Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Animal control officers responded to a complaint about the Abbotts’ dog running loose. Travis interfered with efforts to capture the dog and made threats, prompting a call to police. After his mother, Cindy, coaxed him out, Officer Sweeney informed Travis that he was under arrest for obstruction and assault. Travis attempted to evade the officers. Sweeney handcuffed Travis and placed him in a cruiser. A taser was used. Seeing Travis struggling in the moving car, with no partition, Sweeney reached to gain control. His foot slipped and his cruiser rolled into Cindy’s vehicle. Cindy became upset and began screaming. Sweeney, concerned that she was trying to help Travis escape, ordered her to stop, but she continued toward the vehicles. He shot her in the abdomen with his taser. Cindy fell; after another jolt, she was handcuffed. Cindy was never informed of charges against her. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part; Sweeney had probable cause to arrest Travis and is entitled to qualified immunity on Travis’s excessive-force claim. Qualified immunity also applies to Cindy’s false-arrest and false imprisonment claims, but the court vacated with respect to her excessive-force claim.View "Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty." on Justia Law

In 1983, Matamoros was sentenced to 10 years in prison, with a three-year special parole term to follow. When his ordinary parole term expired in 2005, Matamoros’ parole officer issued a Notice of Discharge, explaining that he was no longer subject to supervision by the U.S. Parole Commission. Neither the Commission nor Matamoros’ parole officer noticed that Matamoros still had the special parole term left to serve until a month later, when the Commission issued a Certificate of Special Parole, nunc pro tunc. About six hours after the Commission issued the Certificate, Matamoros participated in an armed robbery, for which he was later sentenced to jail in Wisconsin. The Commission issued a warrant for Matamoros’ arrest for violating the conditions of his special parole. The warrant later lodged as a detainer that remains in effect. Matamoros sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the legality of the special parole term imposition, the detainer, and the delayed dispositional review of the detainer. Matamoros argued that the government should be estopped from enforcing the detainer because he was mistakenly told he was no longer subject to the Commission’s supervision. The district court rejected the arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed View "Matamoros v. Gram" on Justia Law

At the request of a local detective, Winkle, a member of the violent crime task force, was dispatched to investigate a group of men, reportedly drinking beers on a public sidewalk. The location was in a high-crime area; there had been multiple, recent reports of shots-fired; two nights earlier, there had been a drive-by shooting one block from the site. Several officers arrived and converged on the men, blocking escape. Patton was among the group. The officers directed the men to a spot for a pat-down before writing citations. Winkle noticed Patton backing away, looking from side to side nervously, and perceived Patton’s behavior as a “flight or fight” response to police presence that could mean he had a weapon or was wanted on a high-bond warrant. Ultimately he began walking forward, his demeanor still nervous. Winkle then patted the front of Patton’s waistband and immediately felt a gun. Patton entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a weapon 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) after the court denied a motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the pat-down was supported by a reasonable suspicion that Patton might be armed and therefore pose a danger to the officers.View "United States v. Patton" on Justia Law

Starting in 2002, Smith sought a place on Beloit’s “tow list,” to be called when police required towing services. Chief Wilson denied these requests. Smith, who is African-American, attributed his exclusion to racial bias. In 2008, Wilson’s subordinates made allegations that, in everyday conversation, Wilson referred to “niggers,” “towel heads,” and “spics.” Several officers specifically recalled that Wilson used such slurs about Smith. Smith filed claims under Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, 42 U.S.C.1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury returned a verdict finding that race was a “motivating factor” in Wilson’s decision not to include Smith on the list, but that Wilson would not have added Smith to the list even if race had played no part in Wilson’s thinking. The district court concluded that the mixed verdict precluded relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury’s second finding (that his company would have been left off the tow list regardless of race) was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; that Smith was entitled to some relief because he succeeded in demonstrating that improper racial considerations at least partially motivated Wilson; and that instruction on the allocation of the burden of persuasion was incorrect. View "Smith v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Indiana Code 35-42-4-12 prohibits certain individuals required to register as sex offenders (Ind. Code 11-8-8) from knowingly using a social networking web site, an instant messaging, or chat room program that the offender knows allows access or use by a person who is less than 18 years of age. Violation constitutes a Class A misdemeanor; subsequent violations constitute Class D felonies. The law does not differentiate based on the age of victim, the manner in which the crime was committed, or the time since the predicate offense. It provides a defense if the individual did not know the website allowed minors or upon discovering it does, immediately ceased use, and exempts persons convicted of consensual “Romeo and Juliet relationships” where the victim and perpetrator are close in age. In 2000, Doe was convicted of child exploitation. He challenged the law on First Amendment grounds on behalf of a class of similarly-situated sex offenders. The district court rejected the challenge. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the law unconstitutional. Though content neutral, it is not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interest. It broadly prohibits substantial protected speech rather than specifically targeting the evil of improper communications to minors.View "Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature passed Act 10, a budget repair bill proposed by recently-elected Governor Walker. Act 10 significantly altered state public employee labor laws, creating two classes of public employees: “public safety employees” and all others, “general employees.” The Act prohibited general employees from collectively bargaining on issues other than “base wages,” imposed rigorous recertification requirements on them, and prohibited their employers from deducting union dues from paychecks. The Act did not subject public safety employees or their unions to the same requirements. The enactment was controversial and received nationwide publicity. Unions filed suit, challenging the limitations on collective bargaining, the recertification requirements, and a prohibition on payroll deduction of dues, under the Equal Protection Clause. They also challenged the payroll deduction provision under the First Amendment. The district court invalidated Act 10’s recertification and payroll deduction provisions, but upheld the limitation on collective bargaining. The Seventh Circuit held that the Act is valid in its entirety. Act 10 is viewpoint-neutral and, while “publicly administered payroll deductions for political purposes can enhance the unions’ exercise of First Amendment rights, [states are] under no obligation to aid the unions in their political activities.” The classifications and recertification requirement survive rational basis review. View "WI Educ. Ass'n v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 2001, Suggs was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 300 months. He challenged his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, succeeding on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding sentencing. On remand, the district court sentenced him to 240 months. After his 2009 resentencing, Suggs obtained new information that he argues was withheld in violation of Brady v. Maryland. A key witness has recanted and claims that his first statement to law enforcement did not implicate Suggs. The government agreed that if this were Suggs’ first 2255 motion, the evidence would require an evidentiary hearing, but sections 2244(a) and 2255(h) restrict “second or successive” motions to circumstances that do not apply. The Seventh Circuit denied permission to bring a second challenge, 28 U.S.C. 2255(h), finding that his new evidence did “not come close to showing that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty.” Suggs filed a new 2255 motion, arguing that the new evidence challenge should not be barred because his resentencing imposed a new judgment. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision, Magwood v. Patterson, did not address this situation. View "Suggs v. United States" on Justia Law

McMurtrey pled guilty and was sentenced to 180 months in prison for possession of more than five grams of crack cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The plea reserved his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress. He claimed that the warrant was obtained with an affidavit that was deliberately or recklessly false. McMurtrey made a sufficient preliminary showing under Franks by offering police officers’ affidavits that were contradictory on which of two houses should be searched. The affidavits also indicated that each officer previously had contradicted himself in providing information to the other. Rather than hold a full Franks hearing, the district court held a pre-Franks hearing and permitted the government to offer additional evidence. The defense was not permitted full cross-examination. The court relied on the evidence to find that the defense was not entitled to a full Franks hearing. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the procedure was erroneous. A court should not allow the government to present its evidence on the validity of the warrant without converting the hearing into a full evidentiary Franks hearing, including cross-examination. View "United States v. McMurtrey" on Justia Law

In 2011, BEST fired Aslin, a securities broker, to remain compliant with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority “Taping Rule,” which requires securities firms to adopt monitoring measures when too many of their brokers have recently worked for “Disciplined Firms.” Instead of adopting such measures, the employer may terminate brokers. FINRA, a private corporation, is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a “national securities association.” The Maloney Act provides for establishment of private self-regulatory organizations to oversee securities markets, 15 U.S.C. 78o. The SEC must approve FINRA’s rules and may abrogate, add to, and delete FINRA rules. Aslin filed suit alleging that FINRA violated his due process rights by including him on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms without providing him the opportunity to challenge the designation. The district court dismissed, concluding that Aslin failed to state a claim because he was not deprived of a protected property or liberty interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Since Aslin sought only injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent application of the rule to him, the controversy ended in 2012, after which Aslin was no longer included on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms and the case was moot. View "Aslin v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc." on Justia Law

Poole, an Illinois prisoner, believed that a required $2 co-payment for dental care furnished at the prison violate his rights under the Eighth Amendment. After paying the fee, he sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Poole’s complaint “frivolously” accuses defendants of “committing strong arm robbery” against a “captive market of inmates.” After screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C.1915A, the district court dismissed Poole’s claims against several defendants with prejudice, but allowed the action to proceed against Isaacs, the prison healthcare administrator, because Poole alleged that he “didn’t have any money” for the co-payment. That allegation was false, and following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for Isaacs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that both the original lawsuit and the appeal were so lacking in merit that they warrant the imposition of two strikes under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Isaacs did not deny dental care for Poole, nor is she to blame for the delay in treatment. Poole had sufficient funds in his trust fund account but opted to refuse treatment rather than part with his money. View "Poole v. Issac" on Justia Law