Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

CEnergy filed suit against Glenmore claiming a denial of its right under the Fourteenth Amendment to substantive due process and a violation of the town's state law obligation to deal in good faith. While CEnergy obtained a conditional use permit from Glenmore to develop a wind farm, the company failed to obtain required building permits in time to take advantage of a lucrative opportunity to sell electricity generated by wind turbines to a Wisconsin power company. The court concluded that the town board's decision to delay action on CEnergy's building permit requests could not have been arbitrary in the constitutional sense. Even if the board's treatment of the building permit applications had been arbitrary in the constitutional sense, CEnergy still would have failed to state a substantive due process claim where a plaintiff who ignores potential state law remedies cannot state a substantive due process claim based on a state-created property right. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "CEnergy-Glenmore Wind Farm #1 v. Town of Glenmore" on Justia Law

Before entering his mother’s wedding reception, Miller smoked marijuana. At the reception, Miller drank three shots of vodka in an hour and a half. Miller then dropped off his girlfriend and went to a Kenosha bar. He smoked more marijuana and had three beers. He left for another bar, where he drank more beer, then bought a final Heineken for the road. He drove to a gas station to use a phone to call his girlfriend. At the same time, Kenosha police received a call about a stabbing that occurred two blocks away from the same gas station. Responding to an inquiry by Officer Gonzalez, Miller denied seeing anyone running. Gonzalez asked Miller his name. Miller, who was driving without a license and had been seen exiting his car with a beer, replied with the fake name. Miller admitted that he was on probation for burglary and disorderly conduct. Gonzalez told Miller, who was becoming increasingly fidgety and nervous, to take his hands out of his front pockets and not to run. Miller took off running with Gonzalez in pursuit. Another officer captured Miller, who was on the ground when Gonzalez jumped a fence and landed on him, breaking his jaw. The district court rejected Miller’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Miller, if believed, presented evidence from which a rational jury could determine that Gonzalez deliberately inflicted the blow that broke his jaw. View "Miller v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 2003, Light was convicted in Minnesota district court of firearm possession by a felon. The presentence report suggested that Light was subject the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The PSR referred to two qualifying juvenile acts of violence and prior adult convictions for criminal vehicular operation resulting in substantial bodily harm, third-degree burglary, a third-degree controlled substances crime, and a felony conviction for fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. The court used a guideline imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months, rather than the 120-150 months range without the ACCA enhancement. In sentencing Light to 235 months, the court did not specify which three convictions supported the armed career criminal designation. After unsuccessful direct appeal, Light filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition, challenging the use of the drug offense as a predicate offense. The court held that Light’s “criminal history include[d] a sufficient number of other predicate offenses to support an armed career criminal status without any reliance upon the objected to offense.” In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Begay v. United States, concluding that driving under the influence of alcohol is not a “violent felony” under the ACCA. The Eighth Circuit denied leave to file successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 petitions. He then filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in Indiana, where he is incarcerated, claiming that, under Begay, he was entitled to sentence reduction. The district court dismissed, stating that relief under section 2255 had been available to him and had not been “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Light v. Caraway" on Justia Law

After being acquitted in a state court of aggravated battery, the plaintiff sued two Chicago police officers and the City of Chicago, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for malicious prosecution. He claimed that the officers had prepared false police reports and used them to persuade a state prosecutor to file the charge. The district court dismissed, reasoning that a federal suit for malicious prosecution by state officers is permissible only if the state in which the plaintiff had been prosecuted does not provide an adequate remedy, which Illinois does. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a federal suit for malicious prosecution can be based on the Fourth Amendment rather than on the due process clause, and that all that the plaintiff has to prove in order to establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment is that he was wrongfully in detention at some point. Because the initial seizure was supported by probable cause and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the fact that the deprivation of liberty lasted longer than it should have, is irrelevant. The Fourth Amendment does not regulate the length of detentions. View "Llovet v. City of Chicago " on Justia Law

Ashburn was convicted in Illinois state court of the first degree murder of Muckenstrum. After appealing his conviction and filing a collateral challenge in Illinois state court, Ashburn filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Ashburn’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his state appellate counsel did not raise a speedy trial claim; that Ashburn was denied due process because of the admission of a knife unrelated to the murder; that Ashburn was denied due process by the state’s purported use of perjured testimony; and that Ashburn was denied due process by the giving of an accountability instruction to the jury. View "Ashburn v. Atchison" on Justia Law

Webster was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. His guilt is not contested. At trial Webster introduced evidence from experts who concluded that his IQ is less than 70 and that he is retarded. The prosecutor responded with evidence from other experts who concluded that Webster is not retarded and was malingering to evade punishment. After unsuccessful direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit, where the crime and trial occurred, denied Webster’s application for permission to pursue a second collateral attack. Webster asked for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the Indiana, where he is confined. Current counsel acquired records from his Social Security Administration application for disability benefits, before his trial. The SSA psychologist, plus two consulting physicians, concluded that he is retarded. The SSA nonetheless classified him as not disabled. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, (2002), that the Constitution forbids the execution of persons who are retarded or unable to understand what capital punishment means and why they have been sentenced to die, Webster does not contend that the law or his mental condition have changed since the Fifth Circuit’s decisions on direct and collateral review. View "Webster v. Caraway" on Justia Law

FBI surveillance of Terre Haute neighbors Denny and Miller included recording activities of those homes, using a camera mounted on a utility pole. The camera captured a live feed, but skipped every few seconds and did not produce a fluid, continuous video. Agents monitored the live feed. On February 8, the camera recorded Constantino, a security guard, arriving at Denny’s residence in Constantino’s company car, entering Denny’s residence, and later leaving. Denny cooperated with the FBI and later revealed that Constantino sold him methamphetamine inside his home that day. Agents followed Constantino to a restaurant and saw him carrying a handgun on his hip. The camera showed Constantino return to Denny’s residence on February 14, with his brother Nicholas, who walked to a toolbox attached to their truck. The video records the toolbox open and then shut, with Nicholas beside it, but does not show him removing anything. The brothers entered the home. Denny later testified that they placed methamphetamine in his microwave and received $8,000 from him. Agents stopped them, seized a loaded gun from Constantino’s waistband, and found another gun and $8,000 cash in the toolbox. Both were indicted for conspiring to supply more than 500 grams of meth; possession and distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Affirming their convictions, the Seventh Circuit held that the video was an accurate depiction of events; skips did not render it inadmissible. Nothing about the video would cause a reasonable jury to decide the case on an improper basis. Two predicate drug offenses involving distinct conduct were sufficient to support two firearms convictions; the mandatory 25 year sentence for a second conviction does not violate double jeopardy. View "United States v. Cejas" on Justia Law

Based on a tip that Gutierrez was involved in drug trafficking, officers went to his home with a certified narcotics canine and knocked at the front door. They saw movement inside, but no one answered the door. The officers had the dog examine the door for the scent of narcotics, and he alerted. After knocking for 15 minutes, the officers forcibly entered and secured the home, but did not search. An officer swore out an affidavit, relying on the dog’s positive alert, and returned with a search warrant. The ensuing search revealed 11 pounds of methamphetamine in Gutierrez’s home. A few months later, the Supreme Court held that the use of a drug-sniffing dog on an individual’s porch is a Fourth Amendment search. Gutierrez pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum, 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that under the 2011 Supreme Court decision, Davis v. United States, the evidence should not be suppressed if “binding appellate precedent specifically authorize[d]” the officers’ conduct at the time they acted. Seventh Circuit precedent did authorize the officers’ conduct. View "United States v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Charged with committing four drug-related robberies of Milwaukee pharmacies; having used a firearm in connection with the robberies; and having possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute, defendant was first represented by appointed counsel. He disagreed with how counsel proposed to handle the hearing on a motion to suppress and sought to discharge counsel and proceed pro se. He did not seek a continuance; nor did he object to the hearing being conducted by a magistrate. The magistrate responded that “this hearing will proceed with the defendant … represented by counsel. Following the hearing, the court will address the defendant’s motion to remove counsel and proceed pro se.” The hearing lasted nine hours; 12 witnesses testified. After the hearing, the magistrate granted the motion to discharge counsel, then mooted it with respect to the suppression hearing, denying defendant’s motion to reopen the hearing to present additional evidence. The magistrate recommended that the original motion to suppress, be denied. The district judge agreed with both recommendations. Defendant represented himself at trial and on appeal. He was sentenced to 780 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit vacated and ordered the court to hold a new hearing on the motion to suppress, allowing the defendant to represent himself. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Dewitt’s eye problems began in 2007 during his first incarceration at an Indiana Department of Corrections facility. Dewitt submitted the first of many Requests for Healthcare to Corizon stating something was wrong with his bloodshot left eye. After attempts to receive treatment from IDOC providers, Dewitt was released on parole in 2008. A doctor determined that Dewitt had a form of glaucoma and advised that he undergo laser-eye surgery to prevent future attacks. He underwent a surgical procedure on his right eye. His left eye continued to have higher than normal intra-ocular pressure. Dewitt was again incarcerated in 2009 and filed another Request for Healthcare. After several more attempts to obtain care, in 2012, he underwent surgery to remove part of his left eye’s ciliary body. Dewitt filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting deliberately indifference to his glaucoma condition. The district court denied three requests for appointed counsel, finding that Dewitt’s claims were not overly complex or meritorious. The district court ultimately entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motions for recruitment of counsel and that those denials affected Dewitt’s ability to develop and litigate his case. View "DeWitt v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law