Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Javell, the owner of a mortgage brokerage, and Arroyo, Javell’s employee and loan processor, were convicted of two counts of mortgage-based wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343) based on their actions in procuring a fraudulent mortgage during an FBI sting operation. Javell was sentenced to 12 months and one day in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Javell argued the district court violated Bruton, and Javell’s Sixth Amendment rights by admitting the post-arrest statements made by Arroyo and by failing to properly instruct the jury about the rules of non-imputation. According to Javell, Arroyo’s post-arrest statements directly implicated Javell and had the jury not heard those statements, Javell would not have been convicted. Noting a “plethora” of other evidence, including recordings, the court rejected the argument.

During unrelated federal civil litigation against Illinois Department of Corrections officials, Eichwedel, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed motions for sanctions that the district court denied as “frivolous.” The state revoked six months of Eichwedel’s good-conduct credits. Illinois law establishes penalties for prisoners who file frivolous motions in litigation against the state, 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). A state trial court denied relief; the appellate court declined review. Rejecting a federal habeas petition, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court never has recognized a First Amendment right to file frivolous motions and that the revocation of Eichwedel’s credit was supported by “some evidence in the record.” The Seventh Circuit held that the district court correctly disposed of the right-of-access claim, but certified to the Supreme Court of Illinois the question: As of the date Mr. Eichwedel’s state court challenge to the revocation of his good-conduct credits became final, was the State required to establish, in order to revoke a prisoner’s good-conduct credit, either that the court making the finding of frivolousness had determined specifically that the filing satisfied one of the definitions of frivolousness in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) or that the court had otherwise made its intent to invoke 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) known?

Capeheart is a tenured Justice Studies professor at Northeastern Illinois University and an outspoken critic of the university on a number of issues, including its failure to hire more Latino professors and its willingness to host military and CIA recruiters at campus job fairs. She claims that university officials have defamed her, refused to make her department chair, and denied her an award (among other things) because of her speech. In her 42 U.S.C. l983 claim, she sued University President Hahs and Provost Frank, asking for an injunction against future retaliation, and damages under Illinois law. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the federal claims as unripe. The prospect of retaliation by Hahs or Frank is no more than conjecture. The district court incorrectly reached the merits of Capeheart’s federal claim.

In 2001, Hall was convicted in state court of murdering his stepson. Shortly after his verdict came down, Hall discovered that one of his jurors had a son that was a fellow inmate of his. Before his trial, the juror’s son informed the juror that Hall was likely innocent, but during the trial, the juror found out that his son and several co-inmates changed their mind about Hall, and thought him guilty. The juror relayed this information to several jurors. The state court rejected Hall’s motion to correct error, and Hall was denied relief on direct appeal. After unsuccessfully seeking collateral relief in Indiana, Hall filed a federal habeas petition, arguing that the state should have carried the burden of proving that the extraneous information that reached his jury was not prejudicial. The district court granted the petition. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the state court violated a clearly established constitutional right, but did not adequately address the issue of prejudice. The district court erred in presuming prejudice.

A class of persons required to register on the state’s online sex and violent offender database sued the Indiana Department of Correction, alleging that failure to provide any procedure to correct errors in the registry violates due process. In response, the DOC created a new policy to give notice to current prisoners about their pending registry listings and an opportunity to challenge the information. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that the new policy was sufficient to comply with due process. The new procedures still fail to provide any process at all for an entire class of registrants: those who are not incarcerated. The Seventh Circuit reversed. State judicial post-deprivation remedies cited by the DOC are insufficient to meet the requirements of due process. Although registrants can challenge registry errors in the course of criminal prosecutions for failure to comply with registration requirements, due process does not require a person to risk additional criminal conviction as the price of correcting an erroneous listing, especially where a simple procedural fix is available much earlier.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and sexual exploitation of a child, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2251(a), and was sentenced to 420 months, reserving the right to appeal the legality of the search of his computer. The warrant affidavit said that authorities had discovered that a pornographic video, which a 13- year-girl had made of herself and uploaded to the Internet, had been downloaded to a computer at defendant’s home and that images from that video had been uploaded from that computer to an image-sharing website. A Facebook message with a link to that website had been sent to the girl’s stepmother from the same computer. Authorities identified the computer’s Internet Protocol address as registered to the defendant. Defendant argued that the facts were stale and that there was no reason to believe that seven months after he had uploaded child pornography there would still be evidence of the crime on his computer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Staleness is highly relevant to the legality of a search for a perishable or consumable object, like cocaine, but rarely relevant to a computer file. Computers and computer equipment are “not the type of evidence that rapidly dissipates or degrades.”

Defendant gave an informer for the federal Drug Enforcement Administration $477,020 for 32 kilograms of what he thought was cocaine. After arresting him officers searched his apartment, with assistance and written consent from his 18-year-old niece, and found 13 kilograms of real cocaine. Defendant's niece had access to the apartment to assist defendant with child care.No charges were based on the real cocaine. He pled guilty to attempting to possess cocaine and intending to distribute it and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. His plea agreement provided that he could challenge the search, based on an apparent belief that he might be acquitted of attempted possession if the real cocaine were kept out of the case. The judge denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The police had a reasonable belief that the niece was authorized to consent to the search.

Plaintiffs were convicted of sex crimes and completed their sentences years ago, but remain in state custody as civil detainees under Illinois’ Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1-99. They filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging constitutional problems with the conditions of their confinement. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Commitment under the Act is civil and may be for purposes such as incapacitation and treatment, but not punishment. Generally persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. Limitations imposed on their ability to interact with other detainees are justified by security concerns, even if not imposed by treatment professionals. Not allowing detainees to communicate by letter using the facility’s internal mail system does not impinge on a constitutional right or constitute punishment.

Convicted of fraud, tax, and money laundering offenses, Swanson failed to appear for his sentencing hearing, but was apprehended as a fugitive in Seattle the next month. His presentence report recommended a four-level U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a) enhancement for his status as an organizer-leader of criminal activity, driving his total offense level to 34 with a 151-188 month guideline range. Swanson’s trial counsel filed 13 pages of objections, including that the evidence revealed there was no criminal organization and to use of the 2001 guidelines. On remand, the court imposed a 151-month sentence. Swanson alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his trial counsel abandoned a poorly developed but winning objection to the enhancement. The district court rejected the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trial counsel raised the objection twice and did not withdraw it; his performance was not objectively deficient. Appellate counsel failed to raise the issue on direct appeal.

In 1999, Hill was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court found that each of Hill’s prior convictions (attempted murder; two aggravated battery) qualified as a career-offender “crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1), and a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i) and imposed a sentence of 276 months. He filed two unsuccessful petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging ineffective assistance, two unsuccessful petitions to modify his sentence, 18 U.S.C. 3582, then filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 224, claiming that his classification as a career offender and armed career criminal was erroneous and that he was “innocent” of the sentence enhancements imposed. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While noting that Hill’s conviction under the Illinois battery statute, 720 ILCS 5/12-3, qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the ACCA, the court held that the petition failed because Hill could not establish that the 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective.