Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee in a Wisconsin county jail, was subjected to a pat down and strip search by defendant, a guard. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the guard spent five to seven seconds gratuitously fondling plaintiff’s testicles and penis through the plaintiff’s clothing and, while strip searching him, fondled his nude testicles for two or three seconds, contrary to jail policy and without any justification. The guard denies the allegations. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the guard. He acknowledged that because the parties’ factual disputes could not be resolved on summary judgment he had to “presume that the defendant grabbed the plaintiff’s genitals in a way that was not related to penological interests,” but concluded that plaintiff had “presented evidence of only de minimis injury,” had “suffered at most an assault and battery,” and had presented no evidence concerning defendant’s “subjective intent.” The Seventh Circuit reversed. Excessive force is not the only means by which a prisoner’s civil rights can be violated.

Petitioner, convicted of robbery and forgery in state court, filed a state court motion challenging his sentence. The motion was denied, as was his request for appointed counsel. The federal district court rejected a habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The motion to correct petitioner’s sentence was not a motion pursuant to Ind. Code 35-38-1-15 but a collateral attack on his sentence. Therefore, he had no constitutional right to counsel.

Reeves was arrested for his role in a heroine distribution ring. Prior to trial, the government informed the court and Reeves that it would seek an enhancement (21 U.S.C. 851) of any sentence resulting from a guilty because Reeves had, in 2004, pleaded guilty in Illinois state court to possession and sale of cocaine. He was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and 843. Reeves objected to the enhancement, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that the attorney representing him during his 2004 guilty plea did not inform him that a guilty plea could be used against him later to trigger a statutory sentencing enhancement in federal court. The court applied the enhancement and sentenced Reeves to 25 years in prison to run concurrently with a separate, lesser sentence of 8 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It was not unreasonable for Reeves’ attorney in the 2004 proceedings to fail to advise his client that a guilty plea could result in a later sentencing enhancement for a future crime.

Levin worked as an Illinois Assistant Attorney General from 2000, until his termination in 2006. Levin was over the age of 60 at the time of his termination and believes he was fired because of his age and gender. He was replaced by a woman in her 30s. He brought claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied a motion to dismiss the individual-capacity defendants on grounds of qualified immunity with respect to Levin’s section 1983 age discrimination claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. At the time of the alleged wrongdoing, it was clearly established that age discrimination in employment violates the Equal Protection Clause. Although age is not a suspect classification, states may not discriminate on that basis if such discrimination is not “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Whether the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs suffering age discrimination in employment is irrelevant; a constitutional right was clearly established.

Thompson was murdered in 2001. Carter was 16 years old and Thompson was 19. No fingerprint, DNA, or physical evidence connected the murder to Carter, or to anyone else. Detectives picked up Carter and took her to the police station. She was not given Miranda warnings; no one told her that she was free to leave. Carter was effectively without any legal guardian. She was allowed to speak to her father for a few minutes and was given food and drink and eventually released. A few hours after Carter’s release, her apartment building caught fire. The cause was arson, and the fire started in the apartment where Carter and Thompson lived. Police again took Carter to the station, with no adult, and without stating her rights. A third trip to the station resulted in a stay of 55 hours. Carter was allowed to move around freely and was provided with necessities; she changed her story several times. She eventually received Miranda warnings, spoke to her parents, and confessed to the murder. She was convicted and sentenced to 30 years. The district court denied her petition for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was adequate evidence to conclude that the confession was voluntary.

The Church holds a festival, open to the public, without charge, and obtains a Chicago permit to close portions of streets to vehicles. For the 2008 festival, the parish used a team of paid security guards and volunteer off-duty police officers (parishioners), headed by Kolasinski, a parishioner and Chicago police officer. Members of another church (Garfield) attended the festival to conduct ministry. Its pastor (Teesdale) carried a bullhorn; others carried signs with Scripture verses. The group distributed gospel tracts. Kolasinski, off-duty, wearing a shirt that read “St. Symphorosa Police,” told Teesdale that he could not use a bullhorn or distribute literature without permission. Teesdale attempted to use the bullhorn. Kolasinski handcuffed Teesdale and stated that he was under arrest. Police arrived 30 minutes later. Teesdale was arrested for trespass, a charge eventually dismissed. Teesdale, and others alleged violations of First and Fourth Amendment rights and sought to enjoin the city from preventing attendance at future festivals. A court order permitted Garfield members to enter the festival during specific hours with limitations on the size of signs and a prohibition on sound-enhancement. The 2009 festival passed without incident. The court ruled in favor of the city, but found that First Amendment rights at future festivals were threatened by official policy. The Seventh Circuit remanded that holding for dismissal, based on lack of standing.

Cotts was injured in 2004 while incarcerated. He complained of intense pain, and was diagnosed with an inguinal hernia, two inches in diameter, pushing into his groin. Cotts visited the health unit 16 times and stated that pain was interfering with walking, sleeping, and using the restroom. Care providers manually shoved it back. Cotts testified that this procedure was painful and that often the hernia popped back out. Cotts claims that a doctor told him that regardless of pain, he would not have surgery because the hernia was reducible. On parole, he was admitted to the emergency room with “unbearable” pain. There was no surgery; Cotts could not pay. Cotts was arrested for parole violation and sent to a different facility, where the doctor told him his hernia necessitated surgery. It was the size of a grapefruit in his groin and a small grapefruit in his right scrotum. He was transferred again and returned repeatedly to the health care unit but was denied surgery. In February 2007, Cotts had surgery. Cotts filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Despite an agreement by the parties, the district court used jury instructions that suggested that “cruel and unusual punishment” was an independent element of liability beyond showing deliberate indifference to serious medical need and that damages were an element of liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the misleading instructions prejudiced Cotts.

Alexander, a criminal defense attorney, alleged that a local prosecutor, McKinney, conspired with FBI agents to manufacture false evidence and bring trumped-up charges of conspiracy to commit bribery against him. Alexander had frequently criticized McKinney. A jury acquitted Alexander of the charges, and he sued McKinney for violating his due process rights. The district court dismissed, finding McKinney entitled to qualified immunity because the complaint did not identify a deprivation of a cognizable constitutional right. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Alexander’s complaint was merely an attempt to recast an untimely false arrest claim into a due process claim. The Fourth Amendment, not the due process clause, is the proper basis for challenging the lawfulness of an arrest. The Supreme Court has made it clear that a substantive due process claim may not be maintained where a specific constitutional provision protects the right at issue.

Garvey was convicted of four counts of distributing methamphetamine. The evidence at trial included testimony from a crime lab analyst, Nied, who testified that four plastic bags recovered from controlled buys at Garvey’s apartment contained methamphetamine. Nied was not the analyst who actually conducted lab tests on the white substance found in the bags—that analyst had left to take another job, and was not called as a witness. Nied was a supervisor at the same lab and had peer reviewed the analyst’s work. Garvey did not object to Nied’s testimony at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Garvey’s argument under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Garvey did not demonstrate that any alleged error affected his substantial rights.

Mosley was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated arson and was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 60 years on the murder charge and 15 years on the arson charge. After exhausting post-conviction remedies in Illinois state courts, Mosley filed a habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The district court granted his petition and directed the State to release Mosley unless within 30 days it either filed an appeal or announced its intention to retry him. The Seventh Circuit vacated, first rejecting a challenge to its jurisdiction. The court agreed that, assuming the accuracy of the original trial record and the affidavits of two potential alibi witnesses whom Mosley’s defense lawyer did not call to testify, Mosley’s lawyer provided ineffective assistance. The state appellate court’s decision that Mosley was not denied effective assistance of counsel was contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The district court, however, heard additional evidence that contradicted the affidavits, but did not make findings on that evidence. The court remanded for determination of whether, based on new evidence not available to the state appellate court, Mosley’s trial counsel was in fact constitutionally ineffective.