and spoliation in failure to download and preserve video from the prison security cameras. Bracey requested court assistance in recruiting counsel, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1). The district court concluded Bracey had made adequate efforts to find counsel but found the allegations sufficiently straightforward and Bracey sufficiently competent to handle the case himself. It denied a motion to compel disclosure of information relating to the destruction of the videotapes and denied requests for spoliation sanctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bracey did not meet his burden of establishing a duty to preserve the videotape and destruction of that video in bad faith. View "Bracey v. Grondin" on Justia Law

Thomas was sentenced to 65 years’ imprisonment for murder. Indiana courts affirmed the conviction and rejected collateral attack. A federal district judge denied Thomas’s petition for habeas corpus, declined to issue a certificate of appealability, and certified that the appeal had been taken in bad faith, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3). Thomas sought to proceed in forma pauperis. Under section 1915, appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith. The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that the prohibition does not apply to collateral attacks. Appellate fees are authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1913, which predated the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA). If Section 1915 were entirely inapplicable to collateral attacks, just because several of its subsections were rewritten by the PLRA, then there would be no basis for excusing prepayment of the fees and prisoners would be worse off. View "Thomas v. Hank" on Justia Law

Kristofek, a part-time police officer in Orland Hills, arrested a driver for traffic violations, but the driver turned out to be the son of a former mayor of a nearby town. Kristofek was ordered to let him go. Kristofek disagreed with what he believed was political corruption and expressed his concerns to fellow officers, supervisors, and eventually the FBI. When Police Chief Scully found out about this conduct, he fired him. Kristofek sued, bringing First Amendment retaliation claims against Scully and the village under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Kristofek’s speech did not involve a matter of public concern, principally because his sole motive was to protect himself from civil and criminal liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The complaint did not allege that Kristofek’s only motive was self-interest, and the mere existence of a self-interest motive does not preclude the plausibility of mixed motives, which is consistent with protected speech. Kristofek plausibly pled, “albeit barely,” that Scully had at least de facto authority to set policy for hiring and firing, sufficient to sustain a “Monell” claim against the village. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law