Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

On Halloween 1996, Parish, age 20, was arrested by Elkhart police as he prepared to take his three children trick-or-treating, and charged with attempted murder and armed robbery. No physical evidence tied Parish to the crime. Based mainly on eyewitness testimony, the jury convicted Parish. For eight years, Parish pursued appeals. In 2005, the appellate court ordered a new trial based on his attorney’s failure to properly investigate and introduction of an improper jury instruction. Parish was then 30 years old. The government offered a plea that involved no additional jail time, but Parish refused. The government then dismissed the case. Parish sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The jury found in favor of Parish, but awarded only $73,125 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. In his unsuccessful motion for a new trial, Parish presented evidence that the average jury award was nearly $950,000 per year of wrongful imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the court admitted testimony of eyewitnesses identifying Parish, but refused to allow Parish to present significant evidence that he was not guilty, including identification of other individuals as possible perpetrators, and recantations by the eyewitnesses. View "Parish v. City of Elkhart, IN" on Justia Law

On December 7, 2009, Burd pleaded guilty in Illinois state court to attempted burglary. He had 30 days to withdraw the plea. For the first 29 days of this period, he was held at prison facilities that had no library resources. On the thirtieth day, he was transferred and immediately asked to use the library. Officials told him the library was closed. Burd missed the filing deadline, but continued to seek access to the law library. He filled out request slips, but each time he was denied access because the library was closed. When he explained to Sessler, the prison educational administrator, that he wanted to research withdrawing his plea or an appeal of his sentence, she told him that any such action would be untimely and denied him access to the library. Burd also requested that a fellow inmate be permitted to assist him with his motion. He never received a response. Burd did not seek to set aside his conviction through federal or state habeas corpus before filing under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of his request for damages as for failure to seek collateral relief.View "Burd v. Sessler" on Justia Law

Woolley was charged in Illinois state court with murder, armed violence, armed robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, arising out the fatal shootings of two victims in 1995. After initially confessing, he later recanted, claiming he had falsely implicated himself in order to protect his wife, Marcia, who committed the murders out of jealousy toward one of the victims. The jury convicted him on all counts. In state post-conviction procedures, Woolley produced an expert who pointed out flaws in expert evidence introduced at trial. After obtaining no relief and exhausting review in state court, Martin filed a federal habeas corpus petition (28 U.S.C. 2254), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Woolley’s counsel was ineffective, remaining nearly passive in the face of damning, impeachable testimony from the crime scene investigator, that effectively hollowed out the core of his client’s defense, but Woolley was not prejudiced by the error. View "Woolley v. Gaetz" on Justia Law

Escobedo became suicidal and ingested cocaine. He dialed 911 and told the operator he had taken cocaine, had a gun to his head, and wanted to kill himself. An emergency response team was dispatched to negotiate with Escobedo and to try to get him to put down his weapon and leave his apartment voluntarily. Negotiations were unsuccessful and the police opted to deploy a tactical response to remove Escobedo, as they thought he presented a danger to the community around him. After deploying two volleys of tear gas into Escobedo’s seventh-floor apartment, a team of six officers wearing gas masks and other protective equipment broke into the apartment. The officers found him in his closet with a gun to his head. The officers ordered him to put down the weapon, but Escobedo did not comply and was shot by two officers. Escobedo’s Estate brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force claim against the police and the City of Fort Wayne. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Estate of Escobedo v. Martin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged an Illinois law that forbid carrying a gun ready to use (loaded, immediately accessible, uncased), with exceptions for police, security personnel, hunters, members of target shooting clubs, a person on his own property, in his home, in his fixed place of business, or on the property of someone who has permitted him to be there with a ready-to-use gun,720 ILCS 5/24-2. Carrying an unloaded gun in public, uncased and immediately accessible, is prohibited, other than excepted persons, unless carried openly outside a vehicle in an unincorporated area and ammunition is not immediately accessible. The district court dismissed, holding that the Second Amendment does not create a right of self-defense outside the home. The Seventh Circuit reversed, but stayed its mandate for 180 days to allow the legislature to draft new restrictions. The Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside. Evidence, although inconclusive, is consistent with concluding that a right to carry firearms in public may promote self-defense. Illinois failed to provide more than merely a rational basis for believing that its sweeping ban was justified by increased public safety. View "Moore v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Harney and Muldoon occupy one unit of a three-unit Chicago building; DeVarela occupies another. In 2004, DeVarela contacted police to complain about damage to her vehicle. Midona’s police report noted an “unknown offender.” Months later, DeVarela’s dog bit Harney. Harney reported the incident. Days later, DeVarela telephoned Midona, claiming that Harney and Muldoon chased her up the stairs and pushed her. Months later DeVarela again called Midona and showed officers a videotape that may have shown Harney and Muldoon damaging the car. The next day Midona went to the building with detectives, and, outside the unit, told Harney that he was under arrest. While outside of his unit, Harney told the officers that he would get Muldoon. The officers followed Harney into the unit. Harney did not invite them in, but did not instruct them to remain outside. While Harney was speaking with Muldoon, the officers instructed them that they needed to come out of the bedroom. Harney did not know that they were in the unit until then. Harney and Muldoon were found not guilty of damaging the vehicle and sued (42 U.S.C. 1983) Midona and the city. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Harney v. Devarela" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owns three tracts, zoned agricultural, and challenged a 2009 amendment to the Winnebago County zoning ordinance that makes it easier to obtain permission to build a wind farm. She claimed that a wind farm on adjacent land would deprive the property “of the full extent of the kinetic energy of the wind and air as it enters the property, subjecting it to shadow flicker and reduction of light, severe noise, possible ice throw and blade throws, interference with radar, cell phone, GPS, television, and other wireless communications, increased likelihood of lightening damage and stray voltage. increased electromagnetic radiation, prevention of crop dusting, drying out her land, and killing raptors. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the claim as simply that a wind farm adjacent to plaintiff’s property would be a nuisance. There is no merit to the claim that the amendment violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. It is a “modest legislative encouragement of wind farming,” within the constitutional authority, state as well as federal, of a local government.View "Muscarello v. Winnebago Cnty. Bd." on Justia Law

In 2006, B.T., 14 years old, was failing in high school. Her friends accused her of making a bomb threat. She attempted suicide. In July 2006, B.T. told police that Dietrich, a family friend, had sexually assaulted her between June and August 2004 when she was 12 years old. Dietrich was charged repeated first-degree sexual assault of a child and intimidation of a child victim. Dietrich sought in camera review of B.T.’s counseling records. Dietrich believed the records would show that though the alleged sexual assaults occurred in 2004, B.T. did not tell her therapist about the assaults until after her April 2006 suicide attempt. The state trial court declined. Dietrich was convicted and sentenced to 13 years in prison. After exhausting post-conviction remedies in Wisconsin courts, Dietrich sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief, but granted a certificate of appealability on the question of whether Dietrich’s due process rights were violated when the state trial court did not conduct the requested in camera review. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The state court reasonably applied precedent, as Dietrich failed to make a plausible showing that the victim’s counseling records contained evidence material to his defense. View "Dietrich v. Smith" on Justia Law

An officer responding to a report of gunshots, saw a Hispanic male running toward a building. A witness told the officer that her cousin had been shot by a black male and was hiding in an apartment in that building. Officers approached the apartment. Delgado, the Hispanic male, and the shooting victim, with a visible graze wound, emerged from the apartment. Officers detained Delgado and, without a warrant, searched his apartment, finding firearms. Delgado was indicted as a felon in possession and for possessing an unregistered firearm. The district court agreed that the search was not justified by exigent circumstances, but found that it was a valid protective sweep and denied a motion to suppress. Delgado entered a conditional plea. The government conceded that the search was not a valid protective sweep, but argued that a reasonable officer could have believed that the shooter was in the apartment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that, absent any indication that anyone was in the apartment or had been subjected to violence inside the apartment, the mere fact that the shooter was at large was not enough for a reasonable officer to believe that the shooter was in the apartment. View "United States v. Delgado" on Justia Law

Pelletier admitted during a job interview with the FBI that he had pornographic pictures of children on his home computer, which he claimed were related to research. The admission occurred in an unlocked polygraph room, in the presence of an unarmed agent. Pelletier signed a form that provided: “I understand that I am not in custody, that my participation in the polygraph examination is voluntary, and that I may leave at any time.” Another agent, wearing his badge and sidearm, told Pelletier that “you don’t have to answer any questions.” Pelletier refused a request for a computer search, but admitted to “inadvertently” creating child pornography by recording himself having sex with a girl. The agent directed another agent to go to Pelletier’s home and freeze the premises, telling Pelletier that he was going to try to get a warrant. Pelletier signed a consent form. The FBI found more than 600 images of children on his computer. Pelletier conditionally pled guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(5)(B). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. Pelletier was never in custody; voluntarily consented to the search; and the contents of the computer inevitably would have been discovered with a search warrant. View "United States v. Pelletier" on Justia Law