Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Holloway was arrested without a warrant and detained. Although Holloway had a probable cause determination the day after his arrest and an initial appearance in front of a judicial officer within three days, he was detained for nine days without having any charges filed against him. During his time in jail, Holloway received care from the medical staff. Before his detention, Holloway had been taking prescribed Oxycontin and other medications to treat chronic pain caused by his Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome. The jail physician did not believe that Oxycontin was necessary to treat Holloway’s chronic pain and, instead, prescribed non-narcotic pain medications and other medications to prevent narcotic withdrawal symptoms. After the prosecutor did not file charges against Holloway within the time allowed by the court, Holloway was released from jail and was admitted to a hospital, where he resumed his regimen of Oxycontin. Holloway sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), alleging that the sheriff violated his rights by detaining him without charges for nine days and that the jail physician and two attending nurses violated his constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff" on Justia Law

Ray was convicted of reckless homicide and reckless endangerment, arising from a retaliatory shooting that left an 11-year-old girl dead and two others injured. At trial, the state called Detective Phillips to describe a signed statement that Ray gave during his police interview. Phillips read from Ray’s statement and recounted his own out-of-court statements informing Ray that co-actors had implicated Ray. Neither co-actor testified, but defense counsel did not object to Phillips’s testimony. Wisconsin courts rejected direct appeal and denied post-conviction relief. In his first federal habeas petition, the Seventh Circuit found that Ray’s constitutional rights were violated when the state introduced out-of-court statements made by individuals who did not testify, but remanded to allow the state to assert that Ray’s state post-conviction motion was untimely. On remand, the district court placed the burden of proof on Ray, finding that he did not timely give his motion to a prison official for mailing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the prisoner mailbox rule governs whether a state post-conviction document is “properly filed” because Wisconsin has not clearly rejected it. The state failed to rebut Ray’s testimony and documents showing that he timely gave his state post-conviction motion to a prison official. View "Ray v. Pollard" on Justia Law

During unrelated civil litigation against Illinois Department of Corrections officials, Eichwedel, an inmate, pro se, filed motions that the district court denied as “frivolous.” The state revoked six months of Eichwedel’s good-conduct credits. Illinois law establishes penalties for prisoners who file frivolous motions against the state, 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). A state trial court denied relief; the appellate court declined review. Rejecting a federal habeas petition, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court never has recognized a First Amendment right to file frivolous motions. The Seventh Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Illinois the question: was the State required to establish, in order to revoke a prisoner’s good-conduct credit, either that the court making the finding of frivolousness had determined specifically that the filing satisfied one of the definitions of frivolousness in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) or that the court had otherwise made its intent to invoke 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) known? After Eichwedel was released, the court withdrew the certification as moot. While the underlying situation may occur again and may not be resolved before a prisoner’s release date, the chance of this situation happening to Eichwedel is simply too speculative to constitute a continuing controversy between him and IDOC. View "Eichwedel v. Chandler" on Justia Law

Porter, a civilian police department employee, worked the “auto desk,” where employees process information about towed, stolen, repossessed, or recovered vehicles, 24 hours per day, seven days a week. In 2005 she was assigned to a group that has Fridays and Saturdays off. She requested reassignment because she was involved in her church. The request was granted. She then requested to work a later shift to attend classes as a student minister. The request was granted. Weeks later, Porter took leave due to a car accident and pregnancy complications. Following three months of FMLA leave, Porter took a medical leave for another six months. She returned and was assigned to the Friday/Saturday days-off group. She was told that her request would be accommodated when an opening became available in the Sunday/Monday group. Between returning to work on July 16, 2006, and November 12, 2006, Porter was absent 34 days, including 16 Sundays. Porter claimed that she was harassed by her supervisors and filed internal grievances. Porter sued, alleging that the city failed to accommodate her religious practice, discriminated against her, and retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Porter v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

American citizen-civilians, employees of a private Iraqi security services company, alleged that they were detained and tortured by U.S. military personnel while in Iraq in 2006, then released without being charged with a crime. Plaintiffs sought damages and to recover seized personal property. The district court denied motions to dismiss. In 2011, the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility and that he is not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a common-law claim for damages should not be created. The Supreme Court has never created or even favorably mentioned a nonstatutory right of action for damages on account of conduct that occurred outside of the U.S. The Military Claims Act and the Foreign Claims Act indicate that Congress has decided that compensation should come from the Treasury rather than from federal employees and that plaintiffs do not need a common-law damages remedy in order to achieve some recompense. Even such a remedy existed, Rumsfeld could not be held liable. He did not arrest plaintiffs, hold them incommunicado, refuse to speak with the FBI, subject them to loud noises, or threaten them while they wore hoods. View "Vance v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police officers were investigating gunshots heard near an intersection and learned that one person had been shot in the leg and was recovering at a hospital. An officer approached a backyard shared by two duplexes on one of the streets and noticed bullet holes and a trail of spent casings in the area, including five casings next to one of the duplexes and a casing in the yard itself. Without a warrant, he entered the backyard and found and seized a rifle, which belonged to Schmidt, who was subsequently indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)). The district court denied his motion to suppress. Schmidt pled guilty and was sentenced to 21 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that any danger had dissipated by the time of the search given the heavy presence of police and passage of a few hours’ time. A reasonable officer could have believed that there were other exigent circumstances, i.e., wounded victims in the backyard; the officer’s warrantless presence in the backyard was justified even if the backyard were curtilage and the scope and breech of the rifle were in plain view once he was there. View "United States v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Sanchez testified that he, José, and friends were outside of José’s house when three unmarked police cars pulled up. Officers demanded to know what the men were doing and ordered them to empty their pockets for a pat-down. Officer Caballero seized keys and walked toward the dwelling. Sanchez protested. A swearing match ensued and Sanchez was handcuffed. Caballero nodded at officers who forced Sanchez to the pavement. Sanchez testified that the officers hit and kicked him. José called 911. The police left the scene without arresting anyone. The officers testified that they had tried to break up a fight between Sanchez and Jose; they filed contact cards without mention of a fight. Caballero wrote that José was “loitering”; Peterson wrote that Sanchez “made a suspicious movement as if to conceal something.” Sanchez sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and failure to intervene in misconduct of another. A jury found in defendants’ favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the parties and the court apparently misapprehended the prospective liability of defendants for the acts of unnamed officers, and the jury was not properly instructed as to the potential liability of officers for failing to intervene, none of the errors warranted reversal. View "Sanchez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

White created a website to advance white supremacy and included a statement that “everyone associated with the Matt Hale trial has deserved assassination for a long time.” The site also included information related to the foreperson of the jury that convicted Hale, a white supremacist, of criminally soliciting harm to a federal judge. Although a jury convicted him of soliciting the commission of a violent federal crime against a juror, 18 U.S.C. 373, the district court held that the government failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that White was guilty of criminal solicitation, and that White’s speech was protected by the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the conviction and remanded for sentencing. A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that, based on the contents of the website, its readership, and other contextual factors, White intentionally solicited a violent crime against Juror A by posting Juror A’s personal information on his website. Criminal solicitation is not protected by the First Amendment. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

In 2011 Indiana prohibited state agencies from providing state or federal funds to any entity that performs abortions or operates a facility where abortions are performed ( 5-22-17-5.5(b)). The Hyde Amendment already prohibits use of federal funds for most nontherapeutic abortions; Indiana has a similar ban. The new law prohibits abortion providers from receiving any state-administered funds for other services. Planned Parenthood provides medical services to low-income patients (named plaintiffs) and claimed that the law violates Medicaid’s requirement that state plans allow patients to choose their providers, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(23); that it is preempted by a statute authorizing grants for programs related to sexually transmitted diseases, 42 U.S.C. 247c(c); and that it places an unconstitutional condition on receipt of funds. The district court enjoined enforcement with respect to Medicaid and 247c(c) funding. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. The free-choice-of-provider requirement creates a private right of action; although Indiana may exclude unqualified providers from its Medicaid program, it may not exclude a class of providers for a reason unrelated to qualifications. Other claims are not likely to succeed; the grant statute does not create actionable private rights and the law does not conflict with that statute. The government’s refusal to subsidize abortion does not impermissibly burden a woman’s right to obtain an abortion. View "Planned Parenthood of IN, Inc. v. Comm'r of the IN Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

On December 23, 1980, police found a body in a ditch and another nearby; both had been shot in the head. Months later, an informant implicated Pamela Thompkins; she was arrested and confessed to assisting her former brother-in-law (Willie Thompkins) and a friend in a robbery that became double murder. Willie agreed to talk after receiving Miranda warnings. During interrogation, he took a phone call from an attorney, but continued to talk without invoking his right to counsel; in court for a bond hearing, he confessed. A jury convicted him, based on his confession, eyewitness testimony, and evidence from the scene. He was sentenced to death. After unsuccessful direct appeal and years of state post-conviction proceedings, the Governor commuted the sentences of all death-row inmates, and Thompkins was resentenced to life. He exhausted remaining post-conviction claims. The district court denied federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court did not unreasonably determine the facts or unreasonably apply federal law in holding that the right to counsel had not yet attached when Thompkins confessed, so the trial court properly declined to suppress the confession, or in rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance based on procedural default and lack of factual support. View "Thompkins v. Pierce" on Justia Law