Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice, runs a number of youth detention facilities. Jamal, age 16, had a history of mental illness and was known to have attempted suicide at least three times when he arrived at one of those facilities in 2008. His intake assessment noted a history of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, major depression, bipolar disorder, psychosis, behavior disorders, and anger and drug abuse counseling. His behavioral history included delinquency, gang affiliations, anger, aggression, setting of fires, cruelty to animals, putting a gun to a cousin’s head, threatening to kill teachers, learning disabilities, alcohol abuse, and cannabis use. Jamal denied that he had manic or depressive symptoms, that he was depressed, or that he had experienced suicidal thoughts since his June 2008 attempt; the intake doctor prescribed Prozac and lithium. Jamal was noncompliant, had disciplinary problems, and was periodically evaluated for suicide risk before he committed suicide by hanging himself from a bunk bed. In his mother’s suit, alleging deliberate indifference to Jamal’s serious mental illness, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Miller v. Nordstrom" on Justia Law

Adams was sentenced, in Illinois, to 180 days in jail plus three years’ probation for a 1981 armed robbery; he committed a second robbery while on probation. He was convicted of robbery and aggravated battery. Paroled in August, 1984, he promptly violated, but was re-paroled in December. He committed another armed robbery in January 1985 and was sentenced to 25 years. While confined, Adams committed aggravated battery of a guard. He had not been out for long when he was caught with a firearm, convicted as a felon in possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Adams conceded that two convictions qualify as violent felonies but argued that two do not, given 18 U.S.C.921(a)(20), which provides that restoration of civil rights causes a conviction to be disregarded for federal felon-in-possession statutes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In 1984 Illinois repealed statutes that had allowed criminals to possess firearms beginning five years after release from prison; his civil right to possess firearms was not restored and that right would not have been restored even under the pre-1984 version of Illinois law, since he has not spent any five-year period out of prison. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Racine County Human Services Department caseworker Wagner removed Thor, a 12-year-old, from his parents’ home and placed him into protective custody. Thor suffers from cerebral palsy, global developmental delay, and is confined to a wheelchair. Wagner investigated after receiving a referral from personnel at Thor’s school concerning bruising on his arm and leg. A judge issued a probable cause order for removal, based on evidence of Thor’s injuries and that he had been left unattended. Thor suffered additional injuries as a result of accidents that occurred in foster care and at a rehabilitation facility. Thor’s mother and stepfather and Thor sued Wagner, his supervisor, another caseworker, and her supervisor, alleging violations of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on qualified immunity grounds and because plaintiffs failed to establish sufficient evidence of racial animus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any alleged violation of plaintiffs’ right to familial relations; for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to bodily security and integrity based on the decision to continue his placements; and for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to individualized treatment. View "Xiong v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Four-year-old Jaquari died from asphyxiation by an elastic band from a fitted bed sheet. That day, his mother, Harris, disciplined her sons for leaving the apartment while she out doing laundry. The state argued that Jaquari would not stop crying and that Harris strangled him while five-year-old Diante slept in the bunk above. The defense claimed that Jaquari had wrapped the elastic around his own neck and accidentally asphyxiated himself. A videotaped confession, recorded the day after Jaquari’s death following 27 hours of intermittent interrogation, was admitted. Diante, has maintained since the day after Jaquari’s death that his brother wrapped the elastic band around his own neck and that neither parent was present. The trial court determined that Diante (then six) was not a competent witness, improperly reversing a presumption of competency, requiring the defendant to prove competency. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected direct appeal. The district court denied federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Exclusion of defense evidence violates the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause where evidence is material to the outcome and the exclusion is arbitrary or disproportionate to the state’s legitimate interests. Harris was denied effective assistance. Counsel did not interview Diante, did not secure a witness to show that Diante’s recollections were consistent, and did not challenge the burden of proof. View "Harris v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Illinois inmate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that his cell was infested with mice and cockroaches, that a window pane was missing and rain came in through the window, and that a warden had seen the conditions, yet nothing had been done. The district judge dismissed on alternative grounds: that the defendants were immune from suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and that the complaint failed to allege harm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, after noting that the complaint alleged that allowing rain to enter the cell created a health hazard, adequately alleging harm. Depending on how extensive infestation is, what odors or bites or risk of disease the pests create, the prisoner’s known particular psychological sensitivities, and how long infestation continues, a trier of fact might reasonably conclude that the prisoner had been subjected to harm sufficient to support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment even if he had not contracted a disease or suffered any pain. The suit is against a state and a state agency and Congress did not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity under section 1983, as it could have done. A state and its agencies are not suable “persons” under section 1983. View "Thomas v. State of IL" on Justia Law

Gruenberg, who has accrued 230 misconduct reports since his incarceration for burglary in 1999, seized a set of keys from a prison guard and swallowed them. He was taken to a hospital, where an x-ray showed that the keys were lodged in his abdomen. A physician told the prison officials that Gruenberg would probably pass the keys naturally within five days. They returned him to the prison and kept Gruenberg naked and in restraints for five days until he passed the keys. After five days, Gruenberg had not yet passed them and surgery was needed to remove them. Gruenberg sued, claiming violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing qualified immunity. While the conditions were undoubtedly uncomfortable, there was no evidence that any member of the prison staff showed “deliberate indifference” to Gruenberg’s health or safety. Those conditions were a reasonable response to a “unique situation.” View "Gruenberg v. Gempeler" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers arrested plaintiffs for disorderly conduct at a 2005 antiwar demonstration. The plaintiffs brought claims for First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment false arrest, Fourteenth Amendment class-of-one equal protection violations, and state law malicious prosecution. They also brought facial challenges against Chicago’s disorderly conduct ordinance, as overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis of qualified immunity. The facial attack on the ordinance was rendered moot by an earlier decision, which partially invalidated the subsection on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ arrests under a now-invalid ordinance may have affected their free speech rights, but that they did not bring an as-applied challenge to redress such an injury.

Charged with possessing with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), Dowell plead guilty in return for the government’s agreement to withdraw an information filed under 21 U.S.C. 851, alleging that Dowell had previously been convicted of a felony drug offense. Without that withdrawal, Dowell would have faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. The court nonetheless applied the “career offender” guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, and imposed a sentence of 180 months. Although Dowell claims to have instructed his attorney to file, a notice of appeal was not filed within 10 days, as required for timely filing. Dowell, therefore, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion asserting that failure to file constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The government opposed the motion, arguing that Dowell’s agreement in his plea not to challenge his sentence on collateral attack precluded relief. The district court agreed with the government. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for determination as to whether Dowell told his attorney to file the appeal.

In 2008, plaintiffs were inmates at the Indianapolis jail, which was operated by CCA under contract with the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. They claimed that the jail provided inadequate medical care and exposed inmates to inhumane living conditions so egregious that they amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court certified a class, but dismissed claims that the jail failed to provide adequate medical care, that the conditions of confinement inside the jail were inhumane, and that the procedures in the jail violated inmates’ rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and later entered summary judgment for CCA on the remaining issues. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that CCA had produced an affidavit indicating that complained-of problems had been resolved.

Doyle was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for distributing heroin that resulted in the death of Ward. At trial, the government presented two expert witnesses. During direct examination of Dr. Burch, the St. Louis Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, the government began laying a foundation to admit into evidence the Post Mortem Report. Doyle’s counsel, with the intention to “help things along,” stated that he had no objection to any of the government’s medical reports coming in as evidence. The district court then admitted into evidence all of the government’s medical exhibits, including the Medical Examiner’s findings form, created by Dr. Dutra and containing notes concerning Ward’s cause of death. The form lists “Acute heroin and cocaine intoxication” as the cause of death, but the words “and cocaine intoxication” are crossed out. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Doyle’s argument that admission of the form without the testimony of its author violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. In light of the trial record as a whole, Doyle did not satisfy his burden to establish that the outcome of the trial would probably have been different.